United States v. Real Property , 589 F. App'x 496 ( 2014 )

Case: 14-10968 Date Filed: 12/31/2014 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-10968
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cv-02961-WMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
REAL PROPERTY,
known as 420 Sterling Park Circle, Alabaster, Shelby
County, Alabama, and all fixtures and appurtenances
thereon,
Defendant,
CHRISTOPHER LINTON,
Claimant,
FLEMING BROOKS,
Claimant-Appellee,
IBERIABANK,
Claimant-Appellant.
Case: 14-10968 Date Filed: 12/31/2014 Page: 2 of 4
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(December 31, 2014)
Before WILSON and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and CONWAY, * District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:
The United States initiated this civil forfeiture action to acquire real property
obtained by Christopher Linton through proceeds from allegedly fraudulent
activity. In the course of the proceedings below, the parties agreed to an
interlocutory sale of the subject property conditioned on claimant Fleming Brooks’
assertion that he was an innocent owner of the property. On May 1, 2013, the
district court entered a consent order on interlocutory sale, permitting sale of the
property but subjecting the proceeds of the sale to the court’s future ruling on
priority. Brooks moved for summary judgment based on his claim as an innocent
owner; however, instead of substantively responding, claimant Iberiabank
requested that the district court stay the federal proceedings pending resolution of
an appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court of a state court order denying
Iberiabank’s request to intervene in a related reformation action. The district court
*
Honorable Anne C. Conway, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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ultimately denied Iberiabank’s motion to stay and granted Brooks’ motion for
summary judgment. The district court found that Brooks was an innocent owner of
the subject property, entitling him to a first priority lien on the property, which, in
turn, solidified his priority over Iberiabank’s judgment lien. Thereafter, the United
States moved the district court (1) to vacate its prior order permitting interlocutory
sale and (2) to dismiss the case without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a)(2). In granting the United States’ motion for voluntary dismissal,
the district court stated, “[t]he words ‘without prejudice’ will mean, inter alia, that
the order respecting the property rights of Iberiabank and Brooks remain in effect.”
In this appeal, Iberiabank contends that the effect of the United States’
voluntary dismissal was such that the case should have been left as though it had
never been filed. Therefore, Iberiabank argues, it was improper for the district
court to keep its prior decision on priority intact. We disagree.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) provides, “an action may be
dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that the court
considers proper.” The district court retains broad discretion in deciding whether to
allow a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2). Potenberg v. Bos. Scientific
Corp., 252 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). We therefore review a
district court’s decision to allow a Rule 41(a)(2) voluntary dismissal without
prejudice only for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1256.
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The plain language of Rule 41 permits a district court to dismiss an action on
terms that the court considers proper. Here, in exercising its broad authority to
create conditions on Rule 41(a) dismissals, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by granting the United States’ voluntary dismissal while keeping intact
its prior finding concerning the property rights of Iberiabank and Brooks.1 We find
the remaining arguments presented by Iberiabank to be meritless.
AFFIRMED.
1
Whether the district court’s preserved order can have collateral estoppel and res judicata
effects in other litigation is not before this Court, so we express no opinion on that issue.
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