United States v. Alfred E. Daking, Jr. ( 2015 )


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  •            Case: 14-10716   Date Filed: 01/02/2015   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-10716
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cr-14069-DLG-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ALFRED E. DAKING, JR.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (January 2, 2015)
    Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 14-10716     Date Filed: 01/02/2015     Page: 2 of 4
    Alfred Daking appeals his 180-month prison sentence, a downward
    deviation from the Guidelines sentence range of 235-240 months,1 imposed after
    he pled guilty to transportation of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    § 2252(a)(1). Daking seeks the vacation of his sentence on the ground that it is
    both procedurally and substantively unreasonably. He contends that his sentence is
    procedurally unreasonable because the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. §§
    2G2.2(b)(2), 2G2.2(b)(3)(D) and 2G2.2(b)(5), all specific offense characteristics,
    and that it is substantively unreasonable due to these procedural errors. We affirm.
    I.
    The district court increased the base offense level of Dakings’s offense,
    U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, by two levels under § 2G2.2(b)(2) because the pornographic
    material he transmitted “involved a prepubescent minor or a minor who had not
    attained the age of 12 years.” Daking argues that the court erred because the child
    to whom he transmitted the pornography—D.R.—was over age twelve when he
    began transmitting illicit content to him. Dakings failed to object to the courts §
    2G2.2(b)(2) enhancement, so we review the enhancement for plain error.
    To prevail, Daking must convince us that the court not only erred, but that
    the error was plain and prejudicially affected his substantial rights. United States v.
    Stevenson, 
    68 F.3d 1292
    , 1294 (11th Cir.1995). Even then, he would not be
    1
    The statutory maximum term of imprisonment was 240 months. See 18 U.S.C. §
    2252(b)(1).
    2
    Case: 14-10716      Date Filed: 01/02/2015    Page: 3 of 4
    entitled to relief unless we conclude that the error seriously affected the fairness,
    integrity, or public reputation of his sentencing proceeding. United States v. Olano,
    
    507 U.S. 725
    , 736, 
    113 S. Ct. 1770
    , 1779, 
    123 L. Ed. 2d 508
    (1993). We find no
    error here, much less error that is plain. The search of Daking’s computer
    equipment, and a comparison of the images found to a national child pornography
    database, revealed that Daking was responsible for images of child victims known
    to be under twelve.
    II.
    Section § 2G2.2(b)(5) requires the district court to increase the base offense
    level by five levels “[i]f the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving
    the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor.” Section § 2G2.2(b)(3)(D) requires the
    district court to increase the base offense level by six levels if “[d]istribution to a
    minor that was intended to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce the minor to engage
    in any illegal activity, other than illegal activity covered under subdivision (E).”
    The invited error doctrine precludes our review of Daking’s argument that the
    district court erred in applying these guidelines in fixing the total offense level for
    his offense because his attorney, at the sentencing hearing, informed the court that
    he was withdrawing any objections Dakings may have had to the application of
    these guidelines. See Doc. 115: 6, 11-12. See, e.g., United States v. Love, 
    449 F.3d 1154
    , 1157 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying invited error doctrine where defendant
    3
    Case: 14-10716     Date Filed: 01/02/2015    Page: 4 of 4
    requested supervised release as a sentence and then contested his eligibility for
    supervised release on appeal).
    III.
    Dakings’ argument that his sentence is substantively unreasonable is based
    on the assumption that the district court erred in applying the guidelines cited
    above. Since we do not disturb the court’s application of those guidelines, his
    argument that his sentence is substantively unreasonable fails.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-10716

Judges: Tjoflat, Martin, Anderson

Filed Date: 1/2/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024