USCA11 Case: 21-14095 Date Filed: 05/27/2022 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-14095
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
PATRICK HENRY JOSEPH,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cr-60110-JIC-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-14095
Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Patrick Joseph, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals
the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction.
The government has moved for summary affirmance. Because
there is no substantial question that the district court reached the
correct conclusion, we grant the government’s motion and affirm
the district court’s order. We also deny Joseph’s motion for
appointment of counsel as moot.
The district court construed Joseph’s motion as a request for
a sentence reduction under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the
retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines in
Amendment 782, which lowered the base offense levels for many
drug offenses. See United States v. Llewlyn,
879 F.3d 1291, 1293
(11th Cir. 2018). We review a district court’s conclusion about the
scope of its authority to reduce a defendant’s sentence under
§ 3582(c)(2) de novo. United States v. Jones,
548 F.3d 1366, 1368
(11th Cir. 2008). Summary affirmance is appropriate where “the
position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so
that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the
case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is
frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis,
406 F.2d 1158, 1162
(5th Cir. 1969).
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21-14095 Opinion of the Court 3
Section 3582(c)(2) allows a district court to modify a term of
imprisonment when the defendant was sentenced based on a
sentencing range that was subsequently lowered by the Sentencing
Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). But a defendant is not eligible
for this reduction if an amendment to the sentencing range “does
not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline
range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory
provision.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A) (Nov.
2018). An amendment does not authorize a sentence reduction
under § 3582(c)(2) if it “reduces a defendant’s base offense level, but
does not alter the sentencing range upon which his or her
sentenced was based.” United States v. Moore,
541 F.3d 1323, 1330
(11th Cir. 2008).
Joseph’s offense level was based on the career offender
enhancement of § 4B1.1 of the Guidelines, not the base offense
levels for drug offenses under § 2D1.1. See United States v.
Lawson,
686 F.3d 1317, 1319–21 (11th Cir. 2012). As a result,
Amendment 782 did not lower his sentencing range. The district
court correctly concluded that it lacked authority to modify
Joseph’s sentence under § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 782.
Joseph states in his brief on appeal that he is not a career
offender. Although pro se briefs are construed liberally, he has
abandoned that argument by raising it “in a perfunctory manner
without supporting arguments and authority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate
Floridian Ins. Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014); see Timson v.
Sampson,
518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). In any event, because
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-14095
he was found to be a career offender at his original sentencing, the
district court could not have made an inconsistent finding at this
stage. See United States v. Hamilton,
715 F.3d 328, 340 (11th Cir.
2013); United States v. Bravo,
203 F.3d 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2000).
Joseph also discusses prisoners’ eligibility for good-time credit
under the First Step Act of 2018. He raises this issue for the first
time on appeal, so we will not consider it. See Access Now, Inc. v.
Sw. Airlines Co.,
385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004).
There is no substantial question that the district court
properly denied Joseph’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. We therefore
GRANT the government’s motion for summary affirmance. In his
opening brief on appeal, Joseph requests the appointment of
counsel to brief his reply, which we construe as a motion for
appointment of counsel. Having decided the appeal, we DENY
Joseph’s motion as moot.
AFFIRMED.
