Mitchell v. Farcass , 112 F.3d 1483 ( 1997 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 96-3026.
Henry Greene MITCHELL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Dave FARCASS, Superintendent, Hendry Correctional Institution, J.
King, Inspector Hendry Correctional Institution, Defendants-
Appellees.
May 6, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. (No. 96-201-CIV-FTM-25), Henry Lee Adams, Jr.,
Judge.
Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and LAY*,
Senior Circuit Judge.
HATCHETT, Chief Judge:
In this prisoner civil rights action, we consider challenges
to provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"
or "the Act"), Title VIII of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions
and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321(Apr. 26, 1996). We hold that: (1) the provisions of the PLRA
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) apply to cases pending prior to
the Act's passage; (2) the filing fee requirements of the PLRA do
not violate the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection; (3)
to the extent the PLRA's filing fee requirements conflict with
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), the Act's provisions
control; (4) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards
govern our review of dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);
and (5) the district court erred in dismissing the appellant's
*
Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the
Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
First Amendment retaliation claim under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
I. BACKGROUND
On January 29, 1996, appellant Henry Mitchell, a Florida
prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Dave Farcass, Superintendent of the Hendry
Correctional Institution ("HCI"), and J. King, an inspector at HCI.
The district court granted Mitchell's motion to proceed in forma
pauperis ("IFP"). Mitchell's complaint alleges the following
factual scenario.
In late December 1995, Mitchell, then an inmate at HCI, wrote
a letter to the Naples, Florida office of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People in which he complained about
the religious services at HCI. Mitchell also sent copies of this
letter to several officials of Florida's correctional system,
including Farcass. On January 15, 1996, Mitchell submitted an
inmate request to Farcass, asking him to explain "why no black
culture churches were being allowed to come into [HCI] like the
[S]panish culture churches and the white churches." In this
request, Mitchell claimed that HCI's religious services did not
comply with the provision of the Florida Administrative Code that
governs chaplaincy services at state correctional institutions.
According to Mitchell, around eighty other inmates had submitted
requests "asking the same question or pertaining to that subject."
The following day, January 16, a prison employee told Mitchell
to report to "C-Building." Upon his arrival, Mitchell met with
Farcass, other HCI officials and another inmate. Farcass had in
his possession the inmate requests concerning the chaplaincy
services, including Mitchell's request. Mitchell guesses that the
officials requested his and the other inmate's presence at this
meeting because they considered the two inmates "to be the
leaders." Farcass told the inmates that the amount of requests
upset him and that "some one could be charged with [in]citing a
riot." Farcass, however, also told Mitchell and the other inmate
that the "meeting was to address the issue presented in the
requests" and that they "were not being charged with anything, ...
were not going to get locked up, [and] were not going to get
transfer[r]ed." Farcass informed the inmates that officials had to
process paperwork in order for representatives from black churches
to begin visiting HCI.
The next day, January 17, an HCI employee told Mitchell to
report to the chaplain, and Mitchell wound up meeting with the
chaplain, assistant chaplain and assistant superintendent of HCI.
The assistant superintendent stated that the purpose of the meeting
was for the chaplain to explain the procedures churches had to
comply with before they could be permitted to provide religious
services at HCI. During the meeting, someone called the assistant
superintendent from the room. Upon returning, the assistant
superintendent reported that Farcass and King had ordered Mitchell
placed in administrative confinement while HCI officials
investigated whether he was responsible for inciting a riot.
HCI officials placed Mitchell in administrative confinement
that same day. When officials brought Mitchell his property, he
found that his legal materials had been "smashed" and "crushed."
Later, in the evening, three correctional officers entered
Mitchell's cell, handcuffed him behind his back, and "smashed" his
legal work and property. Thereafter, Mitchell submitted another
inmate request to Farcass, this time asking that he be placed in
"protective management" because he feared further retaliation from
the HCI staff.
Mitchell asserts that Farcass and King breached his rights
under the First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; he seeks
monetary relief. On June 18, 1996, the district court addressed
Mitchell's complaint. Recognizing Mitchell's IFP status, the court
assessed his pleading under the provisions of section 804(a) of the
PLRA that are now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court
held, "[a]fter reading Plaintiff's complaint in a liberal fashion,"
that Mitchell could "prove no set of facts in support of his claim
that would entitle him to relief." Therefore, the court dismissed
Mitchell's complaint sua sponte pursuant to section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1
Thereafter, Mitchell moved in the district court to proceed
IFP on appeal. On July 31, 1996, the court granted the motion
(thus allowing Mitchell to proceed without prepaying the entire
$105 appellate docketing and filing fee) and applied the filing fee
provisions of PLRA section 804(a), see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(a), (b)
(West Supp.1997). As a result, the court ordered Mitchell to
tender payment of a fee equal to twenty percent of his average
monthly deposits to his prison account (this fee totalled $4) and
make monthly payments (submitted with updated account statements)
1
Farcass and King were never served with Mitchell's
complaint.
equal to twenty percent of the income credited to his account each
preceding month, until he paid the full docketing and filing fee.
Mitchell filed his notice of appeal on July 3, 1996.
In his pro se brief to this court, Mitchell argued, among
other things, that the district court erred in applying section
1915(e)(2) to his complaint because he commenced this lawsuit prior
to the PLRA's enactment on April 26, 1996, and that the filing fee
provisions of the PLRA violated constitutional norms. This court
appointed Mitchell a lawyer and placed this case on the oral
argument calendar. The United States intervened in this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), and the State of Florida
participated as amicus curiae.
II. DISCUSSION
A.
The first issue we address is whether section 1915(e)(2)
applies to cases pending prior to the enactment of the PLRA. The
district court's determination of this issue was one of law; we
review it under the de novo standard. E.g., Goldsmith v. City of
Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir.1993).
Prior to the passage of the PLRA, section 1915 permitted a
court to dismiss a case authorized under that section if "satisfied
that the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
(1994). As amended by the PLRA, however, section 1915 now provides
that a court "shall dismiss the case at any time" if it determines
that the "action or appeal" is "(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (West Supp.1997). As stated,
the district court dismissed Mitchell's complaint under section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
"Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483,
128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), provides the analytical framework for
determining whether newly enacted statutory provisions are
applicable to pending cases." Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d
1565, 1569 (11th Cir.1996) (en banc ), petition for cert. filed, 65
U.S.L.W. 3648 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1997) (No. 96-1443). Under Landgraf,
our first inquiry is "to determine whether Congress has expressly
prescribed the statute's proper reach." 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct.
at 1505. Here, however, Congress has simply not spoken on the
issue. Accordingly, we should apply section 1915(e)(2) to pending
cases unless doing so would engender a "retroactive effect."
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. at 1505; see also Hunter, 101
F.3d at 1570. A new statute has a retroactive effect if, in
applying it to a pending case, it (1) impairs rights a party
possessed when he or she acted, (2) increases a party's liability
for past conduct, or (3) imposes new duties with respect to
transactions already completed. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114
S.Ct. at 1505; Hunter 101 F.3d at 1570.
The second and third indices of statutory retroactive effect
outlined above clearly have no application to this case, and
Mitchell makes no argument to the contrary. The issue for us to
consider then, is whether the application of section 1915(e)(2) to
this case "would impair rights [Mitchell] possessed when he acted."
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. Mitchell states that
under pre-PLRA section 1915, the first test of the sufficiency of
his complaint would probably have come after the defendants had
filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), after which time he could have amended his complaint in
light of the defendants' motion. Therefore, Mitchell contends, the
application of the PLRA amendments to his case deprived him of the
more liberal procedural treatment he had anticipated receiving
under the old provisions of section 1915(d).
We have little difficulty in concluding that Mitchell's
position fails. As this court stated inHunter, "the term "rights'
as used in this context should not be construed broadly so as to
sweep within its ambit mere expectation interests under procedural
or remedy rules." 101 F.3d at 1572. Mitchell concedes, as he
must, that the PLRA amendments at issue are "wholly procedural";
moreover, we cannot say that Mitchell has anything more than an
expectation interest in having pre-PLRA section 1915 applied in his
case. Indeed, we find the appellants' position in Hunter (i.e.,
that applying the certificate of appealability provisions of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 to pending
cases would produce a retroactive effect), which this court sitting
en banc unanimously rejected, much more compelling than Mitchell's
argument. See Hunter, 101 F.3d at 1568-73. Consequently, we agree
with the Ninth Circuit that section 1915(e)(2) "raises no
retroactivity concerns under Landgraf." Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d
494, 496 (9th Cir.1996).
B.
We next consider whether the filing fee provisions of the
PLRA (1) withstand equal protection review and (2) are superseded
by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a). These issues present
legal questions that we address in plenary fashion. E.g., Collins
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 105 F.3d 1368, 1370 (11th
Cir.1997).
Section 804(a) of the PLRA refashioned the procedures
prisoners must observe when seeking to proceed IFP in civil
actions. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) now provides:
A prisoner seeking to bring a civil action or appeal a
judgment in a civil action or proceeding without prepayment of
fees or security therefor, in addition to filing the affidavit
filed under paragraph (1), shall submit a certified copy of
the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent)
for the prisoner for the 6-month period immediately preceding
the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal, obtained from
the appropriate official of each prison at which the prisoner
is or was confined.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(a)(2) (West Supp.1997). Section 1915(b) now
reads:
(b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a prisoner brings a
civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the
prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing
fee. The court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect,
as a partial payment of any court fees required by law, an
initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of—
(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner's
account; or
(B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account
for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint or notice of appeal.
(2) After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the
prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of 20
percent of the preceding month's income credited to the
prisoner's account. The agency having custody of the prisoner
shall forward payments from the prisoner's account to the
clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds
$10 until the filing fees are paid.
(3) In no event shall the filing fee collected exceed the
amount of fees permitted by statute for the commencement of a
civil action or an appeal of a civil action or criminal
judgment.
(4) In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing
a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for
the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by
which to pay the initial partial filing fee.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(b) (West Supp.1997).
Mitchell contends that the PLRA's filing fee requirements fail
equal protection rational basis review and thus deny him due
process under the Fifth Amendment.2 "The first step in determining
whether legislation survives rational-basis scrutiny is identifying
a legitimate government purpose—a goal—which the enacting
government body could have been pursuing." Haves v. City of Miami,
52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir.1995). "The second step of
rational-basis scrutiny asks whether a rational basis exists for
the enacting governmental body to believe that the legislation
would further the hypothesized purpose." Haves, 52 F.3d at 922.
After reviewing the statutory framework of the PLRA, this
court recently concluded that Congress promulgated the Act to
2
In his brief to this court, Mitchell's counsel made clear
that
Mr. Mitchell does not contend that the amended
statute's different treatment of indigent prisoners
implicates the line of Supreme Court cases beginning
with Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585,
100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), which generally prohibits making
access to the appellate process dependent on the
appellant's ability to pay.... Mr. Mitchell also does
not contend that prisoners (or specifically indigent
prisoners) are a suspect class for purposes of his
equal-protection claim.
Appellant's Br. at 17-18. We note that both the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits have considered and rejected each of these
contentions in denying challenges to the PLRA. See Roller v.
Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 231-33 (4th Cir.1997); Hampton v.
Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1284-87 (6th Cir.1997).
curtail abusive prisoner tort, civil rights and conditions
litigation. Anderson v. Singletary, No. 96-2697, --- F.3d ----, --
-- (11th Cir.1997); see also Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286
(6th Cir.1997) ("The legislation was aimed at the skyrocketing
numbers of claims filed by prisoners—many of which are
meritless—and the corresponding burden those filings have placed on
the federal courts."); Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755
(3d Cir.1996) ("Congress enacted the PLRA primarily to curtail
claims brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal
Tort Claims Act, most of which concern prison conditions and many
of which are routinely dismissed as legally frivolous."). Clearly,
Congress had a rational basis to believe that the fee requirements
of the PLRA would further this objective. As the Sixth Circuit
recently found:
Congress sought to put in place economic incentives that would
prompt prisoners to "stop and think" before filing a
complaint. Congress's rationale for placing the fee
requirements on prisoners is captured in the statements of
Senator Kyl:
Section 2 will require prisoners to pay a very small
share of the large burden they place on the Federal
judicial system by paying a small filing fee upon
commencement of lawsuits. In doing so, the provision
will deter frivolous inmate lawsuits. The modest
monetary outlay will force prisoners to think twice about
the case and not just file reflexively. Prisoners will
have to make the same decision that law-abiding Americans
must make: Is the lawsuit worth the price? Criminals
should not be given a special privilege that other
Americans do not have....
The volume of prisoner litigation represents a large
burden on the judicial system, which is already
overburdened by increases in nonprisoner litigation. Yet
prisoners have very little incentive not to file
nonmeritorious lawsuits. Unlike other prospective
litigants who seek poor person status, prisoners have all
the necessities of life supplied, including the materials
required to bring their lawsuits. For a prisoner who
qualifies for poor person status, there is no cost to
bring a suit and, therefore, no incentive to limit suits
to cases that have some chance of success.
The filing fee is small enough not to deter a
prisoner with a meritorious claim, yet large enough to
deter frivolous claims and multiple filings.
141 Cong. Rec. S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Kyl) (citations omitted).
Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1286-87. In addition to the foregoing, we
note that prisoners "often have free time on their hands that other
litigants do not possess." Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 234 (4th
Cir.1997). Moreover, prisoners have unique incentives to file
meritless or frivolous lawsuits, e.g., to attempt to obtain a
"short sabbatical in the nearest federal courthouse," Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319, 327, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1084, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), or to harass prison officials or
correctional officers. See, e.g., Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of
Correction, 64 F.3d 951, 953-54 n. 1 (4th Cir.1995) ( en banc )
(noting that "all too often" prisoner litigation is initiated to
harass prison officials), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct.
1273, 134 L.Ed.2d 219 (1996). In short, "[d]eterring frivolous
prisoner filings in the federal courts falls within the realm of
Congress's legitimate interests, and the specific provisions in
question are rationally related to the achievement of that
interest." Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1287; accord Roller, 107 F.3d at
230-31, 233-34.
Mitchell bases his equal protection challenge on Rinaldi v.
Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1966). In
that case, the Court struck down a New Jersey statute that required
unsuccessful criminal appellants who were incarcerated, but not
unsuccessful criminal appellants who were not imprisoned, to
reimburse the state for the costs of trial transcripts. 384 U.S.
at 308, 86 S.Ct. at 1499. In so doing, the Court found that the
classification at issue did not further any of the purported bases
for the law—reimbursement, administrative convenience or deterrence
of frivolous appeals. 384 U.S. at 309-11, 86 S.Ct. at 1499-1501 .
Mitchell argues that the "distinction made in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)
between incarcerated indigent [litigants] and all other indigent
[litigants] is nearly identical to the distinction made in
Rinaldi."
We find Rinaldi inapposite. Unlike the situation here, that
case involved an "unreasoned distinction," i.e., the Court could
not find any justification for the classification the New Jersey
statute made. See Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 309-10, 86 S.Ct. at 1499-
1500. In enacting the PLRA, however, Congress had ample
justification (e.g., prisoners often have an abundance of free
time, live in a nearly cost-free environment, and have unique
incentives to file meritless or frivolous lawsuits) in
differentiating between indigent prisoners and other litigants.
See Roller, 107 F.3d at 234 n. 2.
Next, Mitchell contends that the fee provisions of the PLRA
stand in apparent conflict with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
24(a), which states that once a district court grants a party's
motion to proceed IFP, "the party may proceed without further
application to the court of appeals and without prepayment of fees
or costs in either court or the giving of security therefor." Fed.
R.App. P. 24(a).3 The Fifth Circuit recently considered this issue
and cited authority for the proposition that "a statute passed
after the effective date of a federal rule repeals the rule to the
extent that it actually conflicts." Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d
132, 135 (5th Cir.1996). The court went on to hold that "[t]o the
extent that the Rules Enabling Act (as expressed in Rule 24(a))
actually conflicts with the PLRA, we hold that the statute repeals
the Rule." Jackson, 102 F.3d at 136. We adopt the analysis and
holding of the Jackson court. See 102 F.3d at 134-36; see also
Floyd v. United States Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 278 (6th
Cir.1997) ("[T]o the extent that Rule 24(a) conflicts with the
PLRA, we hold that the statute repeals Rule 24(a).").
C.
Finally, we address the propriety of the district court's
dismissal of this action, i.e., whether the district court
correctly concluded that Mitchell failed to state a claim on which
relief may be granted. The language of section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
and we will apply Rule 12(b)(6) standards in reviewing dismissals
under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Of course, we review dismissals
under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, viewing the allegations in the
complaint as true. E.g., South Fla. Water Management Dist. v.
Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 406 (11th Cir.1996).
"To state a first amendment claim for retaliation, a prisoner
3
Although Mitchell discussed this issue in his brief, he did
not formally assert it. He did, however, pursue the issue at
oral argument, and therefore we address it. See Beckwith v. City
of Daytona Beach Shores, 58 F.3d 1554, 1561 n. 11 (11th
Cir.1995).
need not allege violation of a separate and distinct constitutional
right.... The gist of a retaliation claim is that a prisoner is
penalized for exercising the right of free speech." Thomas v.
Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1242 (11th Cir.1989). In Bridges v. Russell,
757 F.2d 1155, 1157 (11th Cir.1985), we reversed the dismissal of
a complaint where the prisoner-appellant alleged that officials
transferred him to another facility because he (1) filed a
grievance against his work supervisor alleging racial
discrimination in the assignment of work duties; (2) actively
encouraged other inmates to sign a petition in protest of this
treatment; and (3) prepared a similar grievance on behalf of
another inmate. In our view, it does not appear beyond doubt that
Mitchell can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief
on his First Amendment claim for retaliation. See Bridges, 757
F.2d at 1157; see also Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467,
1468 (11th Cir.1989); Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 (11th
Cir.1986). Accordingly, we reverse the district court and remand
for further proceedings on this issue.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that: (1) the PLRA's
filing fee provisions easily pass equal protection rational basis
review; (2) to the extent those provisions conflict with Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), the PLRA controls; (3) the
district court was correct in concluding that 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) applied in this case; (4) Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) standards govern our review of dismissals under
section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); and (5) the district court erred in
dismissing Mitchell's First Amendment retaliation claim pursuant to
section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). As a result, we remand to the district
court for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
LAY, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring:
I am pleased to concur in Chief Judge Hatchett's excellent
opinion holding (1) that the filing fee provisions of the PLRA do
not violate a prisoner's equal protection rights, and (2) that the
procedural mechanism for dismissal of in forma pauperis (IFP) suits
found in § 1915(e)(2) may be applied retroactively. I write
separately, however, to note my concern as to the constitutionality
of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which allows sua sponte dismissal of an IFP
complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
This case comes to us in an unusual posture. On June 18,
1996, the district court, without service of process, summarily
dismissed Mitchell's pro se complaint as failing to state a claim
for relief, applying the dismissal standard of Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). On July 31, 1996, the district court granted Mitchell
leave to appeal IFP, assessing him filing fees pursuant to the new
provisions of § 1915(b). The only issues decided by the district
court related to whether Mitchell had filed a complaint sufficient
to withstand dismissal under the new act. On January 28, 1997,
this court ordered an expedited appeal and appointed counsel.
Although issues regarding the PLRA were not raised or briefed in
the district court, this court requested that counsel address the
constitutionality of § 1915(b), and the retroactive effect, if any,
of § 1915(e)(2). I am informed that one of the reasons this court
took this action is that several hundred cases in the district
courts of the Eleventh Circuit are awaiting a decision on the
constitutionality and retroactivity of the PLRA. In addition, it
should be obvious that the court took this liberty because this
petitioner appeared pro se in the district court, and because of
the importance of these issues to all IFP litigants.
Litigants and district courts, however, should not be confused
by the path of this litigation. Additional constitutional
challenges to the PLRA, including the one I articulate today, are
not foreclosed by this court's opinion. I write this concurring
opinion to note my concern with the substance of §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), used in this case, which I feel is
constitutionally flawed. Since this court raised the
constitutional issues on its own, it seems to me our opinion should
be expanded to consider this additional constitutional concern.
It is my view that in this section, Congress has deprived
prisoners and other indigents1 of a significant procedural right
1
Section 1915(e) applies to all IFP litigants—prisoners who
pay fees on an installment basis, prisoners who pay nothing, and
nonprisoners in both categories. Therefore, in my discussion of
§ 1915(e), I will usually use the term "IFP litigants" to
encompass all of these individuals. I note, however, that the
group most affected by § 1915(e) will be prisoners, simply
because they make up such a large fraction of IFP litigants. In
addition, the 1996 statute's purpose is to curtail prisoner
litigation, a point exemplified not only by its title, but also
by the ambiguous language in § 1915(a), which purports to apply
to any "person," but only if that person "submits an affidavit
that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses."
(emphasis added). This section obviously needs clarification.
See Floyd v. United States Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 275 (6th
Cir.1997) ("Despite the use of the term "prisoner possesses,' we
conclude that a typographical error in the final version of the
statute occurred and that Congress actually intended the phrase
that noninstitutionalized paying litigants enjoy, and has not
provided a rational justification for this differential treatment.
Under the earlier version of the IFP statute, the district
court was empowered and instructed to dismiss an IFP application
sua sponte if it deemed the suit was frivolous or malicious. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1994). This rule was in accord with the
established principle that a patently frivolous complaint may be
dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 n.
6, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832 n. 6, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (citing Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1378-79, 39 L.Ed.2d
577 (1974); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776,
90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)). The obvious rational basis for such
peremptory action was that the government should not incur expenses
in serving parties sued in frivolous actions. Thus, named
defendants were typically not required to respond to these suits.
See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324, 109 S.Ct. at 1831 ("Dismissals on
these grounds are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of
process, so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience
and expense of answering such complaints."). Section 1915(d)'s
successor, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), applied here to Mitchell's
complaint, allows courts to dismiss a complaint sua sponte not only
for frivolousness, but also for failure to state a claim on which
2
relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). While
to be "person possesses.' ").
2
Section 1915(e)(2) reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that
courts have recognized that this seemingly innocuous change is a
significant expansion of the court's power, see, e.g., Douglas v.
DeBruyn, 936 F.Supp. 572, 579 n. 4 (S.D.Ind.1996), nothing in the
legislative history of the statute indicates that Congress was
aware of the real meaning of the change. See 141 Cong Rec. S14413-
S14419 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995); 141 Cong. Rec. S7525-S7527
(daily ed. May 25, 1995).
The difference between dismissal for frivolousness and
dismissal for failure to state a claim was explained by the Supreme
Court in Neitzke, which interpreted § 1915(d) of the old IFP
statute. The Neitzke Court, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, was critical of the district court in conflating
the standards of frivolousness under the old § 1915(d) and failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme
Court observed that the error in doing so denied "indigent
plaintiffs the practical protections against unwarranted dismissal
generally accorded paying plaintiffs under the Federal Rules." 490
may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any
time if the court determines that—
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal—
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
Its predecessor read, "The court may ... dismiss the case if
the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that
the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
(1994).
U.S. at 330, 109 S.Ct. at 1834.
Neitzke recognized that protection from sua sponte dismissal
for failure to state a claim is a meaningful right:
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff with an arguable claim is
ordinarily accorded notice of a pending motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim and an opportunity to amend the
complaint before the motion is ruled upon. These procedures
alert him to the legal theory underlying the defendant's
challenge, and enable him meaningfully to respond by opposing
the motion to dismiss on legal grounds or by clarifying his
factual allegations so as to conform with the requirements of
a valid legal cause of action.
Id. at 329-30, 109 S.Ct. at 1833-34. The PLRA strips this right
only from IFP litigants, denying them equality of treatment in the
federal courts. See id. at 330, 109 S.Ct. at 1834 (noting the
unfairness in applying the failure to state a claim dismissal
standard to § 1915(d), because an indigent litigant's complaint
"whose only defect was its failure to state a claim, will in all
likelihood be dismissed sua sponte, whereas an identical complaint
filed by a paying plaintiff will in all likelihood receive the
considerable benefits of the adversary proceedings contemplated by
the Federal Rules"). This differential treatment cannot in my view
be justified by the stated purposes of the PLRA—to deter frivolous
prisoner litigation and ease the burden of such suits on the
federal courts. The distinction between immediate dismissal for
failure to state a claim and immediate dismissal for frivolousness,
if not lost on the average litigant, surely will not weigh heavily
in his or her decision whether to bring a claim. Easing the small
bit of the courts' burden that is made up of complaints that are
not frivolous but nonetheless fail to state a claim simply cannot
be justified when weighed against the procedural right IFP
litigants are denied. Depriving one group of this right while
retaining it for another stands in stark opposition to established
principles of equal access to courts for all litigants, which of
course is the original purpose behind 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 447, 82 S.Ct. 917, 922, 8
L.Ed.2d 21 (1962) (noting that the purpose of the IFP statute was
"to assure equality of consideration for all litigants"); cf.
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 1500, 16
L.Ed.2d 577 (1966) (ruling that judicial mechanisms like appellate
review "must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only
impede open and equal access to the courts").3
In stating my objections, I recognize that there is no
question that many prisoner suits are baseless. I also agree that
the payment of a filing fee may well deter such suits. We should
proceed with caution, however, in approving additional deterrence
mechanisms that trample prisoner litigants' rights, for fear we
lose sight of the purpose of prisoner litigation: to protect
prisoners' constitutional rights, and to curb inhumane treatment
and abuse of power in prison environments. See generally, e.g.,
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4, 112 S.Ct. 995, 997-998, 117
3
The same problems arise under the newly given right of the
court to dismiss claims on the ground of immunity. Under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), the defense of immunity is an affirmative
defense, which should be asserted in an adversarial setting.
Some courts have required plaintiffs responding to assert
specific facts addressing the defense of qualified immunity in a
special reply under Rule 7, governing notice pleading. See,
e.g., Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir.1995) (en
banc). Often, factual issues need to be resolved to determine
whether immunity is justified. Resolution of these issues can
only occur in an adversarial setting. Obviously, if the case is
patently frivolous on immunity grounds, the court can still
dismiss it before service, under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (determining that prison guards who placed an
inmate in handcuffs and shackle and beat him while their supervisor
told them "not to have too much fun" used excessive force in
violation of the Eighth Amendment); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,
103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983) (affirming a punitive damage
award against a prison guard whom a jury found liable for the
harassment, beating, and homosexual rape of a Missouri reformatory
inmate); Hutto v. Finney 437 U.S. 678, 681-83, 98 S.Ct. 2565,
2568-70, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (deeming the district court's
characterization of Arkansas prison conditions as "a dark and evil
world completely alien to the free world" to be "amply supported by
the evidence"). While many prisoner lawsuits are a burden to the
state and to the judicial system, limited overview by the courts
serves as a deterrent to prison authorities who might otherwise
abuse their power, and serves also as a necessary inducement to
them to provide humane conditions to prisoners.4
4
Chief Judge Jon Newman of the Second Circuit has challenged
courts with prisoner litigation suits before them to "avoid
letting the large number of frivolous complaints and appeals
impair their conscientious consideration of the few meritorious
cases that are filed." Hon. Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner
Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 Brook. L.Rev.
519, 527 (1996). The adversarial process inherent in the
standard for dismissal for failure to state a claim is a useful
tool in meeting this challenge. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 330,
109 S.Ct. at 1834. Congress has not provided a rational
justification for denying the courts this tool and
differentiating between indigent and nonindigent litigants.