Smith v. Colorado Supreme Court (In Re Smith) , 287 F. App'x 683 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 24, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
In re: DAVID L. SMITH, a/k/a David
Lee Smith, a/k/a David Smith; M.
JULIA HOOK, a/k/a Mary Julia Hook,
a/k/a Julia Hook,
Debtors, No. 08-1030
___________________________ (D. Colorado)
DAVID L. SMITH, (BAP No. CO-07-028)
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COLORADO SUPREME COURT,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellant David L. Smith, an attorney, was a debtor in a Chapter 11
bankruptcy action in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Colorado. In his bankruptcy action he filed a complaint against the Colorado
Supreme Court, challenging his disbarment by that court and seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief that would restore his privileges as a licensed attorney in that
state. On motion by the Colorado Supreme Court, the bankruptcy court dismissed
the complaint, holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the
decision of the Colorado court under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923). Mr. Smith appealed to the United States Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel of the Tenth Circuit (BAP), which affirmed the dismissal. He now appeals
the BAP’s decision. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), we affirm.
The doctrine that has become known as Rooker-Feldman recognizes that
the lower federal courts have no authority to review the final judgments of state
courts. As we have explained:
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is the product of two Supreme Court
cases interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). Section 1257(a) provides
that “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a
State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.” The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
is the negative inference of § 1257(a): if appellate review of state
court judgments is vested in the United States Supreme Court, it
follows that review is not vested in lower federal courts. Section
1257(a) thus implicitly deprives lower federal courts of subject
matter jurisdiction to entertain cases that would entail review of
decisions rendered by state courts.
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Crutchfield v. Countrywide Home Loans, 389 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 2004),
abrogated in part on other grounds by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005). This doctrine applies to suits challenging state-court
decisions regarding admission to that state’s bar. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 479.
The facts of Feldman itself closely resemble those of Mr. Smith’s case. In
Feldman two attorneys who had been denied admission to the District of
Columbia Bar after seeking waiver of its requirements brought suit in federal
district court, asking the court to order the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
to permit them to sit for the bar examination. 460 U.S. at 465–73. The Supreme
Court held that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the
District of Columbia court’s denial of their petitions. Id. at 482.
Despite the striking similarity between his case and Feldman, Mr. Smith
makes three arguments that Rooker-Feldman does not bar his claim, all of which
we find unavailing. First, he contends that the relief he seeks—“declaratory and
prospective injunctive relief, and reinstatement or readmission to the Colorado
bar”—would not overturn the state court judgment. Aplt. Br. at 11–12. We
disagree. As the BAP explained: “This is a distinction without a difference.
Even if [Mr. Smith] seeks only prospective relief, the bankruptcy court could not
grant that relief without reversing the Supreme Court’s order of disbarment.”
Aplee. Supp. App. at 190.
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Second, Mr. Smith argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because the
Colorado Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over the disciplinary
proceedings against him. Smith has cited no authority, and we have found none,
for the proposition that there is a general exception to Rooker-Feldman when the
state court is alleged to have acted without jurisdiction. Even if the Colorado
Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to decide Smith’s case, a highly dubious
proposition, Smith’s exclusive avenue for federal-court relief was nevertheless a
petition to the United States Supreme Court.
Finally, Smith quotes Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco), 226 F.3d 1103, 1110
(10th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
bar a federal action, when the plaintiff . . . lacked a reasonable opportunity to
litigate claims in the state court.” We have previously rejected this very
interpretation of Johnson. See Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 478
(10th Cir. 2002), abrogated in part on other grounds by Exxon Mobil Corp., 544
U.S. 280, and by Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006). As we pointed out in
Kenmen, the plaintiff in Johnson was not a party to the original state-court action;
Johnson did not recognize a general “full and fair opportunity” requirement in the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 478–79. We reaffirmed that Rooker-Feldman
applies “regardless of whether the state-court proceeding afforded the
federal-court plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims.” Id. at
478. “[C]onsideration of whether a federal-court plaintiff lacked an opportunity
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to previously litigate her claims in a state-court proceeding is only relevant
insofar as it informs the analysis of whether the federal-court plaintiff is a
‘non-party’ . . . .” Id. at n.9.
The bankruptcy court and the BAP were correct in concluding that
Mr. Smith’s claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We AFFIRM the
judgment of the BAP.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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