Fernando Jose Gonzalez Blandon vs USA , 444 F. App'x 319 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-10206 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar SEPTEMBER 7, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
Agency No. A024-668-747
FERNANDO JOSE GONZALEZ BLANDON,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(September 7, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Fernando Jose Gonzalez Blandon seeks review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’s (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order
denying his applications for adjustment of status under the Nicaraguan Adjustment
and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (“NACARA”), Pub. L. No. 105-100,
§ 202, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193 (1997); asylum under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”) § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), withholding of removal under INA
§ 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and withholding of removal under the United
Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c).
We must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s
denial of Gonzalez Blandon’s application for adjustment of status under
NACARA. Gonzalez Blandon also raises four additional claims: (1) the BIA
applied the wrong burdens of proof; (2) the BIA erroneously sustained the charge
that Gonzalez Blandon was subject to removal under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); (3) Gonzalez Blandon is statutorily eligible for a waiver
of inadmissibility under INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (“§ 212(h) waiver”);
and (4) the BIA erroneously denied his applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT relief.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
We first examine our jurisdiction over Gonzalez Blandon’s claims. “We
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review subject matter jurisdiction de novo.” Frech v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d
1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2007). Although we lack jurisdiction to review a final
decision on an application for an adjustment of status under NACARA, we retain
jurisdiction to consider substantial constitutional claims related to such an
application. Id. at 1280-81. “A ‘substantial’ constitutional challenge is one that
has merit.” Id. at 1280 n.5. We also lack jurisdiction to review the denial of a
§ 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility. INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). However, “we retain jurisdiction to determine whether the
statutory conditions for limiting judicial review exist.” Vuksanovic v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 439 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2006). Additionally, we retain jurisdiction
to review “constitutional claims and questions of law” relating to a denial of a
§ 212(h) waiver. INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Whether the
correct legal standards were applied is a question of law. Frech, 491 F.3d at 1281.
Like review of a decision under NACARA, under INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D), we only retain jurisdiction to consider substantial constitutional
claims in a petition for review of the denial of a § 212(h) waiver. Alvarez-Acosta
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 524 F.3d 1191, 1197 (11th Cir. 2008).
A due process claim only has merit if the alien has been substantially
prejudiced. Ibrahim v. U.S. INS, 821 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1987). An alien
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cannot show substantial prejudice based on the denial of discretionary relief
“because no standards exist for a court to determine whether the executive would
have granted the extraordinary relief anyway.” Mejia Rodriguez v. Reno, 178 F.3d
1139, 1146, 1148 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that even if the appellant received
ineffective assistance of counsel, there was no due process violation because there
was no way to know whether the discretionary relief would have been granted but
for the ineffective assistance).
A court may not review a final order of removal unless “the alien has
exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” INA
§ 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). The petitioner must administratively exhaust his
arguments by raising them before the BIA. Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006). We lack jurisdiction to consider
unexhausted procedural due process claims. Id. at 1251.
First, we have jurisdiction to consider whether the BIA applied the correct
burdens of proof because whether the correct legal standards were applied is a
question of law. See Frech, 491 F.3d at 1281. Second, we have jurisdiction to
consider whether the BIA erroneously sustained the government’s charge that
Gonzalez Blandon was removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), because this issue does not concern his application for an
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adjustment of status, nor does it concern his application for discretionary relief.
Third, we have jurisdiction to consider whether Gonzalez Blandon is statutorily
eligible for a § 212(h) waiver. See Vuksanovic, 439 F.3d at 1310. Fourth, we do
not have jurisdiction to consider Gonzalez Blandon’s due process arguments
because he did not exhaust these procedural due process claims and because they
are meritless. Gonzalez Blandon cannot show substantial prejudice because there
are no standards for us to determine whether he would have been granted the
discretionary relief. See Mejia Rodriguez, 178 F.3d at 1148 (11th Cir. 1999).
Accordingly, we dismiss Gonzalez Blandon’s petition for review as to his due
process arguments.
B. Burden of Proof
On appeal, Gonzalez Blandon argues that the BIA and IJ erred by not
requiring the Government to prove by clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence that he was removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Gonzalez Blandon denied that he was removable under this
section before both the IJ and the BIA, and, he argues, the Government should
have been required to prove that he was removable under this section even though
he had already conceded that he was removable under another section of the INA,
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specifically INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Gonzalez Blandon
asserts that only after the Government proved that he was removable under INA §
237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) should the burden of proof switch to
him to show that he was eligible for the § 212(h) waiver.
We review questions of law de novo. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262,
1284 (11th Cir. 2001). The government bears the burden of proving that the alien
is removable by clear and convincing evidence. INA § 240(c)(3)(A); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(3)(A). However, once that burden is established, the alien bears the
burden of establishing that: (1) he meets the eligibility requirements for the relief
sought; and (2) if he seeks discretionary relief, he “merits a favorable exercise of
discretion.” Id. § 240(c)(4)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A). An alien may only
receive an adjustment of status under NACARA if he is “otherwise admissible to
the United States.” Pub. L. No. 105-100, § 202(a)(1)(B), 111 Stat. 2160, 2193
(1997). An alien seeking admission must establish that he “is clearly and beyond
doubt entitled to be admitted and is not inadmissible under” INA § 212, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182. Id. § 240(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A).
The BIA applied the correct burdens of proof in this case. The BIA found
that Gonzalez Blandon was removable under INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(B), because he conceded that he was removable under this section.
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Only then did the BIA place a burden of proof on Gonzalez Blandon. Specifically,
the BIA then required him to show that his conviction for the introduction of
contraband into a penal institution did not render him inadmissible. This burden
of proof is consistent with INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, which requires an alien
seeking admissibility to prove “clearly and beyond a doubt [that he] is not
inadmissible under” INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182. INA § 240(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(2)(A).
C. Removal under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)
Next, Gonzalez Blandon argues that the BIA and IJ erred in sustaining the
charge of removability under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
The Government had relied upon Gonzalez Blandon’s conviction report, but, he
asserts, this report does not establish that the contraband at issue in that conviction
was related to a controlled substance, other than marijuana for his personal use.
Gonzalez Blandon’s argument that the BIA erroneously sustained the
charge of removability under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) is
belied by the record, which shows that the BIA simply did not consider this charge
because Gonzalez Blandon conceded that he was subject to removal under INA
§ 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).
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D. Waiver of inadmissibility under INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182Gonzalez Blandon next asserts that the BIA and IJ erred when they failed to
consider his application for a § 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility. He contends that
he was statutorily eligible for the § 212(h) waiver because his convictions did not
render him ineligible. He also asserts that he did not need to prove that he was
eligible for a § 212(h) wavier because the Government did not prove that he was
removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). If, however,
this Court requires him to prove eligibility, he asserts that his testimony shows that
he qualifies for this relief.
An “alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits
committing acts which constitute the essential elements of” a violation of law
relating to a controlled substance is inadmissible. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). The Attorney General may exercise his discretion
and grant such an alien a waiver of inadmissibility if the controlled substance
violation related “to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of
marijuana.” Id. § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Under Florida law, it is illegal to
introduce, “take or attempt to take or send or attempt to send therefrom,” a number
of items, including controlled substances, into a state correctional institution. Fla.
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Stat. § 944.47(1)(a). It is also unlawful for inmates to possess controlled
substances in a state correctional institution. Id. § 944.47(1)(c).
Gonzalez Blandon did not establish that he was not inadmissible under INA
§ 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182, because he has been convicted of introducing contraband,
which he testified was marijuana, into a penal institution. See INA § 240(c)(2)(A),
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A). To be statutorily eligible for a waiver under § 212(h),
Gonzalez Blandon would have had to establish that this violation involved 30
grams or less of marijuana and that it was an offense of simple possession. INA
§ 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). However, Gonzalez Blandon testified that he did
more than merely possess the marijuana, as prohibited by Fla. Stat. § 944.47(1)(c).
Rather, he testified that he brought a package of marijuana inside his prison, as
prohibited by Fla. Stat. § 944.47(1)(a).
E. Asylum, Withholding of Removal or CAT relief
Finally, Gonzalez Blandon contends that he is eligible for asylum because
he has a well-founded fear of future persecution based on his political opinion and
membership in a social group. The BIA found that he had subjective fear of future
persecution but determined that it was not objectively reasonable. Gonzalez
Blandon contends that court erred because his fear was objectively reasonable,
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based on his family being part of Somoza’s regime, and when that regime fell, its
members were at risk for being arrested, tortured, and killed. He also points to a
pattern or practice of persecution, as shown by the fact that some of his family
members were granted asylum and the fact that one of his brothers was arrested
and threatened by the Sandinistas. He contends that he is eligible for withholding
of removal and CAT relief for the same reasons.
We lack jurisdiction to consider arguments that an alien failed to
administratively exhaust before the BIA, even if the BIA considered those
arguments sua sponte. Amaya-Artunduaga, 463 F.3d at 1250-51.
We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo. Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
605 F.3d 941, 948 (11th Cir. 2010). The BIA’s factual findings are reviewed
under the “highly deferential” substantial evidence test, and we will affirm the
BIA’s decision “if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Id. (quotation omitted). We will
only reverse “when the record compels a reversal.” Id. (quotation omitted).
An alien who arrives in or is present in the United States may apply for
asylum. INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). To be eligible for asylum, the
applicant must prove that he is a “refugee” within the meaning of the INA. INA
§ 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). To establish asylum eligibility, the
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alien must, with specific and credible evidence, establish: (1) past persecution on
account of a statutorily listed factor; or (2) a “well-founded fear” that the
statutorily listed factor, in this case political opinion or membership in a particular
social group, will cause such future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), (b). In
establishing a well-founded fear of future persecution, the alien must present
“specific, detailed facts showing a good reason to fear that he or she will be
singled out for persecution.” Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287 (quotations omitted).
The alien must demonstrate that his fear “is subjectively genuine and objectively
reasonable.” Id. at 1289. An alien’s fear is objectively reasonable if he “has a
good reason to fear future persecution.” Id. (quotation omitted).
To qualify for withholding of removal under the INA, an alien must show
that if returned to his country, he would “more likely than not . . . be persecuted or
tortured” based upon a statutorily listed factor. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401
F.3d 1226, 1232 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). “This is a more stringent
standard than for asylum,” and an alien who is unable to establish that he is
eligible for asylum “is generally precluded from qualifying” for withholding of
removal. Id. at 1232-33.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Gonzalez Blandon was
not eligible for asylum. There was no evidence of past persecution, and there is
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“reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence” that Gonzalez Blandon did not
have an objectively reasonable, well-founded fear of future persecution. Al
Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1284 (quotation omitted). Gonzalez Blandon testified that he
was not aware of any person or group in Nicaragua that would seek to harm him if
he returned to the country, and his mother testified that she had returned to
Nicaragua twice in the four years prior to the hearing. Based on this testimony,
the BIA reasonably found that Gonzalez Blandon had not established that he had
an objectively reasonable, well-founded fear of future persecution.
Next, because Gonzalez Blandon is unable to establish that he was eligible
for asylum, he is unable to meet the “more stringent standard” for withholding of
removal that he would “more likely than not . . . be persecuted or tortured” if he
returned to Nicaragua. Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1232-33. Finally, we do not have
jurisdiction to consider Gonzalez Blandon’s claim that he is eligible for CAT relief
because he failed to exhaust this claim by not raising it before the BIA. See
Amaya-Artunduaga, 463 F.3d at 1250. It is of no moment that the BIA considered
this claim sua sponte. See id. at 1250-51.
Based on the above, we deny Gonzalez Blandon’s petition for review as to
his claims that: (1) the BIA applied the wrong burdens of proof; (2) the BIA
erroneously sustained the charge of removability under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8
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U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); (3) he was statutorily eligible for a § 212(h) waiver;
(4) the BIA erroneously found him ineligible for asylum; and (5) the BIA
erroneously found him ineligible for withholding of removal. We dismiss
Gonzalez Blandon’s petition for review as to his due process claims and as to his
claim that the BIA erroneously found him ineligible for CAT relief.
PETITION DENIED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.
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