Rayner v. Reeves (Reeves) , 502 F. App'x 776 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                  FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS       Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                  November 21, 2012
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    ARTHUR JAMES REEVES, member Art
    Reeves, member Art Reeves Builders
    LLC, member Mountain View Design &
    Build LLC,
    No. 11-1574
    Debtor.                                    (No. 11-035-CO)
    (B.A.P.)
    -------------------------------------------------
    LAWRENCE RAYNER and SALLY
    RAYNER,
    Plaintiffs–Appellees,
    v.
    ARTHUR JAMES REEVES,
    Defendant–Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *      0F
    Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
    estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    Arthur James Reeves appeals an order of the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy
    Appellate Panel (“BAP”) denying his motion for extension of time to a file a notice
    of appeal. We affirm.
    I
    This appeal arises out of a proceeding brought in 2009 by Lawrence Rayner
    and Sally Rayner (the “Rayners”) against Reeves to establish the non-
    dischargeability of two debts. Since 2001, the parties have been involved in lengthy
    civil litigation in Wisconsin state court concerning construction work Reeves had
    performed on the Rayners’ home. Because of the parties’ familiarity with the
    underlying facts, we only summarize them here.
    The Rayners sought to except two debts from Reeves’ bankruptcy discharge: a
    debt for criminal restitution that stemmed from Reeves’ guilty plea to felony theft by
    contractor, of which the Rayners were victims (“Criminal Restitution”); and a debt
    arising from a judgment entered in favor of the Rayners by a Wisconsin state court
    (the “Wisconsin Judgment”).
    With respect to the discharge of Criminal Restitution, Reeves asserted as an
    affirmative defense that the matter was being appealed in Wisconsin state court. This
    representation to the bankruptcy court was false. Reeves ultimately admitted that the
    Criminal Restitution was non-dischargeable, and the bankruptcy court consequently
    granted the Rayners’ summary judgment motion excepting the Criminal Restitution.
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    In December 2010, the Rayners similarly moved for summary judgment on the
    dischargeability of the Wisconsin Judgment on the basis that Reeves made false
    representations to the Rayners and caused them to sustain losses. Reeves had
    convinced the Rayners during a prior state court action that he had no money or
    property from which a judgment could be satisfied. Based on these representations,
    the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the action on the condition that if any
    representations were false, the Rayners would be entitled to a judgment of $100,000.
    The Rayners later learned Reeves’ representations were indeed false, and judgment
    was entered against him. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the Wisconsin
    Judgment in October 2010, and the bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of the
    Rayners on June 3, 2011, declaring the Wisconsin Judgment non-dischargeable
    pursuant to 
    11 U.S.C. § 523
    (a)(2)(A).
    Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002, Reeves had until June 17, 2011 to file a notice
    of appeal of the bankruptcy court’s order. One day before the deadline, Reeves filed
    a motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal, requesting an extension until
    July 8, 2011. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, and the BAP affirmed. This
    appeal followed.
    II
    In an appeal from a BAP ruling, we review only the bankruptcy court’s
    decision. Miller v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. (In re Miller), 
    666 F.3d 1255
    ,
    1260 (10th Cir. 2012). Matters of law are reviewed de novo, and factual findings
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    made by the bankruptcy court are reviewed for clear error. 
    Id.
     We review the
    bankruptcy court’s decision to deny an extension of time under Rule 8002 for abuse
    of discretion. See Lang v. Lang (In re Lang), 
    414 F.3d 1191
    , 1194 (10th Cir. 2005);
    see also Lovelace v. Higgins (In re Higgins), 
    220 B.R. 1022
    , 1024 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.
    1998). We will not disturb the bankruptcy court’s decision unless it has “made a
    clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the
    circumstances.” Moothart v. Bell, 
    21 F.3d 1499
    , 1504 (10th Cir. 1994). “An abuse
    of discretion occurs when the [trial] court’s decision is arbitrary, capricious or
    whimsical, or results in a manifestly unreasonable judgment.” 
    Id. at 1504-05
    (quotation omitted).
    A notice of appeal from a bankruptcy court order must be filed with the clerk
    of the bankruptcy court “within 14 days of the date of the entry of the judgment,
    order, or decree appealed from.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a). However, a “bankruptcy
    judge may extend the time for filing the notice of appeal by any party” by an
    additional twenty-one days provided that the motion is filed within the original
    fourteen-day time period. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(c) (emphasis added). Because
    Reeves filed his motion for extension of time one day before his deadline to file a
    notice of appeal, his motion was filed within the original fourteen-day time period.
    As grounds for his request, Reeves stated that he was consulting with an
    attorney who handled bankruptcy appeals and that the attorney was reviewing
    Reeves’ file. He also stated that he resided in Crested Butte, Colorado, and was
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    referred to counsel in Grand Junction, Colorado. However, the bankruptcy court
    denied Reeves’ motion because the “litigation between the parties has lasted over
    10 years [and] [a]ny further delay would be an undue delay.” Pointing out that
    Reeves was a “seasoned litigator” familiar with the appellate process, the court
    concluded that the proceedings before the Wisconsin state court reflected a history of
    delay and that Reeves “[did] not set forth good cause” for his requested extension.
    On appeal, Reeves does not assert expressly that the bankruptcy court abused
    its discretion in denying his request for an extension of time. Instead, he advocates
    for use of the standard established by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
    in Nugent v. Betacom of Phoenix, Inc. (In re Betacom of Phoenix, Inc.), 
    250 B.R. 376
     (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000), to determine whether a motion for extension of time
    under Rule 8002(c) should be granted. The Ninth Circuit BAP considered the
    following factors:
    (1) whether the appellant is seeking the extension for a proper purpose;
    (2) whether the need for an extension would likely be met if the motion
    were granted; (3) the extent to which granting the motion would
    inconvenience the court and the appellee or would unduly delay the
    administration of the bankruptcy case; and (4) the extent to which the
    appellant would be harmed if the motion were denied.
    
    Id. at 381
     (footnotes omitted). Reeves applies these factors to his case and suggests
    that his motion for extension of time should be granted under Betacom.
    Regardless of his reliance on Betacom, Reeves fails to establish that the
    bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying his request for an extension of time.
    In Higgins, the Tenth Circuit BAP emphasized that the decision to grant or deny a
    -5-
    motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal in these circumstances is
    discretionary, noting that the use of the word “may” in Rule 8002(c) “clearly
    indicates that the court has discretion in passing on such motions.” 
    220 B.R. at 1025
    .
    “If such extensions were to be automatically granted, the rule would state ‘shall.’”
    
    Id.
     Moreover, in exercising its discretion, the bankruptcy court “considers the
    motion in light of the specific circumstances of each case.” 
    Id.
    While this court has not specified a standard by which to judge the merits of a
    motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal under Rule 8002(c), Higgins
    provides guidance and we decline to adopt the standard used by the Ninth Circuit
    BAP in Betacom. Review of the record supports the bankruptcy court’s findings that
    the litigation between the parties reflects a history of delay or abuse by Reeves and
    that Reeves is a seasoned litigator familiar with the appellate process. Further, apart
    from stating that he was consulting with an attorney, Reeves offers no basis for his
    request for an extension and does not attempt to explain any difficulties that
    prevented him from filing a timely notice of appeal. Moreover, we note that even
    under Betacom an extension of time may be denied if the appellant has an improper
    purpose, such as seeking an extension when there has been a history of delay or
    abuse. See 
    250 B.R. at
    381 n.5.
    III
    After careful review of the record, we cannot conclude that the factual findings
    of the bankruptcy court are clearly erroneous or that the denial of Reeves’ motion for
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    extension of time constituted an abuse of discretion. We therefore AFFIRM the
    bankruptcy court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons as those stated in the
    BAP’s November 28, 2011 opinion.
    Entered for the Court
    Carlos F. Lucero
    Circuit Judge
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