Franklin Carson v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-11394
SEPTEMBER 21, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 3:09-cv-00613-JBT
FRANKLIN CARSON,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(September 21, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Franklin Carson appeals the district court's order affirming the
Commissioner's denial of his application for disability insurance benefits. On
appeal, Mr. Carson argues first that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred
by failing to address Mr. Carson’s possible walking and standing limitations in
determining that he was able to perform “light work.” Secondly, Mr. Carson
argues that the ALJ erred by failing to credit his subjective complaints of pain.
After reviewing the district court order and the parties’ briefs, this court affirms.
We review the ALJ's decision “to determine if it is supported by substantial
evidence and based on proper legal standards.” Crawford v. Comm'r, 363 F.3d
1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is more than
a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Even if the evidence preponderates against the
[ALJ]'s findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported by
substantial evidence.” Id. at 1158-59 (citation omitted). In conducting this review,
we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.
Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F. 3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). With respect to the
ALJ's legal conclusions, however, our review is de novo. Lewis v. Barnhart, 285
F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002).
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I.
The ALJ did fully consider Mr. Carson’s limitations with regard to walking
and standing. After an extensive review of the medical and non-medical evidence,
the ALJ found that Mr. Carson had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform a limited range of light work. In order to make this determination the ALJ
followed the requirements of Social Security Ruling 96-8p: “the RFC assessment
must first identify the individual’s functional limitations or restrictions and assess
his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis . . . . Only after
that may RFC be expressed in terms of the exertional levels of work . . . .” SSR
96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474 (July 2, 1996). Following this rubric, the ALJ fully
discussed and evaluated the medical evidence, Mr. Carson’s testimony, and the
effect each impairment has on his daily activities.
While, the ALJ did not specifically refer to Mr. Carson’s ability to walk or
stand, the ALJ did limit Mr. Carson’s exertional level of work to “light work.”
“Light work” by definition limits the amount an individual can walk or stand for
approximately six hours in an eight-hour work day. See SSR 83-10, 1983 WL
31251 (S.S.A.). Furthermore, the ALJ’s thorough evaluation of Mr. Carson’s case
led the ALJ to adopt additional limitations to Mr. Carson’s ability to perform light
work. Simply because the ALJ chose not to adopt further limitations on Mr.
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Carson’s ability to walk or stand, does not mean the ALJ did not properly consider
the alleged limitations. Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that Mr. Carson
is not fully disabled in regards to walking or standing because none of the doctors
that evaluated Mr. Carson noted any concerns with his ability to stand or walk,
other than what Mr. Carson complained of to them. On the contrary, Mr. Carson’s
treating physician, Dr. Lord, only put limitations on Mr. Carson’s ability to use his
left shoulder. Tr. at 13 Furthermore, Dr. Tran, who examined Mr. Carson for the
Commissioner, noted that Mr. Carson’s gait was normal and that he was able to
enter and exit the examining table without difficult. Id. at 291. As such, the ALJ
could properly decide that Mr. Carson could walk or stand for approximately six
hours in an eight-hour work day.
II.
When a claimant attempts to establish disability through his own testimony
concerning pain or other subjective symptoms, we apply a two-part “pain
standard.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F. 3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). The test
requires the claimant to show (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition,
and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the
alleged pain or other symptoms arising from that condition, or (b) that the
objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be
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reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain or other symptoms. Id. When
evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptoms, the ALJ must consider such things
as: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the nature and intensity of pain and other
symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) effects of medications;
and (5) treatment or measures taken by the claimant for relief of symptoms. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).
Here, the ALJ had substantial evidence to conclude that while Mr. Carson
does have an underlying medical condition, there was no objective evidence
confirming the severity of pain that Mr. Carson claimed. Mr. Carson is no longer
taking prescription pain medicine, he followed a conservative treatment plan
directed by his treating physicians, and none of his treating physicians agreed with
Mr. Carson’s assessment of the intensity of pain. Thus, the ALJ could properly
conclude that Mr. Carson’s pain was not as severe as he claimed.
The ALJ correctly determined that Mr. Carson had the RFC to perform light
work with respect to his ability to stand or walk, because the ALJ found that Mr.
Carson was not disabled after enumerating and evaluating all of the impairments
and symptoms alleged, discussing the medical evidence and Mr. Carson’s
testimony, and explaining his reasoning based on the record and the law.
Furthermore, based on the evidence in the record, the ALJ properly determined
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that the objective medical evidence, Mr. Carson’s conservative course of treatment
and Mr. Carson’s choice to not use prescription pain medication indicated that his
complaints of pain were not credible. Accordingly, this Court affirms.
AFFIRMED
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