United States v. Norge Manduley , 585 F. App'x 1001 ( 2014 )

Case: 13-13504 Date Filed: 09/26/2014 Page: 1 of 11
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-13504
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20452-KMM-5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NORGE MANDULEY,
a.k.a. Norge Mandulay,
a.k.a. Norge,
a.k.a. Noje,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(September 26, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 13-13504 Date Filed: 09/26/2014 Page: 2 of 11
Norge Manduley appeals his conviction for one count of conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute less than 100 marijuana plants, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), and his 240-month sentence. After a jury trial, Manduley
was convicted of his participation in the marijuana conspiracy but was acquitted of
various charges stemming from an alleged carjacking, kidnapping, and murder that
Manduley allegedly committed on behalf of the drug organization against the
leader of a rival organization. On appeal, Manduley contends the district court
abused its discretion by permitting the government to introduce into evidence
Manduley’s prior state felony conviction and information from Manduley’s
probation file from a different, unrelated matter. He next argues that the district
court abused its discretion when it excluded as hearsay evidence a statement of his
co-defendant, German Silvestro, that Silvestro overheard another co-defendant,
Juan Filipe Casteneda, admit to the murder that Manduley was alleged to have
committed. Manduley further argues that his statutory maximum sentence, based
on conduct for which he was acquitted, was procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. Lastly, Manduley argues for the first time on appeal that the district
court violated his due process rights by ordering his 240-month statutory maximum
sentence to run consecutive to his ten-year state court sentence for an unrelated
state felony conviction.
2
Case: 13-13504 Date Filed: 09/26/2014 Page: 3 of 11
I.
We review the district court’s rulings on admission of evidence for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256, 1275 (11th Cir. 2013).
Even where an abuse of discretion is shown, we need not reverse a conviction if
the evidentiary error “had no substantial influence on the outcome and sufficient
evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict.” United States v. Fortenberry,
971 F.2d 717, 722 (11th Cir. 1982).
However, when the district court refers a nondispositive matter to a
magistrate judge, a party has 14 days to submit written objections after being
served with a copy of the magistrate’s judge’s written order. Fed. R. Crim. P.
59(a). “The district judge must consider timely objections and modify or set aside
any part of the order that is contrary to law or clearly erroneous. Failure to object
in accordance with this rule waives a party’s right to review.” Id.Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that evidence of a crime, wrong,
or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on
a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character, but it “may
be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1) and (2).
3
Case: 13-13504 Date Filed: 09/26/2014 Page: 4 of 11
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that the district court may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting
time, and/or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is admissible if (1) it is relevant to an
issue other than the defendant’s character, (2) there is sufficient proof to allow a
jury to find that defendant committed the extrinsic act, and (3) the evidence
possesses probative value that is not substantially outweighed by its undue
prejudice and otherwise meets requirements of Rule 403. United States v. Sanders,
668 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2012).
Manduley waived any argument that the evidence of his prior conviction
should not be admitted because he failed to object to the magistrate judge’s order
that the evidence be admitted. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(a). Accordingly, we will
not review his arguments here.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing pages from
Manduley’s probation file into evidence. The portion of the probation file
admitted into evidence consisted of Manduley’s self-reported contact and
employment information, and the phone numbers he provided corresponded to
phone numbers of drug conspiracy members and co-defendants charged with
conspiring to kidnap and murder. This evidence, which was probative of
4
Case: 13-13504 Date Filed: 09/26/2014 Page: 5 of 11
Manduley’s participation in the charged offenses and not Manduley’s character,
was limited to the relevant contact information evidence, and therefore was not
impermissible extrinsic evidence of an uncharged offense. See Fed. R. Evid.
404(b). Furthermore, the highly probative value of the evidence substantially
outweighed any prejudicial effect that may have resulted from the jury’s
knowledge that the information came from a probation file. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the evidence
and took measures to limit any potential prejudice. See Sanders, 668 F.3d at 1314.
Moreover, even if the court did commit error, the error was harmless in light of the
ample evidence of Manduley’s guilt in the marijuana conspiracy. See Fortenberry,
971 F.2d at 722.
II.
A statement is hearsay if “(1) the declarant does not make [it] while
testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers [it] in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). A
statement is not hearsay if it “is offered against an opposing party and . . . was
made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). “The rule is intended to allow for introduction of co-
conspirators’ statements as evidence against them as defendants.” United States v.
Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1014 (3d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, because the prosecution
5
Case: 13-13504 Date Filed: 09/26/2014 Page: 6 of 11
is not a “party” against whom such evidence can be offered, an exculpatory
hearsay statement made by a defendant’s co-conspirator is inadmissible. Id.Where a constitutional violation may have occurred as the result of error, the
conviction need not be reversed where the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705(1967).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Silvestro’s
testimony about his prior statement. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) was not an applicable
exception to the hearsay rule because Manduley offered the statement as an
exculpatory statement made by a co-conspirator. See Kapp, 781 F.2d at 1014.
Even if the district court abused its discretion by excluding Silvestro’s out of court
statement as inadmissible hearsay or violated Manduley’s purported due process
right to admit an exculpatory statement, the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. Castaneda’s
statement, offered through Silvestro, would have related solely to the kidnapping
and murder charges, of which Manduley was acquitted. The evidence connecting
Manduley to the drug conspiracy, for which he was convicted, was overwhelming,
and admission of Silvestro’s statement would not have impacted the jury’s verdict
on that count. Accordingly, the statement “had no substantial influence on the
6
Case: 13-13504 Date Filed: 09/26/2014 Page: 7 of 11
outcome and sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict.”
Fortenberry, 971 F.2d at 722.
III.
When reviewing the district court’s findings with respect to a Guidelines
issue, we consider legal issues de novo, factual findings for clear error, and the
district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts with due deference, which
is tantamount to clear error review. United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621,
624 (11th Cir. 2010). For a finding to be clearly erroneous, the district court’s
finding must leave us with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Id.We review the reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse of discretion
standard. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). The
appellant has the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of
the record and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d
784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).
In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first ensure that the
sentence was procedurally reasonable, meaning the district court properly
calculated the guideline range, treated the Guidelines as advisory, considered the
§ 3553(a) factors, did not select a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, and
adequately explained the chosen sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51,
7
Case: 13-13504 Date Filed: 09/26/2014 Page: 8 of 11
128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).
In reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we consider the totality of the
facts and circumstances in evaluating whether the sentence lies outside the range of
reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case. United States v. Irey, 612
F.3d 1160, 1189-1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Although we do not
automatically presume a sentence within the guideline range to be reasonable, we
ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d
739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008).
The district court must issue a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary” to comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). These purposes include the need for a sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for
the offender, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from future criminal
conduct. Id. § 3553(a)(2). Additional considerations include the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
applicable guideline range, and the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).
At sentencing, the district court may consider conduct of which defendant
has been acquitted, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of
8
Case: 13-13504 Date Filed: 09/26/2014 Page: 9 of 11
evidence. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149, 117 S.Ct. 633, 634, 136
L.Ed.2d 554 (1997).
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, “[i]f a victim was killed under circumstances
that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 had such killing taken place
within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States, [a sentencing
court should] apply § 2A1.1 (First Degree Murder).” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(d)(1). First
degree murder receives a base offense level of 43. U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1. That offense
level applies to both premeditated killings, and to felony murder such as bank
robbery. Id. comment. (nn.1-2).
Manduley’s statutory maximum 240-month sentence is not procedurally or
substantively unreasonable. The district court correctly applied the cross-reference
to the murder guideline to reach a base offense level of 43 because the district
court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the victim in this matter was
killed. Although Manduley was acquitted of the murder charge, under Watts, the
district court was permitted to consider the acquitted conduct for the purposes of
sentencing, so long as that conduct was proved by preponderance of evidence. 519
U.S. at 149, 117 S.Ct. at 634. Accordingly, the district court did not procedurally
err when applying § 2A1.1 and setting Manduley’s base offense level at 43.
Manduley’s sentence is not substantively unreasonable in light of the totality
of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors. In light of the serious nature of the
9
Case: 13-13504 Date Filed: 09/26/2014 Page: 10 of 11
crime, which resulted in kidnapping and murder, it was not a clear abuse of
discretion to sentence Manduley to 240 months. Rather, Manduley’s sentence
promotes respect for the law, provides just punishment, deters criminal conduct,
and protects the public from Manduley’s future criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(2). Manduley has not met his burden of showing that his 240-month
sentence is outside the range of reasonable sentences. See Irey, 612 F.3d 1189-
1190.
IV.
When a defendant fails to assert his objection before the district court at
sentencing, we review for plain error. See United States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743
F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir. 2014). To prevail under the plain error standard, an
appellant must show: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) it affected
his substantial rights; and (4) it seriously affected the fairness of the judicial
proceedings. Id. at 822. An error is “plain” if controlling precedent from the
Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit establishes that an error has occurred. Id.Where a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already
subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently
or consecutively. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). To determine whether to impose a
sentence concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to an undischarged
10
Case: 13-13504 Date Filed: 09/26/2014 Page: 11 of 11
term of imprisonment, the court should consider the factors enumerated in
§ 3553(a). Id. § 3584(b); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c). In addition, the commentary to
§ 5G3.1 provides that the court should also consider, inter alia, any other
circumstance relevant to the determination of an appropriate sentence for the
instant offense. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment. (n.3).
Manduley did not object at sentencing to his sentence being run consecutive
to his state sentence, nor did he argue before or after imposition of sentence that
the consecutive nature of the sentence violated his due process rights. We
therefore review his argument for plain error. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d at 821.
Manduley does not demonstrate that any error occurred, let alone plain error.
The state charge was unrelated to the instant offense, and it was within the district
court’s discretion to impose his federal sentence consecutive to his undischarged
state court sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). Moreover, Manduley does not
provide support for his purely factual contention that his state sentence was to run
concurrent to his federal sentence, and he points to no controlling authority that the
district court violated.
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.
11