David A. Boyette v. Commissioner of Social Security , 605 F. App'x 777 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-12769
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-00090-MP-CAS
DAVID A. BOYETTE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(February 18, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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David Boyette appeals the judgment of the District Court affirming the
decision of the Acting Commissioner (“Commissioner”) of the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) denying his application for disability insurance benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act. The issue he presents is whether the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) “erred by not giving great weight to the
decision of the Veterans Administration (“VA”) that [he] was . . . entitled to
individual unemployable rating (100% disability rating) . . . as of November 21,
2008.” Appellant’s Br. at 1. We conclude that the ALJ did not err in considering
the VA’s disability finding and that substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s decision. We therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment. 1
In determining whether the Commission’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence, we are mindful that substantial evidence is “more than a
scintilla.” Rather, it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept
as adequate to support a conclusion that a claimant is or is not entitled to benefits.
1
Boyette’s applied for disability insurance benefits in February 2010, alleging that he
became disabled on July 17, 2007, due to physical impairments. He worked after that, from
April to November 2008, and from April to November 2009, as an assistant football coach for an
average of two hours a day. He stopped working on both occasions not because of his disability
but because the football season ended in November. The state agency responsible for disability
determinations at the initial and reconsideration levels of review found Boyette not disabled. On
June 13, 2011, the ALJ held a hearing on Boyette’s application for benefits. Boyette, who was
represented by counsel, and a vocational expert testified at the hearing.
Boyette testified that several conditions limited his ability to work: (1) degenerative disc
disease; (2) degenerative joint disease/postthrombotic syndrome; (3) postphlebotic syndrome in
his legs; (4) Factor V coagulation defect; (5) hypertension; (6) tinnitus; (7) tension headaches;
(8) sleep apnea; and (9) chronic sinusitis. The ALJ found Boyette not disabled under the Social
Security Act, concluding that he was still capable of performing his past relevant work as an
administrative assistant and hearing officer.
2
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Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam). At the end of the day, if we conclude that the ALJ (whose decision
became the Commissioner’s) ruled on the claimant’s application for benefits on the
basis of such evidence, we will defer to the ALJ’s decision even if the evidence
preponderates against it. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)
(per curiam).
For Social Security purposes, “disability” is defined as the “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner uses a five-step,
sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled.
Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). This
process includes an analysis of whether the claimant: (1) is unable to engage in
substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe and medically determinable
impairment; (3) has an impairment, or combination thereof, that meets or equals a
Listing, and meets the duration requirement; (4) can perform his past relevant
work, in light of his residual functional capacity (RFC); and (5) can make an
adjustment to other work, in light of his RFC, age, education, and work experience.
Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). The claimant’s RFC is an assessment, based upon
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all the relevant evidence, of the claimant’s ability to do work despite his
impairments. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.945(a)(1). The claimant bears the “heavy burden” to demonstrate “both a
qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore v.
Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
The ALJ has a duty to make clear the weight accorded to each item of
evidence and the reasons for those decisions, so as to enable a reviewing court to
determine whether the ultimate decision is based on substantial evidence. Cowart
v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981). “[T]here is no rigid requirement
that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in [her] decision,” so long
as the ALJ’s decision is not just “a broad rejection” that does not enable the
reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ considered the claimant’s medical
condition as a whole. Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211. The ALJ may make fact findings
implicitly if the implication is sufficiently clear. See Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d
1177, 1178 nn. 1–2 (11th Cir. 1986) (discussing credibility findings).
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504, a decision by any other government
agency, such as the VA, regarding a claimant’s disabled status “is based on [that
agency’s] rules and is not [the commissioner’s] decision” as to disability. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1504. Instead, the Commissioner must “make a
disability . . . determination based on social security law.” Id. VA disability
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ratings are thus not binding on the ALJ, but such ratings should be considered and
“given great weight.” Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 921 (11th Cir. 1984)
(quotation omitted). In Rodriguez v. Schweiker, 640 F.2d 682, 686 (5th Cir. Unit
A, March 25, 1981) (per curiam) 2, the court stated that “[a] VA rating of 100%
disability should have been more closely scrutinized by the ALJ,” because the ALJ
mentioned the VA rating but “obviously refused to give it much weight.” The
court noted that VA disability ratings are nonbinding but “should be considered”
and are “entitled to great weight.” Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504.
In the instant case, the ALJ expressly acknowledged the VA’s determination
that Boyette was entitled to total disability on the basis of individual
unemployability (“TDIU”), and she also noted that this determination was not
binding. Although the ALJ did not assign an express level of weight to the VA
disability rating itself, except to say that it was not entitled to controlling weight,
she scrutinized the VA’s decision and explained in detail why it was not entitled to
controlling weight. The ALJ considered and assigned weight to the VA
examiners’ opinions, VA primary care provider opinions, and VA treatment
records. In fact, the ALJ appears to have given great weight to the VA examiners’
opinions that Boyette was capable of light or sedentary employment, which she
concluded were consistent with the medical evidence and record evidence as a
2
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981), this court adopted as
binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
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whole. However, the ALJ noted that other agencies determined disability under
parameters other than those used by the SSA, and thus, while the clinical findings
reported by the VA medical staff were given “appropriate weight,” the VA’s final
opinion as to degree of disability was not entitled to controlling weight. Cf.
Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that the ALJ
must give treating physician testimony substantial or controlling weight unless
there is “good cause” not to do so, and explaining that good cause exists when the
treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence, the evidence
supported a contrary finding, or the opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with
the physician’s own medical records). Thus, although the ALJ declined to give
controlling weight to the VA disability determination and did not expressly state
she gave “great” weight to it, there is no indication that she failed to give the VA’s
determination great weight or consideration. See Brady, 724 F.2d at 921; see also
Parker, 793 F.2d at 1178 nn. 1–2.
Boyette does not present any other objection to the ALJ’s decision.
Although he contends that it is more difficult to obtain a TDIU rating than it is to
obtain SSA disability benefits, even the VA’s TDIU ratings are not binding on the
ALJ and are not determinative as to whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence. See Brady, 724 F.2d at 921. Here, the ALJ correctly noted
that the VA disability determination is guided by different factors than those for
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SSA disability. Where, as here, the VA treatment notes, examining VA doctors’
opinions, treating doctors’ opinions, and state agency assessments all support the
ALJ’s RFC assessment, the ALJ did not err in her treatment of the VA’s disability
determination. Thus, the ALJ’s finding of no disability is supported by substantial
evidence.
AFFIRMED.
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