United States v. Jeremy Bayne Lynch , 595 F. App'x 943 ( 2014 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-10519
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-00154-CG-N-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JEREMY BAYNE LYNCH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
________________________
(December 29, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, HULL and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jeremy Lynch and six others—Disa Rivers, Christopher Barber, Haley
Jordan, Tessa Rivers, Jamie Holland, and Thomas Turner—were charged in a
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twenty-count superseding indictment with trafficking methamphetamine. Lynch
was charged in six counts: Count One, conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 946; Counts Five, Six,
Seven, Nine, and Eleven, possession with intent to distribute the drug, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Lynch pled guilty to
Count One, which carried a statutory penalty of imprisonment for five to forty
years. The plea agreement contained a waiver, which stated that Lynch
knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to file any direct appeal
or any collateral attack, including a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Accordingly, [Lynch will] not challenge
his guilty plea, conviction, or sentence . . . in any district court
or appellate court proceedings.
The District Court sentenced Lynch to a prison term of sixty months. He now
appeals his conviction and sentence. We affirm.
I.
Lynch seeks the vacation of his conviction on the ground that the District
Court committed plain error in accepting his guilty plea to Count One because the
factual basis presented to the court was insufficient to show that he was involved in
the alleged conspiracy.
Ordinarily, we review a district court’s determination of whether there is a
sufficient factual basis to accept a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Owen, 858 F.2d 1514, 1516 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). However, where, as
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here, a defendant fails to object to a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11
violation in the district court, we review for plain error under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 52(b). See United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1018–19
(11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
To obtain a reversal for plain error, a defendant must show that there is (1)
error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. See United States v.
Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir.2005). “If all three conditions are met,
an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but
only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122
S. Ct. 1781, 1785, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860 (2002)).
As for a Rule 11 violation, “a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction
after a guilty plea . . . must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he
would not have entered the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S.
74, 83, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2340, 159 L. Ed. 2d 157 (2004). To satisfy this standard,
the defendant need not “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for [the]
error things would have been different.” Id. at 83 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 2340 n.9.
Instead, he “must . . . satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the
entire record, that the probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 83; 124 S. Ct. at 2340
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(quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Davila, 749 F.3d 982, 993–94
(11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
Rule 11 requires district courts to “determine that there is a factual basis for
the plea” before entering judgment on a guilty plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).
“The standard for evaluating challenges to the factual basis for a guilty plea is
whether the trial court was presented with evidence from which it could reasonably
find that the defendant was guilty.” United States v. Lopez, 907 F.2d 1096, 1100
(11th Cir. 1990). There is no requirement that there be “uncontroverted evidence”
of guilt. Owen, 858 F.2d at 1516–17. The purpose of the Rule 11 requirement that
a district court conduct a sufficient inquiry into the factual basis for the plea is “to
protect a defendant who mistakenly believes that his conduct constitutes the
criminal offense to which he is pleading.” Lopez, 907 F.2d at 1100. We may
evaluate a defendant’s admissions in a factual summarization if such facts were
presented by the parties to enable the district court to determine the factual basis
for a guilty plea. See United States v. Frye, 402 F.3d 1123, 1128 (11th Cir. 2005)
(per curiam).
To support a conviction for conspiracy to distribute drugs in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846, “the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) a
conspiracy existed; (2) [the defendant] knew of the essential objectives of the
conspiracy; and (3) [he] knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.”
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United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1326 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks
omitted). In considering the first element, we consider whether a common goal
existed, the nature of the underlying scheme, and any overlap of the participants.
See United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1089 (11th Cir. 2009). To prove the
third element, knowing and voluntary participation, the government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had the specific intent to join the
conspiracy. Calderon, 127 F.3d at 1326. However, once the government
establishes the existence of the underlying conspiracy, “it only needs to come
forward with slight evidence to connect a particular defendant to the conspiracy.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
A defendant’s participation in a conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence, and a common purpose and plan with other co-conspirators “may be
inferred from a development and collocation of circumstances.” United States v.
Lyons, 53 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir. 1995) (quotation marks omitted) (explaining
that the inference of participation, raised from presence and association with
conspirators, is a material and probative factor that a jury may properly consider).
There is a “critical distinction between a conspiratorial agreement and a
buyer–seller transaction.” United States v. Mercer, 165 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir.
1999) (per curiam). A buyer–seller transaction “is simply not probative of an
agreement to join together to accomplish a criminal objective beyond that already
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being accomplished by the transaction.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “The
essence of a conspiracy,” by contrast, “is an agreement, not the commission of the
substantive offense.” Id.; see also United States v. Dekle, 165 F.3d 826, 829 (11th
Cir. 1999) (“What distinguishes a conspiracy from its substantive predicate offense
is not just the presence of any agreement, but an agreement with the same joint
criminal objective—here the joint objective of distributing drugs.”). Regarding
drug transactions, a conspiratorial agreement “may be inferred when the evidence
shows a continuing relationship that results in the repeated transfer of illegal drugs
to the purchaser.” Mercer, 165 F.3d at 1335. Additionally, it is “well-established
in this Circuit” that “where there are repeated transactions buying and selling large
quantities of illegal drugs,” there is “sufficient evidence that the participants were
involved in a conspiracy to distribute those drugs in the market.” Brown, 587 F.3d
at 1089; see also United States v. Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2005)
(stating that an agreement may also “be inferred when the evidence shows a
continuing relationship that results in the repeated transfer of illegal drugs”
between a seller and buyer (quoting United States v. Johnson, 889 F.2d 1032,
1035–36 (11th Cir. 1989))). While “mere presence” during a drug transaction is
not enough, such presence is “certainly a factor to consider in determining whether
a defendant joined a conspiracy.” United States v. Charles, 313 F.3d 1278, 1284
(11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
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Lynch has not demonstrated that the District Court plainly erred in
concluding there was a sufficient factual basis for his guilty plea, as there was
ample evidence in the record for the court to reasonably find that he was guilty of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a substance containing
methamphetamine. First, three of Lynch’s codefendants—Christopher Barber,
Disa Rivers, and Haley Jordan—are linked together through the statements of an
unnamed cooperating defendant, as reflected in Lynch’s factual summary. Rivers
arranged for the cooperating defendant to serve as protection during Barber’s drug
purchases from suppliers, and Rivers told Barber that she had some guns to sell,
sold one of those guns to the cooperating defendant, and possibly sold another to
Jordan as well. Rivers confirmed her connection to Jordan and Barber in her post-
arrest statements, stating that it was Jordan who introduced her to Barber.
Second, Lynch is linked to both Rivers and Jordan. As to Rivers, a
confidential informant (“CI”) met with Rivers for a controlled buy; then Rivers
met with Lynch, who presumably supplied her with the methamphetamine ice that
was discovered in the course of her subsequent arrest. Rivers also made a post-
arrest statement implicating Lynch in distributing methamphetamine ice. As to
Jordan, Rivers stated that it was Jordan who told her about Lynch’s dealing in
methamphetamine ice. Rivers also stated that Jordan and Lynch procured
methamphetamine ice on a weekly basis. A CI reported that Lynch agreed to a
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methamphetamine ice deal and that Jordan volunteered to make the delivery.
Lynch told the CI to come to Jordan’s residence to complete the transaction, and
Lynch and Jordan together delivered the methamphetamine ice.
Accordingly, the evidence is not such that a reasonable factfinder could only
conclude that the extent of Lynch’s involvement was as a seller and thus there was
no conspiracy. See Mercer, 165 F.3d at 1335. There is significant overlap of the
participants, and the evidence as a whole permits the inference of a conspiratorial
agreement in which Lynch took part. See id. Rule 11 does not require
uncontroverted evidence of guilt, and circumstantial evidence, particularly
presence and association with conspirators, may be considered. See Lyons, 53 F.3d
at 1201. In sum, the court committed no plain error here.
II.
Lynch argues that his guilty plea was involuntary because the District Court
plainly erred in failing to adequately explain the factual basis underlying his plea.
He also argues that, under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151,
186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), he should be allowed to withdraw his plea so that he can
plead anew to one of the five substantive counts and have a factfinder determine
the drug amount for which he is to be held accountable.
“There is a strong presumption that the statements made during the [plea]
colloquy are true.” United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994).
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In accepting a defendant’s guilty plea, the district court must specifically address
the three core principles of Rule 11 by “ensuring that a defendant (1) enters his
guilty plea free from coercion, (2) understands the nature of the charges, and (3)
understands the consequences of his plea.” Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1019; see also
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G) (requiring that, prior to accepting a guilty plea the
district court inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant
understands, “the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading”).
Whether the district court has complied with Rule 11’s second core principle
“turns on a variety of factors, including the complexity of the offense and the
defendant’s intelligence and education.” United States v. Telemaque, 244 F.3d
1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). The court should not assume that simply
reading the charges to the defendant will suffice; rather, it generally should refer to
the elements of the crime or verify that counsel has helped the defendant
understand the charges. See id. However, “for simple charges . . . a reading of the
indictment, followed by an opportunity given the defendant to ask questions about
it, will usually suffice.” Lopez, 907 F.2d at 1099 (quotation marks omitted); see
also United States v. Bell, 776 F.2d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
(indicating, in a case involving marijuana, that conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute narcotics is a “simple” charge).
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that any fact, other than
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a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury. 530 U.S. 466, 490–91, 120 S. Ct.
2348, 2363–63, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). In Alleyne, the Supreme Court extended
the holding of Apprendi to cover facts that increase a given crime’s mandatory
minimum penalty. 570 U.S. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at 2155, 2163. Interpreting Alleyne,
we have explained that “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence
for a crime must be admitted by a defendant or be submitted to a jury and found
beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Payne, 763 F.3d 1301, 1304 (11th
Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
Here, Lynch’s argument that the District Court did not ensure that he
understood the nature of the charges against him almost entirely relies on his
assertion that the factual summary does not show a conspiracy. However, as we
explained above, Lynch has not shown that the District Court plainly erred in
finding that the factual basis was sufficient. Because the factual summarization
presented to the court furnished a sufficient factual basis, and because the court
ensured that Lynch understood and agreed that the government could prove the
facts contained in the summary, Lynch’s argument fails.
To the extent that Lynch otherwise argues that the District Court did not
ensure that he understood the charges against him, the record shows that the
District Court explained that, to be found guilty of conspiracy to possess with
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intent to distribute a substance containing methamphetamine, the government had
to prove that two or more people came to a mutual understanding to commit an
unlawful act, that Lynch knowingly and intentionally joined the plan, and that
more than 50 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine was involved in
the conspiracy. Lynch stated that he understood, and Lynch also stated that he had
discussed the charges in the indictment with his attorney and understood them at
that point as well. Considering that Lynch graduated high school and was facing
simple charges, and that the court referred Lynch to the elements of the offense and
verified that counsel helped Lynch understand the charges, and taking into account
the presumption that a defendant’s statements during the plea colloquy are true, the
court did not commit plain error under Rule 11. See Medlock, 12 F.3d at 187; Bell,
776 F.2d at 969.
Lynch’s argument regarding Alleyne is meritless, as the District Court
applied the statutory mandatory minimum sentence based on facts Lynch admitted
during the course of his guilty plea. See Payne, 763 F.3d at 1304. Furthermore, to
the extent that he argues that the court plainly erred in not explaining Alleyne
during the plea colloquy, Lynch has not identified any controlling law requiring the
court to do so, and, in any event, Lynch agreed as part of his plea agreement that
the enhanced statutory minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment applied. In
short, Lynch has not demonstrated that the District Court plainly erred in failing to
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properly explain the factual basis for his guilty plea.
III.
Lynch additionally appeals his sentence on the ground that the District Court
clearly erred by not granting a sentence reduction pursuant to the safety valve
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The government contends that this challenge is
barred by the appeal waiver in Lynch’s plea agreement. We agree.
We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo. United States
v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence appeal waiver will
be enforced if it was made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Bushert,
997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1993). To establish that the waiver was made
knowingly and voluntarily, the government must show either that (1) the district
court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver during the plea
colloquy, or (2) the record makes clear that the defendant otherwise understood the
full significance of the waiver. Id. We have enforced a sentence appeal waiver
where “the waiver provision was referenced during [the defendant’s] Rule 11 plea
colloquy and [the defendant] agreed that [he] understood the provision and that
[he] entered into it freely and voluntarily.” See United States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d
1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001).
“An appeal waiver includes the waiver of the right to appeal difficult or
debatable legal issues or even blatant error.” United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399
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F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see United States v. Howle, 166
F.3d 1166, 1169 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that “[w]aiver would be nearly
meaningless if it included only those appeals that border on the frivolous”).
Furthermore, a defendant may waive his right to appeal both constitutional and
non-constitutional issues by executing a valid sentence appeal waiver. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that a
defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal a sentence on
Eighth Amendment grounds); United States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th
Cir. 2005) (holding the same based upon a challenge made under United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005)). We have,
however, suggested that a valid appeal waiver might not prevent a defendant from
appealing a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum, or from arguing that
his equal protection rights were violated because he was sentenced based on an
arbitrary classification such as race or religion. Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1350 n.18.
Additionally, “[i]n extreme circumstances—for instance, if the district court had
sentenced [the defendant] to a public flogging—due process may require that an
appeal be heard despite a previous waiver.” Howle, 166 F.3d at 1169 n.5.
Pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(B), a defendant who conspires to possess with intent
to distribute 50 grams or more of a substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine is subject to a statutory penalty of imprisonment for five to forty
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years. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 841(b)(1)(B)(viii), 846. However, under the “safety
valve” provision, the district court “shall impose a sentence pursuant to the
[Sentencing Guidelines] without regard to any statutory minimum sentence, if the
court finds at sentencing, after the Government has been afforded the opportunity
to make a recommendation,” that five conditions are present. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f);
see U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2; United States v. Brownlee, 204 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir.
2000). The fifth condition requires that, prior to sentencing, the defendant
“truthfully provide[] to the Government all information and evidence the defendant
has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct
or of a common scheme or plan.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). Although it is the
district court’s responsibility to determine the truthfulness of the information the
defendant provided to the government, “[t]he burden of proof on the truthfulness
issue lies, of course, with the defendant.” United States v. Espinosa, 172 F.3d 795,
797 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
Lynch’s safety valve challenge is barred by his sentence appeal waiver.
Lynch does not argue that the waiver was not made knowingly and voluntarily. In
any event, the District Court specifically questioned him regarding the waiver and
he indicated that he understood the provision and entered into it freely and
voluntarily. See Weaver, 275 F.3d at 1333; Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351.
Because the sentence appeal waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily,
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Lynch may not appeal his sentence unless an exception applies. None of the three
exceptions to the waiver applies here because (1) Lynch’s sentence is not beyond
the statutory maximum imprisonment term of forty years provided for in
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(viii) (and is in fact at the statutory minimum); (2) his sentence was
within the Guidelines sentence range; and (3) he does not raise a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.1 See Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1350 n.18.
Lynch also challenges whether he should have been given safety valve relief
from the statutory minimum punishment, which he waived the right to challenge.
Lynch’s argument that the denial of safety valve relief is effectively the same as an
upward variance or departure from what his guideline range should have been is
unpersuasive. The plain language of the appeal waiver exception applies to
upward departures or variances, not their functional equivalents, and the denial of
safety valve relief is not an upward departure or variance. To interpret the plea
agreement otherwise would mean that any guideline calculation issue could fit the
exception, as any alleged error could be said to be the functional equivalent of an
upward variance from the “true” guideline range.
As for Lynch’s argument that the denial of safety valve relief violated
Alleyne and due process, we have held that a defendant may waive constitutional
1
Although Lynch belatedly attempts to assert ineffective assistance of counsel in his
reply brief, the gravamen of his claim is not attorney ineffectiveness but rather district court
error.
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arguments, including an Apprendi claim, see Rubbo, 396 F.3d at 1335, and Lynch
has not explained why an Alleyne claim is meaningfully different. And in any
case, the failure to award safety valve relief does not result in Alleyne error: not
receiving a sentence below the statutory minimum does not mean a defendant was
sentenced to an enhanced statutory minimum sentence based on a fact not alleged
in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the
defendant in pleading guilty. See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at 2155,
2163. Here, there was no Alleyne error because Count One alleged a conspiracy
involving 50 grams of a substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine, the plea agreement stated that the government could prove 50
grams and that the minimum sentence was imprisonment for five years, and Lynch
admitted the factual basis of a conspiracy involving 50 grams. His sentence does
not represent the extreme circumstances where he might be permitted to appeal
despite his appeal waiver. For the forgoing reasons, we do not review Lynch’s
sentence and, to the extent this appeal seeks its review, the appeal is dismissed.
AFFIRMED, in part; DISMISSED, in part.
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