Cleveland Hankerson v. United States ( 2015 )


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  •              Case: 14-10781   Date Filed: 02/24/2015   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-10781
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 5:13-cv-00078-MTT-CHW
    CLEVELAND HANKERSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Department of Parole and Probation,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (February 24, 2015)
    Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 14-10781    Date Filed: 02/24/2015   Page: 2 of 4
    Cleveland Hankerson, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
    district court’s dismissal of his mandamus petition, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    § 1361, which sought to compel the U.S. Probation Office to respond to his request
    to amend his 1992 presentence investigation report (PSI). On appeal, Hankerson
    argues that the district court erred in dismissing his mandamus petition because the
    Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 522a(g)(1), provides him with a civil remedy against the
    Probation Office. He also argues that the sentencing court used allegedly
    inaccurate information in the PSI to impose an unwarranted career offender
    enhancement.
    We review a district court’s refusal to issue a writ of mandamus for abuse of
    discretion. In re Stewart, 
    641 F.3d 1271
    , 1275 (11th Cir. 2011). In the case of a
    pro se action, we will construe the petition more liberally than we would formal
    pleadings drafted by attorneys. Powell v. Lennon, 
    914 F.2d 1459
    , 1463 (11th Cir.
    1990).
    Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, federal courts have jurisdiction over
    mandamus actions seeking “to compel an officer or employee of the United States
    or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
    However, mandamus relief is “an extraordinary remedy which should be utilized
    only in the clearest and most compelling of cases.” Cash v. Barnhart, 
    327 F.3d 1252
    , 1257 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, a writ of mandamus is only appropriate if the
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    petitioner demonstrates that: (1) he has a clear right to the relief requested; (2) the
    respondent has a clear duty to act; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.
    
    Cash, 327 F.3d at 1258
    .
    In certain circumstances, the Privacy Act allows an individual to bring a
    civil action against a government agency if that agency refuses to correct
    inaccurate information in its records. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1). However, this
    private right of action only applies to federal agencies. Schwier v. Cox, 
    340 F.3d 1284
    , 1287 (11th Cir. 2003). The definition of “agency” does not include “the
    courts of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B). Because the Probation Office
    acts as a liaison between the sentencing court and the defendant, it serves as “an
    arm of the court.” United States v. Bernardine, 
    237 F.3d 1279
    , 1283 (11th Cir.
    2001).
    Although we have not squarely addressed whether the Probation Office is
    exempt from the Privacy Act, it is clear that § 551(1)(B) exempts court documents
    and reports from disclosure under the Privacy Act and FOIA. See Lovell v.
    Alderete, 
    630 F.2d 428
    , 434 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that a parole recommendation
    report was exempt from FOIA due to the exception for federal courts in
    § 551(1)(B)).
    Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing
    Hankerson’s mandamus petition. Hankerson has not demonstrated a clear right to
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    relief against the Probation Office because, by definition, the Privacy Act only
    applies to federal agencies, not to federal courts. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(B),
    552a(g)(1). Furthermore, Hankerson could have asserted his Privacy Act claim in
    a civil action under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1), and his arguments related to his
    sentence could have been brought on direct appeal or in an earlier 28 U.S.C.
    § 2255 motion. As such, Hankerson has not demonstrated a clear right to relief,
    and, even if he has, there were adequate remedies other than mandamus available.
    Accordingly, mandamus relief was not appropriate, and the district court did not
    err in dismissing his mandamus petition.
    Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
    affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
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