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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-10986
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-20575-RNS-5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
YINA MARIA CASTANEDA BENAVIDEZ,
a.k.a La Reina,
a.k.a. Ingeniera,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(May 21, 2021)
Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Yina Castaneda Benavidez (Castaneda) appeals her conviction and 270-
month, below-guidelines sentence for conspiring to distribute five or more
kilograms of cocaine knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it would be
unlawfully imported into the United States, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a) and
963. Castaneda, who was convicted after a jury trial, argues: (1) the district court
erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal, filed under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 29; and (2) her sentence was substantively unreasonable.
After review, we affirm Castaneda’s conviction and sentence.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Castaneda first argues it was error for the district court to deny her Rule 29
motion for judgment of acquittal, which she renewed at the close of all the
evidence. She contends the government failed to prove she knew or had
reasonable cause to believe the cocaine at issue—which departed from Tumaco,
Colombia and traveled via go-fast boat to Central America—was destined for
unlawful importation into the United States.
We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal on sufficiency of
the evidence grounds de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the government and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the
government’s favor. United States v. Browne,
505 F.3d 1229, 1253 (11th Cir.
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2007). We will affirm the verdict if a reasonable jury could conclude the evidence
establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. “This inquiry
does not require that the evidence be inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis
except guilt.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). Instead, “the jury is free to choose
between or among the reasonable conclusions to be drawn from the evidence
presented at trial,” and “our sufficiency review requires only that a guilty verdict
be reasonable, not inevitable” based on that evidence.
Id. (quotation marks
omitted).
The test for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same whether the evidence
is direct or circumstantial, and we make no distinction between the weight given to
direct or circumstantial evidence. United States v. Mieres-Borges,
919 F.2d 652,
657 (11th Cir. 1990). However, “[w]hen the government relies on circumstantial
evidence, reasonable inferences, not mere speculation, must support the
conviction.” United States v. Mendez,
528 F.3d 811, 814 (11th Cir. 2008).
The district court did not err in denying Castaneda’s motion for judgment of
acquittal. At trial, the government was required to prove Castaneda conspired to
distribute cocaine “knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe” it would be
“unlawfully imported into the United States or into waters within a distance of 12
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miles of the coast of the United States.”
21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a), 963. 1 Although the
government did not present direct evidence of Castaneda’s knowledge, it presented
sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude
Castaneda knew or had reasonable cause to believe the cocaine would be
unlawfully imported into the United States. See United States v. Bollinger,
796
F.2d 1394, 1405 (11th Cir. 1986) (knowledge cocaine was to be imported in
violation of
21 U.S.C. § 952 could be proven through circumstantial evidence),
modified on other grounds on denial of reh’g,
837 F.2d 436 (11th Cir. 1988).
First, the testimony of Castaneda’s codefendants suggests she knew or had
reasonable cause to believe the cocaine would be unlawfully imported into the
United States. The indictment charged Castaneda and ten codefendants with the
same conspiracy. Four of those codefendants, who pleaded guilty to the
conspiracy, testified that they: (1) worked with Castaneda to smuggle loads of
cocaine weighing hundreds of kilograms each from Colombia to Central America,
and (2) knew the cocaine would be imported into the United States.
1
Section 959(a) makes it unlawful to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance
“intending, knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe [it] will be unlawfully imported into
the United States or into waters within a distance of 12 miles of the coast of the United States.”
21 U.S.C. § 959(a). Though Castaneda’s July 28, 2016, indictment refers to
21 U.S.C.
§ 959(a)(2), which prohibited any person from manufacturing or distributing a controlled
subsection “knowing” it would be unlawfully imported into the United States, that subsection
was eliminated when the statute was amended on May 16, 2016, before the conspiracy ended.
See Transnational Drug Trafficking Act of 2015; Pub. L. 114-154, § 2,
130 Stat. 387 (2016).
The jury was instructed to apply the revised statutory language if it found Castaneda’s
participation in the conspiracy continued after the amendment.
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Julio Belalcazar Estacio (Belalcazar) testified the drug trafficking
organization he and Castaneda were involved in aimed to send cocaine from
Colombia to Central America, “with the final destination being [the] United
States.” He further stated his contacts in Central America told him the cocaine was
going to be sent to the United States and it was no secret the cocaine was going
there. Jefferson Sevillano Quinones testified he knew the cocaine would
ultimately be sold in the United States because one of his bosses in the drug
trafficking organization—Eider Bonilla Moran (Bonilla)—had told him so, and
most people in the organization knew the cocaine’s final destination was the
United States. Ariel Angulo Lasso similarly testified the cocaine’s final
destination was the United States, and it was no secret the cocaine was going to the
United States, where it was “more expensive.” Ceneiber Quinones Jurado likewise
testified he knew the cocaine was going to the United States “because it’s obvious”
and because that was “where the drugs cost the most.” He also testified everyone
in the drug trafficking organization knew the cocaine was going to the United
States.
That Castaneda’s codefendants all knew the cocaine was bound for the
United States suggests that Castaneda herself would have also known this
information. Significantly, the latter three codefendants testified Castaneda ranked
higher in the drug trafficking organization than they did, further indicating she
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would have known at least as much as they did about where the cocaine was
headed.
Second, Castaneda’s intercepted communications referenced U.S. law
enforcement agencies and U.S. currency. Specifically, Castaneda expressed
concern about the United States Drug Enforcement Administration and told
Belalcazar when the “gringos,” meaning the United States Coast Guard, were
patrolling the waters in which the cocaine was being transported. Castaneda also
discussed the price of cocaine in U.S. dollars and did not mention any currency
other than the U.S. dollar or the Colombian peso. Though these communications
do not directly state the cocaine was destined for the United States, they further
suggest Castaneda knew or had reasonable cause to believe it was going there.
Third, the government presented other testimony indicating the cocaine was
bound for the United States. The government’s international drug trafficking
expert testified the quantity of cocaine involved in the shipments indicated it was
“highly likely” the cocaine would be sent to a large and profitable consumer
market, which existed in the Untied States but not Central America, and that the
cocaine could sell for far more money in the United States than in Central America
or Mexico. The government’s expert further testified that Central America was a
critical transshipment zone where cocaine from Colombia was prepared for further
shipment on to the United States, and that transporting the cocaine to Central
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America enabled Colombian drug traffickers to avoid cartel violence in Mexico. A
Colombian National Police Officer who investigated Castaneda and the drug
trafficking organization similarly testified that cocaine is typically smuggled from
Tumaco to Central America and then to the United States, and that it was unlikely
the cocaine was being sent elsewhere. This testimony regarding the likely market
for and typical route of the cocaine to the United States via Central America
further suggests Castaneda had reason to know the cocaine would be unlawfully
imported into the United States.
Castaneda argues the government offered only speculation about her
knowledge of where the cocaine was headed. She also contends the fact she may
have been paid in U.S. dollars is not evidence the cocaine was going to the United
States and points out her expert testified there are large consumer markets for
cocaine outside the United States, such as in Europe. She also asserts cooperating
witnesses are not credible because they hope to receive favorable treatment from
the government. These arguments are unavailing, however, as we draw all
reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the government’s favor, and the
jury was “free to choose between or among the reasonable conclusions to be drawn
from the evidence presented at trial.” See Browne,
505 F.3d at 1253 (quotation
marks omitted). Taken together, the codefendants’ testimony, intercepted
communications, and other testimony concerning the market for and route of the
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cocaine provide substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude
Castaneda knew or had reasonable cause to believe the cocaine would be
unlawfully imported into the United States.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
Castaneda next contends her sentence was substantively unreasonable under
the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. She argues that she was significantly less culpable
than others involved in the large-scale distribution of cocaine, notes her poor and
abusive upbringing in Colombia and separation from her children in Colombia, and
contends a ten-year sentence would have been sufficient to provide just
punishment and fulfill other sentencing goals. Castaneda also argues there was
unwarranted disparity between her sentence and those of her codefendants. 2
We consider the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under the abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). On substantive
reasonableness review, we may vacate the sentence only if we “are left with the
definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United
States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks
2
To the extent Castaneda challenges the conditions of her confinement for the first time
in her reply brief, we deem any such argument to be waived. See United States v. Levy,
379 F.3d
1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2004).
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omitted). The party who challenges the sentence bears the burden to show that the
sentence is unreasonable, considering the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United
States v. Tome,
611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
Section 3553(a) requires the district court to “impose a sentence sufficient,
but not greater than necessary,” to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote
respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct,
protect the public, and provide the defendant with necessary training, care, or
treatment.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D). The court must also consider the nature
and circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of the defendant,
the types of sentences available, the applicable guidelines range, any pertinent
policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims.
Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). The weight given to any § 3553(a) factor is a matter
committed to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Williams,
526
F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008).
Based on a total offense level of 41 and criminal history category of I,
Castaneda’s advisory guidelines range was 324 to 405 months’ imprisonment. The
district court varied downward from the low end of the guidelines range by 54
months, resulting in a below-guidelines sentence of 270 months’ imprisonment.
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The statutory range for Castaneda’s offense was 120 months to life imprisonment.
See
21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii).
Castaneda’s sentence is substantively reasonable. At sentencing, after
hearing the parties’ arguments, the district court emphasized that this was a serious
case involving hundreds of kilograms of cocaine, with over 600 kilograms
attributed to Castaneda. The court also stated Castaneda had played a significant
role in the offense, which was supported by evidence at trial that she brought
others into the drug trafficking organization, managed and supervised others within
the organization, and arranged logistics for shipping the cocaine. The court also
indicated it was important to deter others from committing similar offenses. These
considerations are consistent with § 3553(a) factors including the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
seriousness of the offense and afford adequate deterrence.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
(2)(A)-(B). It was in the court’s discretion to assign greater weight to these factors
than to Castaneda’s upbringing or distance from her family. See Williams,
526
F.3d at 1322.
Castaneda’s sentence did not result in unwarranted sentencing disparity.
Nine of Castaneda’s ten codefendants pleaded guilty before the district court; one
was transferred to another judicial district. Only Castaneda proceeded to trial.
Castaneda argues Edison Perlaza Orobio (Orobio), the leader of the drug
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trafficking organization, had a lower advisory guidelines range even though 30,000
kilograms of cocaine were attributed to him in the presentence investigation report.
She also contends several other defendants—Belalcazar, Bonilla, and Jefferson
Bravo Espinosa (Bravo)—received lower sentences than she did despite being held
accountable for larger quantities of cocaine.
Castaneda’s arguments are without merit. Orobio had yet to be sentenced at
the time of Castaneda’s sentencing. Belalcazar, Bonilla, and Bravo all pleaded
guilty, cooperated with the government, and accepted responsibility. As such,
none of those individuals could serve as proper points of comparison for whether
there was any unwarranted sentencing disparity. See United States v. Cavallo,
790
F.3d 1202, 1237 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating that under § 3553(a)(6), “a defendant
who cooperates with the Government and pleads guilty is not similarly situated to
his co-defendant who proceeds to trial,” and “there is no unwarranted disparity
even when a cooperating defendant receives a substantially shorter sentence than a
defendant who goes to trial” (quotation marks omitted)). In any event, the district
court considered the sentences of Castaneda’s codefendants in deciding to vary
downward by 54 months.
As a final matter, that Castaneda’s sentence fell below the advisory
guidelines range and well below the statutory maximum of life imprisonment are
further indications of its reasonableness. See United States v. Nagel,
835 F.3d
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1371, 1377 (11th Cir. 2016) (concluding sentence’s position at the low end of the
advisory guidelines range and significantly below the statutory maximum of life
supported its reasonableness).
II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, we affirm Castaneda’s conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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