Eldrick Brown v. Roderick Passmore , 445 F. App'x 187 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-11242 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 19, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-20936-MGC
ELDRICK BROWN,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll l Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RODERICK PASSMORE,
Pin # 5532
WILLIAM GOINS,
Pin# 2372
DARION WILLIAMS,
Pin# 7647
WILLIAM COOK,
Pin# 1184
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants-Appellants,
REGINALD KINCHEN,
Sgt., Pin# 3622
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(September 19, 2011)
Before WILSON, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Roderick Passmore, Darion Williams, William Cook, and William Goins,
officers with the Miami Police Department (collectively, “Defendants”), appeal
the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity. Eldrick Brown filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint
against Defendants, alleging that they entered and searched his house without a
warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The parties offered different
versions of the event. Defendants allege that (1) they observed Brown and another
individual engaging in suspected drug sales outside the residence; (2) when Brown
fled into his residence, two officers, who are not named defendants, pursued and
arrested Brown; (3) the two officers then observed drugs in plain view inside the
residence; and (4) the named Defendants had no involvement with the entry and
search of Brown’s residence or his arrest. Brown, however, claims that he was
sleeping and was not selling drugs, the officers did not find drugs in his house or
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on his person, and the officers entered and searched his house without a warrant or
exigent circumstances. Based on these conflicting accounts and inconsistencies in
Defendants’ evidentiary exhibits, the district court found that there were genuine
issues of fact that precluded summary judgment.
Defendants argue that the district court erred in denying summary judgment
because, based on the “undisputed facts,” there was arguable probable cause and
exigent circumstances to search the premises without a warrant. They also assert
that Brown’s contention that no drugs were in the home is immaterial because the
appeal does not involve a challenge to his arrest, but to the lawfulness of the
search. Defendants claim that the law was not clearly established regarding the
“undisputed circumstances” of the search, and thus they were entitled to qualified
immunity and summary judgment.
“We review the denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds
de novo,” Reams v. Irvin, 561 F.3d 1258, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2009), considering
all evidence and reasonable factual inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 964 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). “The
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moving party bears the initial burden of showing the court . . . that there are no
genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial.” Allen v. Bd. of Pub.
Educ., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007).
Once the moving party satisfies that initial showing, the burden of
persuasion shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence to establish the
existence of a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 1314. “Where the record taken as
a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there
is no genuine issue for trial.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). When there are opposing versions of the facts, and one
version is “blatantly contradicted by the record,” a court should not consider the
contradicted version in deciding a motion for summary judgment. Id.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he was
“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” American
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999). Under the Fourth
Amendment, warrantless searches and seizures in a home are presumptively
unreasonable, and thus deprive individuals of the right the amendment secures.
Bates v. Harvey, 518 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008). The search or seizure is
lawful “only when some exception to the warrant requirement—such as consent or
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exigent circumstances—exists.” Id. Exigent circumstances include, inter alia,
“hot pursuit of a suspect [and] risk of removal or destruction of evidence.” Id. at
1245.
Although Defendants phrase the issue as whether they were entitled to
qualified immunity based on the “undisputed” facts, they do not address the
findings of the district court—i.e., that there were a number of specific genuine
issues of fact. For example, Defendants presented a version of facts in which they
observed Brown and another individual engaging in suspected drug transactions
outside of Brown’s residence. When the officers approached Brown, they claim
he fled into his residence. At that point, two officers who are not named
defendants pursued Brown, arrested him, and viewed drugs on a table. Defendants
assert that none of the named Defendants arrested Brown or entered his residence.
Brown, however, testified under oath at his deposition to a different version
of the facts. Brown testified that he was sleeping when Defendants forced entry
into his residence without a warrant, where they searched his entire residence and,
in the process, damaged his belongings. Brown is adamant that the officers found
no drugs within his house. Under Brown’s version of the facts, Defendants
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his house without a warrant,
consent, or exigent circumstances. See id. at 1239. Based on these conflicting
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accounts, the district court did not err in denying summary judgment.
We also note that Defendants’ reliance on Harris is misplaced. Specifically,
in Harris the defendant police officers introduced an objective piece of
evidence—a videotape—which blatantly contradicted the plaintiff’s version of the
facts. Harris, 550 U.S. at 378–80 (explaining how the videotape of the car chase
clearly contradicted the plaintiff’s contention that he was not driving in a manner
that endangered pedestrians or other motorists, and, accordingly, the court need
not credit that statement). In the instant case, Defendants’ only objective evidence
is the property receipt and court documents—both of which contain discrepancies.
While the property receipt would support Defendants’ assertion that drugs were
found at Brown’s residence, it is dated one day before Brown’s arrest. It also lists
only one green bag of cocaine, while the arrest affidavit lists fifteen. Defendants
did not explain, either to the district court or on appeal, why their evidence
showed the drugs in police possession one day before they were allegedly found in
Brown’s residence, or why there was a discrepancy in the number of bags
purportedly seized. The property receipt does not clearly support Defendants’
version of the facts, as did the videotape in Harris.
Moreover, the court documents contradict Defendants’ version of the facts
and supported Brown’s version. Specifically, the resisting-arrest charge (to which
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Brown pleaded guilty) stated that Brown resisted “Officer R. Passmore.” This
objective evidence clearly contradicts Defendants’ contentions, as they all claim
that none of them interacted with Brown. Defendants have not explained how
Passmore allegedly did not have contact with Brown, yet Brown was charged with
resisting Passmore. Thus, this exhibit supports Brown’s claim that he had direct
contact with Passmore.
Because there is no objective evidence that “blatantly” contradicts Brown’s
version, the district court was correct in viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Brown, the non-moving party. The district court did not err in finding
that there were genuine issues of material fact, and appropriately denied
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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