Bruce Ayala v. Sheriff, Broward County Florida , 594 F. App'x 602 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-10582
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cv-61933-RSR
BRUCE AYALA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SHERIFF, BROWARD COUNTY FLORIDA,
Al Lambert in his official capacity,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(February 19, 2015)
Before WILSON, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Bruce Ayala appeals the grant of summary judgment for his former
employer, the Sheriff of Broward County, Florida. Ayala brought suit under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, and the Florida Civil
Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.01. Ayala averred that the
Sheriff eliminated his position in the crime lab as part of a reduction in force (RIF)
based on his age. The district court concluded that Ayala failed to establish a
prima facie case of age discrimination because he did not show that he was
qualified for another available position at the time of the RIF. Ayala contends this
was error, because he was qualified to assume two other positions: one held by
Deborah Friedman, a younger employee whom the Sheriff retained, and a vacant
position. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.
We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Castleberry v. Goldome Credit
Corp., 408 F.3d 773, 785 (11th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate “if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The ADEA forbids discharging an employee who is at least 40 years of age
“because of” the employee’s age. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a). To prevail
on an age-discrimination claim, “[a] plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence (which may be direct or circumstantial), that age was the ‘but-for’ cause
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of the challenged employer decision.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S.
167, 177–78, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009). The FCRA makes it unlawful to
“discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any individual . . . because of” that
individual’s age. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.10(1)(a). “Age discrimination claims
brought under the Florida Civil Rights Act have been considered within the same
framework used to decide actions brought pursuant to the ADEA.” Zaben v. Air
Prods. & Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1455 n.2 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to establish age discrimination through
circumstantial evidence, the district court uses the burden-shifting framework
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817(1973). See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en
banc). Under this framework, if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the defendant must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its employment decision; in response, the plaintiff is afforded an
opportunity to show that the reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id.; McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S. Ct. at 1825.
A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of age discrimination in the RIF
context by showing that: (1) he was in a protected age group and was adversely
affected by an employment decision; (2) he was qualified for his current position
or to assume another available position at the time of discharge; and (3) the
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evidence could lead a factfinder reasonably to conclude that the employer intended
to discriminate on the basis of age. Smith v. J. Smith Lanier & Co., 352 F.3d
1342, 1344 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Here, the district court did not err in
holding that Ayala failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.
Ayala did not show the second element of the prima facie case—that he was
qualified to assume another available position at the time of his discharge. 1
The ADEA “does not mandate that employers establish an interdepartmental
transfer program during the course of an RIF, or impose any added burden on
employers to transfer or rehire laid-off workers in the protected age group as a
matter of course.” Id. (alteration adopted) (citation omitted). The Act “simply
provides that a discharged employee who applies for a job for which she is
qualified and which is available at the time of her termination must be considered
for that job along with all other candidates, and cannot be denied the position based
upon her age.” Id. at 1344–45 (quotation omitted). “Nothing in the ADEA
requires that younger employees be fired so that employees in the protected age
group can be hired.” Earley, 907 F.2d at 1083 (alteration adopted) (citation
omitted).
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Showing that he was qualified for his current position would not satisfy this element. “Where a
particular job position is entirely eliminated for nondiscriminatory reasons, for plaintiff to prevail
against his employer he must show that he was qualified for another available job with that
employer; qualification for his current position is not enough.” Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp.,
907 F.2d 1077, 1082–83 (11th Cir. 1990).
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Ayala points to two positions, but neither satisfies the second element of the
prima facie case: one position was unavailable, and he did not apply for the other.
Friedman took her job in 2009, before Ayala’s termination in 2010. So that
position was not available to Ayala. And Ayala admitted that he did not apply for
the vacant position. See Smith, 352 F.3d at 1345 (discussing an employee’s
“obligation to actually apply for a specific position”). Ayala did not show that he
was qualified for another available position at the time he was discharged, so the
district court properly held that he did not show a prima facie case of age
discrimination.
AFFIRMED.
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