USCA11 Case: 20-13862 Date Filed: 04/23/2021 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-13862
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-03807-ELR
LATRENT D. MONTGOMERY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RJ REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(April 23, 2021)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, MARTIN and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
USCA11 Case: 20-13862 Date Filed: 04/23/2021 Page: 2 of 3
LaTrent Montgomery appeals pro se the dismissal of his complaint against
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. The district court allowed Montgomery to
proceed in forma pauperis, and it later sua sponte dismissed his complaint as
frivolous.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Montgomery challenges the dismissal of his
complaint and the denial of his motion for recusal of the district court. We affirm.
The district judge did not abuse her discretion by refusing to recuse. A judge
must recuse if she “has a personal bias or prejudice either against [the moving
party] or in favor of any adverse party,”
28 U.S.C. § 144, or if “an objective, fully
informed lay observer would entertain significant doubt about the judge’s
impartiality,” Christo v. Padgett,
223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing
28
U.S.C. § 455). Montgomery alleged that it was “inappropriate for a woman” to
preside over a case “about an eunuch” and that concerned his “personal and sexual
information.” Montgomery identified no personal bias or prejudice on the part of
the district judge that required recusal. See Giles v. Garwood,
853 F.2d 876, 878
(11th Cir. 1988) (“A judge should not recuse himself based upon unsupported,
irrational, or tenuous allegations.”). The district judge was not required to recuse
absent an allegation that she had a disqualifying bias against or interest adverse to
Montgomery.
The district court also did not abuse its discretion by sua sponte dismissing
Montgomery’s complaint. A complaint is “frivolous if it is without arguable merit
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either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver,
251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001).
Montgomery alleged that, because he was the “Trent God,” R.J. Reynolds
incorporated his personal information, including his date of birth and social
security number, in the packaging for its cigarettes. Those actions, Montgomery
alleged, resulted in him “being exploited” and his “privacy being invaded,” which
caused him to “self-castrate.” Montgomery does not dispute that he failed either to
state a claim arising under federal law,
28 U.S.C. § 1331, or to allege diversity of
citizenship between him and the company,
id. § 1332(a), to invoke the jurisdiction
of the district court. See Travaglio v. Am. Express Co.,
735 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th
Cir. 2013) (requiring a plaintiff to allege facts that establish subject-matter
jurisdiction); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). Montgomery also does not dispute
that his complaint was devoid of facts to provide R.J. Reynolds “fair notice of what
the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550
U.S. 544, 554 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)), or of
what relief he sought. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)–(3).
We AFFIRM the dismissal of Montgomery’s complaint.
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