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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-15613
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cr-00496-EAK-JSS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EVERETT J. TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(June 10, 2021)
Before: WILSON, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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In June 2017, Everett Taylor agreed to plead guilty to theft of government
property, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 641, and aggravated identity theft, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. In return, the government agreed to (1) dismiss the
remaining counts of his indictment, (2) not charge him with any other known
offenses related to the conduct giving rise to the plea agreement, and (3)
recommend that Taylor be sentenced within his applicable guideline range.
Under a section of the plea agreement titled “Forfeiture of Assets,” Taylor
agreed that, if the district court determined that he had breached that section of the
agreement, he “may be found ineligible for a reduction in the Guidelines
calculation for acceptance of responsibility for an obstruction of justice
enhancement.” Additionally, the plea agreement contains an appeal-waiver
provision, which prevents him from appealing his sentence absent one of the
following circumstances: (1) his sentence exceeds his applicable guideline range as
determined by the court using the Sentencing Guidelines, (2) his sentence exceeds
the statutory maximum penalty, (3) his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment,
or (4) if the government appeals, he could appeal.
Taylor and his trial counsel confirmed that Taylor understood the terms of
his plea agreement, and confirmed that the plea agreement formed the sole basis
for his plea. The district court accepted Taylor’s guilty plea. Shortly thereafter,
the probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report (PSI). The PSI
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reported that Taylor has been arrested for providing a false name and date of birth,
and resisting an officer’s attempt to handcuff him. Consequently, the PSI
increased Taylor’s base-offense level by 2 points for obstruction of justice. The
PSI also reduced his offense level for acceptance of responsibility, to which the
government objected. At sentencing, the district court heard from both parties.
The government requested that Taylor be sentenced to 78 months’ and 24 months’
imprisonment for his respective convictions, for a total of 102 months
imprisonment—a sentence at the bottom of his applicable guidelines range. The
district court adopted the government’s recommendation and sentenced Taylor to
serve 102 months’ imprisonment.
Taylor appeals his convictions and total sentence. He argues that the
government breached an implicit promise in its plea agreement by objecting to the
offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and failing to object to the
offense-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, and therefore asks to
withdraw his guilty plea. He also raises various challenges to his sentence. The
government moves for summary dismissal of Taylor’s breach-of-plea challenge. It
also moves to enforce the appeal-waiver provision of his plea agreement with
respect to Taylor’s challenges to his sentence.
First, we grant the government’s motion for summary disposition as to
Taylor’s breach-of-plea argument. We review de novo whether the government
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has breached a plea agreement. United States v. De La Garza,
516 F.3d 1266,
1269 (11th Cir. 2008). However, where a defendant argues that the government
breached his plea agreement for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error
only.
Id. To show plain error, a party must show that (1) there was an error, (2)
that was plain, (3) that affected his substantial rights, and (4) that “seriously
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Id.
Summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of one of the parties is
clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the
outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is
frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis,
406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir.
1969). 1
Plea agreements “are like contracts and should be interpreted in accord with
what the parties intended.” United States v. Rubbo,
396 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir.
2005). A plea agreement’s unambiguous meaning controls. United States v.
Copeland,
381 F.3d 1101, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004). We do not infer obligations not
agreed to by the parties. See United States v. Benchimol,
471 U.S. 453, 455 (1985)
(per curiam) (determining that, by agreeing simply to recommend a particular
1
Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding that all
decisions of the “old Fifth” Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30,
1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit).
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sentence, the government did not also implicitly agree to “enthusiastically”
recommend a particular sentence or explain its reasons for recommending a
sentence). “If the parties dispute the meaning of the agreement, we interpret the
terms of the plea agreement based on objective standards.” United States v.
Thomas,
487 F.3d 1358, 1360 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). The government is
bound to any material promises that it makes to induce the defendant to plead
guilty.
Id. at 1360. To evaluate whether the government breached a plea
agreement, we must “determine the scope of the government’s promises and ask
whether the government’s actions were inconsistent with what the defendant
reasonably understood when he entered his guilty plea.” United States v. Sosa,
782
F.3d 630, 637 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (alteration adopted and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Summary disposition is appropriate here because there is no substantial
question as to whether the government breached Taylor’s plea agreement. See
Groendyke Transp., Inc.,
406 F.2d at 1162. The unambiguous language of
Taylor’s plea agreement bound the government only to recommend a sentence
within the guideline imprisonment range as it was determined by the district court.
Copeland,
381 F.3d at 1106. The government fulfilled its promise by
recommending a sentence that was on the low end of Taylor’s guideline range and
was required by statute.
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The provision of the plea agreement that stated that Taylor “may be found
ineligible” for an offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and “may
be eligible” for an offense-level enhancement for obstruction of justice if he
breached the section of the agreement regarding forfeiture did not create an
implied obligation on the part of the government. See Benchimol,
471 U.S. at 455.
That provision did not use language that indicated that the government was bound
to make any recommendation or objection as to Taylor’s sentence. Thomas,
487
F.3d at 1360. Rather, it described the sentencing consequences of Taylor’s failure
to forfeit certain assets, which is not tantamount to an affirmative promise to make
a sentencing recommendation. Thus, the government’s adherence to the plea
agreement does not evidence error, let alone plain error.
We also grant the government’s motion to dismiss Taylor’s challenges to his
sentence pursuant to the appeal-waiver provision in his plea agreement. Whether a
defendant waived his right to appeal is a question of law that we revie de novo.
United States v. Bushert,
997 F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir. 1993). A sentence-appeal
waiver is enforceable if it was made knowingly and voluntarily.
Id. at 1350. To
establish that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, the government
must show either that (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant
about the waiver during the plea colloquy, or (2) the record makes clear that the
defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver.
Id. at 1351.
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“An appeal waiver includes the waiver of the right to appeal difficult or debatable
legal issues or even blatant error.” United States v. Grinard-Henry,
399 F.3d 1294,
1296 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). We presume that the statements made during a
plea colloquy are true. See United States v. Castro,
736 F.3d 1308,1314 (11th Cir.
2013) (per curiam).
The record demonstrates that Taylor knowingly and voluntarily waived his
right to appeal his sentence. The magistrate judge went over the waiver provision
and its exceptions during the plea colloquy, and Taylor confirmed that he
understood the appeal waiver, had discussed it with counsel, did not have any
questions, and was freely and voluntarily giving up his right to appeal his sentence
unless any of the four limited exceptions applied. Further, none of the exceptions
to the appeal waiver apply to this appeal.
Therefore, we GRANT the government’s motion for summary disposition
with respect to Taylor’s breach-of-plea challenge. In addition, we GRANT the
government’s motion to dismiss Taylor’s challenges to his sentence pursuant to the
appeal waiver in his plea agreement.
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