Johnson & Bryan, Inc. v. Republic-Franklin Insurance Company ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •           Case: 17-15337   Date Filed: 07/11/2018    Page: 1 of 9
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-15337
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-02609-LMM
    JOHNSON & BRYAN, INC.,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    UTICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant,
    REPUBLIC-FRANKLIN INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (July 11, 2018)
    Case: 17-15337     Date Filed: 07/11/2018   Page: 2 of 9
    Before EDMONDSON, HULL, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Plaintiff Johnson & Bryan, Inc. appeals the dismissal of the civil action filed
    against Plaintiff’s insurer, Defendant Republic-Franklin Insurance Company.
    Briefly stated, Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed wrongfully to defend and to
    indemnify Plaintiff in an underlying lawsuit. No reversible error has been shown;
    we affirm.
    Plaintiff is an insurance brokerage company. At all times pertinent to this
    appeal, Plaintiff was the named insured on an errors and omissions policy
    (“Policy”) issued by Defendant. Among other things, the Policy requires -- as a
    condition precedent to coverage -- that Plaintiff “[i]mmediately send [Defendant]
    copies of any demands . . . received in connection with the ‘claim’ or ‘suit.’”
    In 2011, Plaintiff brokered a property insurance policy for Ellen and Joseph
    Brooks with Hanover Insurance. After the Brooks’ insured property was
    vandalized, Plaintiff -- acting on the Brooks’ behalf -- submitted a claim to
    Hanover. Hanover denied the claim on grounds that the Brooks had failed to
    comply with a fencing requirement under the pertinent property insurance policy.
    2
    Case: 17-15337    Date Filed: 07/11/2018   Page: 3 of 9
    On 18 June 2015, the Brooks’ lawyer sent Plaintiff a demand letter (the “18
    June letter”), asserting that Plaintiff was negligent in failing to provide the Brooks
    with a copy of the Hanover insurance policy or to otherwise make the Brooks
    aware of the fencing requirement. The letter instructed Plaintiff to “tender this
    demand letter to your errors and omissions carrier.” The letter also said expressly
    that the Brooks intended to file a lawsuit if Plaintiff did not respond within 20
    days.
    The 18 June letter arrived at Plaintiff’s office, but a mailroom employee
    believed mistakenly that the letter pertained only to the Brooks’ claim with
    Hanover. Accordingly, the mailroom employee placed a copy of the letter in the
    Hanover claim file and forwarded the letter to Hanover for further handling.
    Plaintiff says no principal, owner, or manager saw or was aware of the letter at that
    time.
    On 5 August 2015, the Brooks filed suit against Plaintiff. Plaintiff learned
    of the lawsuit on 31 August 2015. Plaintiff notified Defendant of the lawsuit on 2
    September 2015. In preparing its notice to Defendant, Plaintiff reviewed the
    Hanover claim file and discovered the 18 June letter. Plaintiff reported the 18 June
    letter to Defendant and explained that Plaintiff had been previously unaware of the
    letter’s contents.
    3
    Case: 17-15337      Date Filed: 07/11/2018     Page: 4 of 9
    Defendant denied Plaintiff’s claim on grounds that Plaintiff failed to notify
    timely Defendant of the 18 June demand letter. Thereafter, Plaintiff hired its own
    lawyer to defend against the Brooks’ lawsuit, which was later settled for $80,000.
    Plaintiff then filed this civil action against Defendant in state court, alleging
    claims for breach of contract, negligence and bad faith, and for attorneys’ fees and
    litigation expenses. Defendant removed the case to federal court. The district
    court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff failed to
    comply with the Policy’s notice provision -- which was a condition precedent to
    coverage -- and that Plaintiff’s asserted excuse for the delay in notification was
    unreasonable as a matter of Georgia law.
    We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss,
    accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light
    most favorable to the plaintiff. Hill v. White, 
    321 F.3d 1334
    , 1335 (11th Cir.
    2003). When a document -- such as both the insurance policy and the demand
    letter involved in this appeal -- “is central to the plaintiff’s claim, its contents are
    not in dispute, and the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss,
    this Court may consider that document as well.” See Allen v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.,
    
    790 F.3d 1274
    , 1278 (11th Cir. 2015).
    4
    Case: 17-15337        Date Filed: 07/11/2018       Page: 5 of 9
    Under Georgia law, * “a notice provision expressly made a condition
    precedent to coverage is valid and must be complied with, absent a showing of
    justification.” Kay-Lex Co. v. Essex Ins. Co., 
    649 S.E.2d 602
    , 606 (Ga. Ct. App.
    2007). To comply with an immediate notice requirement, an insured must give
    notice “with reasonable diligence and within a reasonable length of time in view of
    the attending circumstances of each particular case.” Advocate Networks, LLC v.
    Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 
    674 S.E.2d 617
    , 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). When an insured
    fails to comply with a notice requirement, the insured bears the burden of showing
    justification for the delay in providing notice. Kay-Lex Co., 
    649 S.E.2d at 606
    .
    An insured’s unreasonable failure to give timely notice excuses the insurer from
    providing a defense or coverage. 
    Id.
    The parties do not dispute that the Policy’s notice provision constitutes a
    condition precedent to coverage. Thus, to obtain coverage under the Policy,
    Plaintiff must either show that it complied with the Policy’s notice provision or
    demonstrate a justification for its failure to do so.
    Plaintiff first asserts that it complied with the Policy’s notice provision by
    filing a claim with Defendant two days after receiving notice of the Brooks’
    lawsuit and discovering the 18 June letter. We disagree. Under the express terms
    *
    “Federal courts sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the state in which the case
    arose.” Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 
    592 F.3d 1119
    , 1132-33 (11th Cir. 2010).
    5
    Case: 17-15337      Date Filed: 07/11/2018     Page: 6 of 9
    of the Policy, Plaintiff’s obligation to provide notice to Defendant was triggered by
    Plaintiff’s receipt of the 18 June demand letter. That Plaintiff’s upper-level
    employees were unaware of the contents of the letter does not change the
    undisputed fact that the letter was “received” at Plaintiff’s office by one of
    Plaintiff’s employees on 22 June 2015.
    Given the 72-day delay in providing notice to Defendant, Plaintiff failed to
    allege facts sufficient to show compliance with the Policy’s immediate notice
    requirement. See Granite State Ins. Co. v. Nord Bitumi United States, 
    422 S.E.2d 191
    , 194 (Ga. 1992) (determining that a 46-day delay in providing notice of suit
    constituted a breach of the insured’s duties under the policy and relieved the
    insurer of its obligation to defend and to indemnify); Brooks v. Forest Farms, 
    357 S.E.2d 604
    , 608 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that an insured’s 24-day delay in
    giving notice to its insured of a demand letter “is a breach of its contractual
    obligation as a matter of law”).
    Plaintiff next argues that the district court erred in concluding -- as a matter
    of law -- that Plaintiff failed to allege a sufficient justification for the delay in
    providing notice to Defendant. Plaintiff contends that the reasonableness of its
    excuse is a question of fact that should be decided by a jury.
    6
    Case: 17-15337      Date Filed: 07/11/2018   Page: 7 of 9
    Generally speaking, the sufficiency of an insured’s excuse or justification for
    a delay in giving notice is a question of fact for the jury. Plantation Pipeline Co. v.
    Royal Indem. Co., 
    537 S.E.2d 165
    , 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). In some cases,
    however, the facts and circumstances of a particular case may support a
    determination that an insured’s delay in giving notice was unjustified and
    unreasonable as a matter of law. 
    Id.
    Plaintiff contends that a jury could find that its failure to comply with the
    Policy’s notice provision was reasonable based on a clerical mistake: its mailroom
    employee’s failure to process properly the 18 June letter. Georgia courts, however,
    have determined that when a delay in notice is due to the insured’s own
    negligence, the delay is unreasonable as a matter of law. See Plantation Pipe Line
    Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 
    780 S.E.2d 501
    , 507-09 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (insured’s
    failure to locate an insurance policy was insufficient as a matter of law to excuse a
    2-year delay in notifying the insurer of an occurrence, particularly when nothing
    evidenced that the insurance policy could not have been discovered earlier);
    Buffalo Ins. Co. v. Star Photo Finishing Co., 
    172 S.E.2d 159
    , 166 (Ga. Ct. App.
    1969) (that an insured -- though its own negligence -- lost or misplaced the
    insurance policy was insufficient to excuse the insured’s non-compliance with the
    policy’s notice provisions).
    7
    Case: 17-15337     Date Filed: 07/11/2018     Page: 8 of 9
    Like Plaintiff, the insured in Plantation Pipe Line Co., and in Buffalo Ins.
    Co., each sought to excuse a delay in providing notice to the insurer based on an
    inability to locate a pertinent document. In each case, however, the court
    determined that the document was one that should have been within the insured’s
    possession and that likely could have been discovered earlier through reasonable
    diligence. Under those circumstances, the state court concluded that the insured
    had failed to demonstrate sufficiently a justification for failing to comply with the
    policy’s notice requirements. In the light of these decisions, we agree with the
    district court that Plaintiff failed as a matter of Georgia law to allege sufficiently
    facts that would justify the 72-day delay in notifying Defendant of the Brooks’ 18
    June demand letter.
    We also reject Plaintiff’s argument that the district court erred in failing to
    consider the lack of prejudice suffered by Defendant as a result of the delay in
    notification. Georgia courts have determined that, when a notice requirement is
    expressly made a condition precedent to coverage under an insurance policy, the
    insurer is not