Lane v. Lane ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                                 FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         May 10, 2016
    _________________________________
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    ROBERT M. LANE,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                        No. 15-8092
    (D.C. No. 2:15-CV-00061-ABJ)
    DR. VIKKI L. LANE; MR. BRUCE                                (D. Wyo.)
    GLESBY; MS. MARISA BEUOY;
    GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    _________________________________
    Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Proceeding pro se, Robert Lane appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
    claims for lack of standing. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
    affirm.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
    estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    I
    After Vikki and Robert Lane reached a divorce settlement, Robert1 filed for
    bankruptcy. As part of the bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy trustee (the
    “Trustee”) initiated three adversary proceedings to recover assets that Robert had
    conveyed to affiliated trusts, shell companies, and family members. Eventually,
    Robert and the Trustee reached a global settlement resulting in the dismissal of the
    three adversary proceedings. The settlement provided that Robert and his affiliates
    would turn over all estate property, with certain exceptions, for disposition by the
    Trustee. Robert also agreed that following execution of the agreement, he
    shall not have any standing to object, join, or otherwise be heard on any
    matter or proceeding in any pending or future matter in connection with
    administering [his] Bankruptcy Case; this shall include, but not be
    limited to, approval of settlements, sale of assets, allowance or payment
    of administrative expenses, and allowance or payment of claims.
    He also agreed that he “shall not have standing or any right to pursue pre-petition
    claims or causes of action against any third-party or against any creditor in [his]
    bankruptcy case.” However, Robert later interfered with the Trustee’s ability to
    administer the estate by filing various documents in the bankruptcy court and
    otherwise failed to satisfy his own obligations under the agreement. Accordingly, the
    bankruptcy court sanctioned him twice for interfering with the Trustee’s ability to
    administer the estate and for failing to satisfy his own obligations.
    1
    Because Vikki and Robert Lane share the same last name, we refer to them
    by their first names in this order.
    2
    In 2012, Vikki filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding for
    $1,163,894, and, in April 2015, the Trustee filed a settlement agreement in the
    bankruptcy court to resolve her claim. In response, Robert filed this action in the
    District of Wyoming against Vikki and her attorneys. Although his complaint seeks
    damages for false statements and fraud, each claim he advances constitutes a
    challenge to the resolution of Vikki’s proof of claim. Specifically, he alleges fraud
    because the defendants: (1) filed a “false claim”; (2) asserted that their proof of
    claim is for child support when in actuality it includes legal fees and other items; (3)
    claimed a 10% interest rate, rather than the 7% rate he argues is permitted by the U.S.
    Bankruptcy Court; (4) asked for penalties for past due child support even though
    California waives penalties for unemployed individuals; (5) claimed a spousal
    support buyout “when there was none”; (6) failed to properly account for certain
    payments; (7) requested legal fees that the court had not awarded and that were
    contrary to a prenuptial agreement; and (8) conspired to make false statements in an
    attempt to obtain bankruptcy assets. He also alleges that attorney-defendants’ law
    firm failed to properly supervise them by allowing them to participate in the alleged
    fraud. In his complaint, Robert acknowledges that he only pursued this action in the
    district court because “[a]lthough this matter would normally be a bankruptcy court
    proceeding, Robert’s lack of standing in the bankruptcy court requires this matter to
    be brought in U.S. District Court.”
    The defendants moved to dismiss Robert’s complaint. While the motion was
    pending, the bankruptcy court approved the proposed settlement between Vikki and
    3
    the Trustee allowing her to claim $895,015. The defendants filed a supplemental
    memorandum, asserting that the settlement rendered the district court proceeding
    moot, and advancing a res judicata defense. The district court granted the motion to
    dismiss, concluding that Robert did not have standing because he waived standing in
    the global settlement agreement, and even if he had not waived the issue, the claims
    he asserted rightfully belong to the Trustee. The district court order did not discuss
    mootness or res judicata. This appeal followed.
    II
    The district court determined it did not have subject matter jurisdiction
    because Robert lacked standing.2 We review the district court’s determination
    regarding subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Niemi v. Lasshofer, 
    770 F.3d 1331
    ,
    1344 (10th Cir. 2014). As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, Robert bears the
    burden of establishing standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 561
    (1992). To meet his burden, he must show an “injury in fact.” Clapper v. Amnesty
    Int’l USA, 
    133 S. Ct. 1138
    , 1147 (2013). And “each element must be supported in
    2
    The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing. In the
    bankruptcy context, we often apply a prudential standing requirement that “is more
    stringent . . . than the case or controversy standing requirement of Article III.” In re
    C.W. Mining Co., 
    636 F.3d 1257
    , 1260 n.5 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).
    Under Article III, a cognizable injury “need not be financial and need only be fairly
    traceable to the alleged illegal action.” In re Alpex Comput. Corp., 
    71 F.3d 353
    , 357
    n.6 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). In contrast, in the bankruptcy context an
    appellant must be a “person aggrieved” to have prudential standing, as discussed
    infra. 
    Id. However, the
    distinction is immaterial in the matter before us: the only
    injury Robert advances is a financial injury that would allegedly result from payment
    of Vikki’s claim. Thus, if Robert’s alleged injury is insufficient to show standing
    under the prudential “person aggrieved” standard, see infra, he also fails to show
    standing under the jurisdictional Article III standard.
    4
    the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof,
    i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
    litigation.” 
    Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561
    . At the pleading stage, “[t]hreadbare recitals of
    the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
    suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009).
    We agree with the district court that Robert lacks standing.3 Each of his
    claims alleges that Vikki’s claim on the bankruptcy estate was fraudulent in some
    way. Claims of fraud against a bankruptcy estate “are statutory causes of action
    belonging to the trustee, not to the bankrupt, and the trustee asserts them for the
    benefit of the bankrupt’s creditors, whose rights the trustee enforces.” Allegaert v.
    Perot, 
    548 F.2d 432
    , 436 (2d Cir. 1977). The debtor is not injured by such alleged
    fraud because, “[u]nless the estate is solvent and excess will eventually go to the
    debtor, or unless the matter involves rights unique to the debtor, the debtor is not a
    party aggrieved by orders affecting the administration of the bankruptcy estate.” In
    re Weston, 
    18 F.3d 860
    , 863-64 (10th Cir. 1994). Robert’s argument to the contrary
    3
    Even if Robert demonstrated standing, his complaint amounts to an attempt
    to circumvent the bankruptcy court proceedings. “It is for the court of first instance
    to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed
    for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its orders based on
    its decision are to be respected.” Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 
    514 U.S. 300
    , 313
    (1995) (quotation omitted). Thus, if Robert believes the decisions of the bankruptcy
    court are improper, the proper venues to challenge those decisions are the bankruptcy
    court and a federal district court or a bankruptcy appellate panel through a direct
    appeal. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 158. Robert instead agreed not to object in the
    bankruptcy proceedings. His attempt to collaterally attack those proceedings “cannot
    be permitted . . . without seriously undercutting the orderly process of law.” 
    Celotex, 514 U.S. at 313
    .
    5
    rests on his bare conclusory assertions that if Vikki’s claim was not paid, the money
    would “otherwise be his.”4 These conclusory statements are not sufficient to
    demonstrate an injury to support standing to challenge the administration of the
    bankruptcy estate.5
    III
    The district court’s dismissal for lack of standing is AFFIRMED. Robert’s
    motion to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED.
    Entered for the Court
    Carlos F. Lucero
    Circuit Judge
    4
    In contrast to these bare assertions is Robert’s own concession that he lacks
    standing in the bankruptcy proceedings. In particular, he agreed that he “shall not
    have any standing to object, join, or otherwise be heard on any matter or proceeding
    in any pending or future matter in connection with administering [his] Bankruptcy
    Case; this shall include . . . approval of settlements . . . and allowance or payment of
    claims.” We reject Robert’s contention that his complaint does not concern the
    bankruptcy court’s approval of settlements and allowance or payment of claims. To
    the contrary, the claims brought in this action fall squarely within the scope of his
    concession in the settlement agreement. Our holding finds support in—but does not
    depend on—this concession.
    5
    Robert also argues that the district court abused its discretion by entertaining
    the defendant’s supplemental memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss
    without allowing Robert to file a reply. Robert does not convincingly argue that
    accepting a supplemental memorandum, without more, amounts to an abuse of discretion.
    See United States v. Nicholson, 
    983 F.2d 983
    , 988 (10th Cir. 1993) (“District courts
    generally are afforded great discretion regarding trial procedure applications
    (including control of the docket and parties), and their decisions are reviewed only
    for abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted)).
    6