United States v. Jose Santos Lopez Hernandez , 522 F. App'x 908 ( 2013 )

Case: 12-14085 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-14085
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20041-JAL-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE SANTOS LOPEZ HERNANDEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(March 28, 2013)
Before BARKETT, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Jose Santos Lopez Hernandez appeals his conviction for possession of a
firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). On appeal, Lopez Hernandez argues that his guilty plea to a Florida
state felony offense followed by a withholding of adjudication was not a
“conviction” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
Under the prior precedent rule, a panel of this Court is bound to follow a
prior binding precedent unless and until it is overruled by this Court sitting en banc
or by the Supreme Court. United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236
(11th Cir. 2008). However, when the prior decision involves interpretations of
state law, if the applicable state law “changes or is clarified in a way that is
inconsistent with the state law premise of one of our earlier decisions, the prior
panel precedent rule does not bind us to follow our earlier decision.” United States
v. Johnson, 528 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 559
U.S. 133, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010). We have “categorically rejected
an overlooked reason or argument exception to the prior precedent rule.” Id.We first addressed the question of whether a guilty plea to a Florida state
felony offense and a withholding of adjudication constitutes a predicate conviction
under § 922(g) in United States v. Orellanes, 809 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1987).
Relying on the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242,
243-33 (Fla. 1971), we held that “the term ‘conviction’ means determination of
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guilty by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication
by the court.” Orellanes, 809 F.2d at 1528. Two years later, relying on Orellanes,
we reaffirmed that “under Florida law a person is considered a convicted felon
when there has been a withholding of adjudication of guilt.” United States v.
Grinkiewicz, 873 F.2d 253, 255 (11th Cir. 1989).
We revisited the issue in 2001, and, operating under plain error review, held
that the district court did not plainly err when it accepted the defendant’s guilty
plea to the felon-in-possession charge. United States v. Chubbuck, 252 F.3d 1300,
1306 (11th Cir. 2001). In Chubbuck, we recognized the holdings of Orellanes and
Grinkiewicz, but noted that the analysis in Orellanes may not have fully accounted
for the context-specific nature of the term “conviction” under Florida law. Id. at
1304. While Orellanes and Grinkiewicz relied on a Florida Supreme Court
decision defining the term “conviction” with regard to Florida’s Limitation On
Withheld Sentences Statute, because the term is context-specific, “the more
appropriate source of applicable Florida law would be that surrounding Florida’s
own unlawful possession of firearms by a felon statute, FLA. STAT. § 790.23.” Id.
However, we determined that the case law in the area was limited but varied, and
there was no definitive statement from the Florida Supreme Court on the issue. Id.
at 1304-05. Accordingly, we concluded that, although it had “become increasingly
clear that perhaps our interpretation of Florida law was either in error or has since
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changed,” because there was no definitive authority from the Florida Supreme
Court that contradicted our precedent, the district court did not commit plain error
in accepting Chubbuck’s guilty plea. Id. at 1305. We noted, however, that “the
prior precedent rule would not apply if intervening on-point case law from either
this Court en banc, the United States Supreme Court, or the Florida Supreme Court
existed.” Id. at 1305 n.7.
Here, the district court did not err because the law of this Circuit, as stated in
Orellanes, Grinkiewicz, and Chubbuck, is that Lopez Hernandez’s guilty plea to a
Florida felony offense followed by a withheld adjudication qualifies as a
“conviction” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Because there no intervening,
on-point case law from the Florida Supreme Court, this Court en banc, or the
Supreme Court, the district court’s conclusion was compelled by the prior
precedent rule.
AFFIRMED.
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