Case: 18-10427 Date Filed: 09/11/2018 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-10427
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:17-cv-00570-JSM-PRL
TERRY A. BURLISON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PAM ANGUS,
individually and in her capacity as a Marion County Deputy Clerk,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(September 11, 2018)
Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Terry Burlison appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his pro se1
civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which he sought monetary damages
against Pam Angus, a Marion County, Florida, deputy clerk of court. His suit
alleges that she issued a writ of possession without judicial authority in favor of his
landlords in a state court dispossessory action, which, in turn, caused him to be
evicted from his residence in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. He argues that the district court committed
procedural error when it sua sponte dismissed his § 1983 complaint with prejudice
without first notifying him of its intent to do so and without giving him an
opportunity to respond.
We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for abuse of discretion. See
Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S.,
631 F.3d 1321, 1335–36 (11th Cir. 2011). In doing so, we
review de novo any underlying questions of law in a district court’s dismissal of a
complaint for failure to state a claim. Mitchell v. Farcass,
112 F.3d 1483, 1490
(11th Cir. 1997).
Prior to dismissing a civil action sua sponte, a court normally must provide
the plaintiff “with notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond.”
Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found.,
789 F.3d 1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2015). “An
1
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorney and
will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
Cir. 1998).
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exception to this requirement exists, however, when amending the complaint
would be futile, or when the complaint is patently frivolous.”
Id. A district court
may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim based upon an affirmative
defense “when the defense is an obvious bar given the allegations,” even if the
defendant has not asserted the defense. Sibley v. Lando,
437 F.3d 1067, 1070 n.2
(11th Cir. 2005).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that
Burlison’s complaint was patently frivolous because its central claim was
obviously barred by judicial immunity, which is a recognized defense to liability
under section 1983. See Bolin v. Story,
225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000).
While court clerks are not entitled to absolute immunity from claims for equitable
relief, which Burlison has not sought, they do “have absolute immunity from
actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically required to do under
court order or at a judge’s direction.” Tarter v. Hury,
646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir.
Unit A June 1981); see also Roland v. Phillips,
19 F.3d 552, 556 n.4 (11th Cir.
1994) (stating that when a court official “acts pursuant to a direct judicial order,
absolute quasi-judicial immunity is obvious”). And court clerks are entitled to
qualified immunity from all other actions for damages.
Tarter, 646 F.2d at 1013.
The district court correctly concluded that Burlison’s claim against Angus
was patently frivolous, and therefore could be dismissed without notice and an
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opportunity to respond. Angus, as a deputy clerk of court, was entitled to absolute
judicial immunity on Burlison’s claim for money damages, because, in issuing the
challenged writ of possession in favor of Burlison’s landlords, she was following a
direct order of a Marion County, Florida, judge. See
Tarter, 646 F.2d at 1013.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of
Burlison’s suit.
AFFIRMED.
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