Melissa Stone v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration , 596 F. App'x 878 ( 2015 )

Case: 14-11982 Date Filed: 01/08/2015 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-11982
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-00052-MCR-CAS
MELISSA STONE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(January 8, 2015)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
Case: 14-11982 Date Filed: 01/08/2015 Page: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Melissa Stone appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social Security
Commissioner’s (“Commissioner”) denial of her applications for disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental social security income (“SSI”)
benefits. On appeal, she argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred
by not incorporating the answer to one of the hypotheticals he posed to the
vocational expert (“VE”) when determining that, considering Stone’s age,
education, work experience, and residual functioning capacity (“RFC”), jobs
existed in the national economy that she could perform.
In Social Security appeals, we review the decision of an ALJ as the
Commissioner’s final decision when the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals
Council denies review of the ALJ’s decision. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274,
1278 (11th Cir. 2001). We review the Commissioner’s legal conclusions de novo
and consider whether the Commissioner’s factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Lewis v. Barnhart, 285 F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002).
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lewis v.
Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). We “may not decide facts anew,
reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner.”
2
Case: 14-11982 Date Filed: 01/08/2015 Page: 3 of 5
Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation and alteration
omitted).
An individual claiming Social Security disability benefits must prove that
she is disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). For SSI
claims, a claimant becomes eligible in the first month where she is both disabled
and has an SSI application on file. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202-03. Unlike SSI, which has
no insured-status requirement, a claimant seeking DIB must demonstrate disability
on or before the last date on which she was insured, to be eligible for benefits.
Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
“Disability” is defined as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable impairment that can be expected
to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A
person will be found disabled only if her impairments are so severe that they
prevent her from engaging in any kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the
national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Social Security regulations establish a five-step, “sequential” process
for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). If an
ALJ finds a claimant disabled or not disabled at any given step, the ALJ does not
go on to the next step. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4). At the first step, the ALJ must
3
Case: 14-11982 Date Filed: 01/08/2015 Page: 4 of 5
determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.
Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At the second step, the ALJ must determine whether the
impairment or combination of impairments for which the claimant allegedly
suffers is “severe.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At the third step, the ALJ must decide
whether the claimant’s severe impairments meet or medically equal a listed
impairment. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If not, the ALJ must then determine at step
four whether the claimant has the RFC to perform her past relevant work. Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant cannot perform her past relevant work, the
ALJ must determine at step five whether the claimant can make an adjustment to
other work, considering the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience.
Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). An ALJ may make this determination either by applying
the Medical Vocational Guidelines or by obtaining the testimony of a VE.
Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011).
The Fifth Circuit has held that it was reasonable for an ALJ to reject expert
testimony where the objective medical evidence ultimately did not coincide with
the hypothetical assumptions posed to the VE. See Owens v. Heckler, 770 F.2d
1276, 1282 (5th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit also has held that an ALJ was free
to accept or reject restrictions in a hypothetical question that were not supported by
substantial evidence, even when the hypothetical was posited by the ALJ and not
counsel. See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2001).
4
Case: 14-11982 Date Filed: 01/08/2015 Page: 5 of 5
The claimant bears the burden of proving that she is disabled, and, thus, is
responsible for producing evidence to support her claim. Ellison v. Barnhart, 355
F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). The Commissioner, however, has a limited
burden at step five to show that a significant number of jobs exist that a claimant
can perform. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).
We may not reweigh evidence; and more than a “mere scintilla” of evidence
supports the ALJ’s conclusion that jobs existed in significant numbers in the
national economy that Stone could perform, even accounting for her mental health
limitations. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210; Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. The ALJ
reasonably rejected VE testimony when the hypothetical was not supported by the
record’s medical evidence. See Owens, 770 F.2d at 1282; Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at
1164-65. The ALJ’s determination that there were jobs in the national economy
that Stone could perform is supported by substantial evidence.
AFFIRMED.
5