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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-14200
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-00727-GKS-DCI
JOSEPH HEID,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MARK RUTKOSKI,
FORREST BEST,
ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,
JOHN W. MINA,
Sheriff,
Defendants-Appellees,
JERRY L. DEMINGS,
Defendant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(May 24, 2021)
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Before MARTIN, BRANCH, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Heid appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal, pursuant to
28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), of his second amended civil rights complaint under
42
U.S.C. § 1983. The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in
dismissing the action pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Defendants were never served and therefore have not filed a brief on appeal. After
review, 1 we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 27, 2020, Heid, a state prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint
against the Orange County, Florida Sheriff’s Department (the Sheriff’s
Department), former Orange County Sheriff Jerry L. Demings, and two Orange
County deputy sheriffs, Mark Rutkoski and Forrest Best. Heid alleged that on
April 26, 2016, Rutkoski and Best shot him six times “as he exited his home with
his hands raised, declaring he was unarmed and surrendering.” Heid also asserted
the Sheriff’s Department had failed to provide Rutkoski and Best with adequate
1
The district court stated it was dismissing the case “in accordance with
28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).” We review the district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a
claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo, viewing the allegations in the complaint as true.
Hughes v. Lott,
350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003).
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training. Along with the complaint, Heid filed an application to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP).
Heid then filed the court’s required Notice of Pendency of Other Actions,
noting his case was related to a criminal action in the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court
of Florida. 2 On May 15, 2020, the district court issued an order directing Heid to
correct numerous deficiencies in his complaint, explaining that Heid was required
to state with particularity which of his constitutional rights had been violated and
how each defendant had been involved in the alleged violations. Relevant here, the
court noted Heid’s criminal prosecution appeared to arise from or otherwise
involve the same allegations as his civil case. The court directed Heid to file an
amended complaint providing further details about his criminal case. Specifically,
the court stated as follows:
Plaintiff must clearly set forth the status of the underlying state criminal
prosecution arising from the allegations in this case. He should include
all of the charges filed against him, whether the case has proceeded to
trial, and the outcome of the trial. Plaintiff should include an
identification of the convictions and sentences and whether any of the
Defendants herein were involved as victims or witnesses in the state
criminal prosecution.
The court cautioned that failure to fully comply with its order would result in
dismissal of the action without further notice.
2
See State of Florida v. Heid, No. 2016-CF-005268-A-O (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 28, 2016).
3
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Heid obtained counsel. Through counsel, he filed a first amended complaint
against the same defendants, except current Orange County Sheriff John W. Mina
was named in place of Demings. The amended complaint set forth claims under
42
U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and failure to train, but it did not provide any
information about Heid’s criminal prosecution. There is no indication on the
docket any attempt was made to serve defendants.
Heid’s amended complaint, filed by counsel, failed to provide any
information about Heid’s criminal prosecution. Therefore, the district court could
have begun the process for dismissing the action for failure to comply with its May
15, 2020, order. However, the court did not do so. Instead, on June 8, 2020, the
court issued a second order again directing Heid to comply with its order of May
15, 2020. The court again cautioned that failure to comply would result in
dismissal of the action without further notice.
On June 23, 2020, Heid filed a second amended complaint. Heid stated that
in his state criminal case, he had been found guilty on February 7, 2018, of
attempted first-degree murder and three counts of aggravated assault with a
weapon, and that he was currently serving a 20-year sentence. He stated he had
also been charged with two counts of resisting an officer with violence, but no
action was taken on those counts. Heid further stated Rutkoski and Best were
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witnesses for the state at trial. Heid cited an “Exhibit A” in reference to his
criminal case, but he did not attach any exhibits to his complaint.
With respect to his § 1983 claims, Heid alleged the following. On April 26,
2016, officers were dispatched to his home to arrest him. He exited his home with
his hands up, verbally informing the officers he was unarmed and surrendering.
Rutkoski fired twice into Heid’s left thigh without warning. Heid turned his back
and was shot again, fell face down to the ground and was shot again, and rolled
onto his back and was shot again. Collectively, Rutkoski and Best shot Heid six
times. Heid alleged he was not a danger to the officers or anyone else and was not
attempting to escape arrest. Heid asserted a failure-to-train claim against the
Sheriff’s Department (Count 1), and an excessive force claim against Rutkoski and
Best (Count 2). Once again, no defendant was served with the complaint.
Although the second amended complaint indicated Rutkoski and Best were
witnesses for the state at trial, it failed to indicate whether Rutkoski and Best were
involved as victims, as the May 15, 2020, order had directed. Once more, the court
could have begun the process of dismissing the action for failure to comply with its
prior order, but it did not do so. Instead, on June 25, 2020, the court issued another
order directing Heid to file a memorandum setting forth whether Rutkoski or Best
“was a victim or otherwise a subject of the charges.” The court again cautioned
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that failure to fully comply with its order would result in dismissal of the action
without further notice.
In response to the court’s order, Heid filed a memorandum explaining that
he first encountered law enforcement officers at the rear of his home, and this was
where the attempted murder and aggravated assault had occurred. “At that time,”
Heid stated, “while standing at the rear of the home, [he] allegedly had a shot gun
in his hands and fired at one or more officers,” but he could not identify who they
were. Heid stated he then tried to surrender peacefully at the front of his home.
Heid declared he did “not know if [Rutkoski or Best] had previously been amongst
the officers who were at the rear of the home or not,” and he presumed the officers
in the front “were a different group of officers, since the entire perimeter of the
home was surrounded.”
Even though Heid had already been tried and convicted, he still did not state
who the victims of the attempted murder and aggravated assault were, and
therefore still did not comply with the court’s prior orders. But the court did not
begin the process for dismissing the action on this basis. Instead, on July 14, 2020,
the court directed Heid to file, within 14 days, the “Exhibit A” referenced in the
second amended complaint and a copy of his state-court judgment and sentence.
Heid failed to comply within the required timeframe, and a magistrate judge
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directed him to show cause within ten days why the case should not be dismissed
for failure to comply with the court’s order.
Heid then filed a copy of the state-court docket, minutes from his
arraignment, a scheduling order, and a list of video evidence, which he stated could
“be turned over for review upon court order.” Heid also stated he was serving a
life sentence, not a sentence of 20 years, as stated in the second amended
complaint. Heid separately filed a response to the order to show cause stating he
was unable to locate a copy of his sentencing order.
The court at this stage could have begun the dismissal process based on
Heid’s failure to provide a copy of “Exhibit A” and his state-court judgment and
sentence, but it did not do so. Instead, the court gave Heid another opportunity to
file these materials, cautioning that failure to do so would result in dismissal
without further notice.
Heid then filed a copy of the state-court docket, which he identified as the
missing “Exhibit A,” and a copy of his sentencing order. The “charge details”
listed at the top of the docket sheet reported that, after a jury trial, Heid was
convicted of the following offenses against law enforcement officers, all of which
occurred on April 26, 2016: attempted first-degree murder with a firearm (Count
1), and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Counts 2-4). The docket sheet
also indicated that Heid had been charged with resisting an officer with violence,
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but no action had been taken on that charge. The sentencing order reflected that
Heid was serving a sentence of life imprisonment.
On October 20, 2020—nearly six months after Heid filed suit—the district
court dismissed the action without prejudice pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey,
512
U.S. 477 (1994). The court stated the record revealed Heid had been charged with,
and found guilty of, one count of attempted murder and three counts of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon “as a result of the incident involving . . . Rut[k]oski
and Best.” The court concluded Heck applied because Heid would have to
“establish that he did not commit the offenses for which he was convicted” to
prevail on his civil rights claims, and therefore, “a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor . . .
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his underlying conviction[s].” The court
did not provide any further analysis or explain what information it relied on in
reaching this conclusion. Nor did it provide any information about the events
giving rise to Heid’s criminal convictions and their relationship to Heid’s § 1983
claims.
Heid timely appealed. Because defendants were never served in the district
court, they had no opportunity to appear in the district court. Nor have they had an
opportunity to appear in our court.
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II. DISCUSSION
Under Heck v. Humphrey, a state prisoner may not bring a claim for
damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”
512 U.S. at 487.
“[I]f it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate
that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”
Id. The rule in Heck
avoids “the problem inherent in two potentially conflicting resolutions arising out
of the same set of events by foreclosing collateral attacks on convictions through
the vehicle of a § 1983 suit.” McClish v. Nugent,
483 F.3d 1231, 1250 (11th Cir.
2007).
Heck bars § 1983 actions for damages that are “directly attributable” to a
prisoner’s conviction or confinement as well as those “for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid.” Heck,
512 U.S. at 486-487 & n.6. As an example of the latter category of suit, the
Supreme Court noted a prisoner convicted of resisting a lawful arrest could not
pursue a § 1983 action for damages against the arresting officer based on his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures because “[i]n order
to prevail in this § 1983 action, he would have to negate an element of the offense
of which he has been convicted.” Id. at 486 n.6. We observed that in this
example, the plaintiff’s conviction and § 1983 claim “share a common element,”
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and to succeed on the § 1983 claim, the plaintiff would have to show, in conflict
with his underlying criminal conviction, the unlawfulness of his arrest. McClish,
483 F.3d at 1250-51.
We have held that for Heck to apply, “it must be the case that a successful
§ 1983 suit and the underlying conviction be logically contradictory.” Dyer v. Lee,
488 F.3d 876, 884 (11th Cir. 2007). “In other words, as long as it is possible that a
§ 1983 suit would not negate the underlying conviction, then the suit is not Heck-
barred.” Id. at 879–80.
The district court erred in concluding a judgment in Heid’s favor on his
excessive force and failure-to-train claims would necessarily imply the invalidity
of his state-court convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault. Heid
alleges that when Rutkoski and Best shot him, he posed no threat to them and had
his arms raised. A successful excessive force claim based on these allegations—
which we are obligated to accept as true—does not “logically contradict[]” Heid’s
underlying convictions, which we know little about based on the limited record
before us. See Dyer,
488 F.3d at 884; see also Harrigan v. Metro Dade Police
Dep’t Station #4,
977 F.3d 1185, 1193-97 (11th Cir. 2020) (Heck did not bar
excessive force claim based on unprovoked shooting where prisoner was found
guilty of aggravated assault against another officer); Dixon v. Hodges,
887 F.3d
1235, 1238-40 (11th Cir. 2018) (Heck did not bar prisoner found guilty of battery
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against a correctional officer from pursuing excessive force claim against officer);
Willingham v. Loughnan,
261 F.3d 1178, 1183 (11th Cir. 2001) (jury’s finding that
officers engaged in excessive force did “not necessarily call into question” the
validity of plaintiff’s convictions for attempted second-degree murder and battery
against officers), cert. granted and vacated on other grounds,
537 U.S. 801 (2002).
The factual circumstances surrounding Heid’s attempted murder and
aggravated assault convictions are unknown from the limited record in this case
and were not explained by the district court. 3 It is unclear how quickly the entire
incident unfolded, which officers Heid assaulted, or where Rutkoski and Best were
located. Heid submitted the attempted murder and aggravated assaults took place
before Rutkoski and Best shot him, in a different part of his home, and suggested
Rutkoski and Best were not among the officers he shot. This version of events
may or may not prove true. But without a more developed record, it was error for
the court to conclude Heid’s § 1983 claims necessarily implied the invalidity of his
convictions. Because there exists “a construction of the facts that would allow the
underlying conviction[s] to stand,” Heck does not bar Heid’s suit at this stage of
the proceedings. Dyer,
488 F.3d at 880.
3
We question whether the district court had before it complete and accurate information
about Heid’s convictions to the extent the conviction information was based on Heid’s state-
court docket sheet.
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III. CONCLUSION
The record reveals the district court could have begun the dismissal process
for this action at numerous points in the litigation but elected not to do so. The
district court issued five orders, not counting the magistrate judge’s order to show
cause, directing Heid to provide specific information about his criminal
prosecution, including whether Rutkoski and Best were victims of the attempted
murder and aggravated assault charges. Heid never fully complied with any one of
the district court’s orders, and the court could have initiated the dismissal process
on this basis on at least four occasions. Additionally, this case has reached our
court without defendants knowing of Heid’s lawsuit or having an opportunity to
respond.
There are many potential ways the court could have dismissed this case.
The one it chose, however, has caused us to reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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