Carrillo v. Wieland ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 11, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
ALFONSO A. CARRILLO, JANET
PINA, SERGIO HERNANDEZ,
GONZALO PEREZ, ESTELA PEREZ,
GERMAN JASSO BRUNO, JULIO
ARREGUIN, RAQUEL
BARRIENTOS, JORGE RAMIREZ,
MIGUEL ANGEL CAMPOS,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 12-1448
(D. Colorado)
RICHARD A. WIELAND, United (D.C. No. 1:12-CV-02680-WJM)
States Trustee for the District of
Colorado, in his official and individual
capacities, and JARROD MARTIN,
Deputy United States Trustee for the
District of Colorado, in his official
and individual capacities,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, ANDERSON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiffs, Alfonso A. Carrillo and a group of other individuals proceeding
pro se, 1 appeal the dismissal with prejudice of their complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. The defendants are Richard A.
Wieland, the United States Trustee for the District of Colorado, and Jarrod
Martin, listed in the plaintiffs’ complaint as a “Deputy United States Trustee for
the District of Colorado,” a position which does not exist. Mr. Martin is
apparently actually a trial attorney in the Office of the United States Trustee in
the District of Colorado. We affirm.
As the defendants/Trustees have observed, the pertinent factual allegations,
whether gleaned from the Complaint, the appellants’ brief, or the record, are
“sparse.” Much of the plaintiffs’ factual allegations involve a woman,
Ms. Veronica Fernandez, who is not a plaintiff in this action. As averred in the
Complaint:
1
The other plaintiffs are Janet Pina, Sergio Hernandez, Gonzalo Perez,
Estela Perez, German Bruno, Julio Arreguin, Miguel Campos, Jorge Ramirez and
Raquel Barrientos. Six of the named plaintiffs list “1675 Carr St. Suite 220N in
Lakewood, CO 80214” as their mailing address. The other three list other
addresses (one in Lakewood, one in Brighton, and one in Denver) as their mailing
addresses.
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6.1.2 On or around August 2011, Mrs. Veronica Fernandez-
Beleta and her husband, Jose Leyva Caraveo contracted the non legal
services of America’s Home Retention Services, Inc. and Mr.
Alfonso Carrillo to locate a real estate property (a house) suitable for
claiming and occupation by means of Adverse Possession, to
eventually settle with the lien holder and outright own by and after
Quiet Title action, a truly Judicial acquisition.
Verified Compl. and Jury Demand at ¶ 6.1.2, R. Vol. 1 at 11. The Complaint
further stated that “[a]fter extensive research and forensic analysis on several
potential properties, it was found that the house at 5027 S. Mabre, Littleton CO
80123 . . . reunites of [sic] key elements for a successful acquisition via Adverse
Possession and Quiet Title action.” 2 Id. at ¶ 6.1.3.
As the Complaint additionally states, “[h]aving carefully considered the
aforementioned facts . . . , Plaintiff 3 Veronica Fernandez decided to exercise her
civil rights, liberties and immunities to acquire [the identified property] via
Adverse Possession and Quiet Title, rule 105 following Colorado law.” Id. at
¶ 6.1.10. After various forms were filed and other actions taken, Ms. Fernandez
“took legal possession of” the property. Id. at ¶ 6.1.11(B).
2
Among these “key” elements were: the property had been abandoned and
was vacant and neglected by previous owners; the owners had been found
“legally, physically and morally ‘Diseased’ of any right or interest” in the house;
the house had “maybe [been] involved in some sort of Mortgage Fraud by both
parties.” Compl. at ¶ 6.1.4, .5.
3
As indicated, Ms. Fernandez is not, actually, a listed plaintiff in this
action.
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In June of 2012, the “former” owners of the property apparently appeared
at the property and “verbally attacked the residents.” Id. at ¶ 6.1.11(F). Claims
and counter-claims were evidently filed, including an unsuccessful appeal to the
Colorado Court of Appeals. Facing an eviction notice posted on her door,
Ms. Fernandez “opted for filing for Bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7.” Id.
at ¶ 6.1.11(O). An automatic stay was granted, thereby bringing to a halt any
eviction proceedings against the plaintiffs.
As indicated, the instant action was filed against Mr. Wieland, the United
States Trustee in the District of Colorado, and Mr. Martin, a trial attorney in that
office. The Complaint styles itself as a “Civil Rights Complaint brought by
Plaintiffs seeking to obtain immediate and permanent relief to the injuries
sustained by Plaintiffs, as well as remedies, reparation of damages and punitive
penalties in law and/or equity against Defendants.” Id. at 1.1. The Complaint
further contains somewhat random and disorganized references to various
statutes: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983, 1985, 3603, 3604, and 3617. It similarly
refers to the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, but with no specific connection between any act or
action and the violation of a law, or between any violation and any particular
harm suffered by plaintiffs.
-4-
The district court began its “Order Dismissing Case Sua Sponte for Failure
to State a Claim upon Which Relief Could be Granted” by noting that, under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte “when it is
‘patently obvious’ that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts as alleged, and
allowing him an opportunity to amend his complaint would be futile.” Order at 1
(quoting Hall v. Belmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)). The court then
applied that standard to plaintiffs’ Complaint.
The court observed that plaintiffs had “sued Defendants in both their
official and personal capacities.” Id. at 2. Since claims brought against a
governmental officer in his official capacity are essentially claims brought against
the governmental entity itself, they are barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Pleasant v.
Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 793 (10th Cir. 1989). As the district court noted,
defendants are trustees for the United States Bankruptcy Courts; accordingly,
plaintiffs’ official capacity claims against defendants are essentially brought
against the United States. Those claims are thus barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
Plaintiffs’ claims brought against the defendants in their personal capacities
fare no better. These claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.
Judges have absolute immunity from civil liability for judicial acts, unless those
acts were clearly in absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
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349, 357 (1978). This immunity may extend to others who are not judges where
the performance of judicial acts or activities as an official aide of the judge is
involved. Henriksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852, 855 (10th Cir. 1981). “[A]bsolute
judicial immunity has been extended to non-judicial officers where ‘their duties
had an integral relationship with the judicial process.’” Whitesel v.
Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 867 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Eades v. Sterlinske,
810 F.2d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 1987).
Furthermore, judicial immunity has been specifically extended to apply to
trustees in bankruptcy proceedings. Gregory v. United States Bankr. Ct., 942
F.2d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs have made no allegation that the
defendants exceeded the role of trustee or otherwise acted outside the scope of
their authority. And we agree with the district court that, because plaintiffs’
claims are barred by judicial immunity, amendment of the complaint would be
futile. 4
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in the district
court’s order, we agree that plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim upon which
4
Besides the application of the doctrine of immunity to plaintiffs’ claims,
their pleadings and filings are sparse and articulate no coherent legal theory and
set of facts to support any claim.
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relief could be granted. We therefore AFFIRM the dismissal of the complaint
with prejudice. 5
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
5
The appellees’ motion to strike certain exhibits is before us. The exhibits
had no effect on our disposition in this case, and the motion is denied.
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