United States v. Edward Mincey , 699 F. App'x 895 ( 2017 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-11813
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 7:15-cr-00003-HL-TQL-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
EDWARD MINCEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
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(August 21, 2017)
Before HULL, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Edward Mincey appeals his convictions for possession with intent to
distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and
possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
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841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D). On appeal, Mincey argues that the district court erred
by denying his motion to suppress the controlled substances found in his rental
vehicle during a traffic stop. After thorough review, we affirm.
We review the grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence as a mixed
question of law and fact. United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir.
2003). The district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and the
application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. “The facts are construed in favor of
the party that prevailed below,” which in this case is the government. Id.The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir.
2001). A decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
when an officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred.
United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 778 (11th Cir. 1999). A traffic stop must
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. United States
v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th Cir. 1999). “Ordinarily, when a citation or
warning has been issued and all record checks have been completed and come back
clean, the legitimate investigative purpose of the traffic stop is fulfilled . . . .”
United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2004).
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An officer may prolong a traffic stop beyond its legitimate purpose only in
the limited circumstances where there is “articulable suspicion illegal activity has
occurred or is occurring,” or if the driver consents. Pruitt, 174 F.3d at 1220.
Articulable suspicion must be drawn from specific facts, and rational inferences
therefrom, measured under the totality of the circumstances and in light of the
officer’s knowledge. United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir.
1990). A Fourth Amendment violation occurs when police conduct a dog sniff and
uncover contraband while an individual is unlawfully detained, e.g., “during an
unreasonably prolonged traffic stop.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08
(2005). But see Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (declining to impose
exclusionary remedy under the circumstances of the case). Thus, while the
duration of an initial traffic stop may be reasonable, any continued detention is
illegal absent reasonable suspicion. Perkins, 348 F.3d at 971.
In weighing factors for reasonable suspicion, we look to the “totality of the
circumstances.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). We are not
entitled to give “no weight” to certain factors merely because they may have an
innocent explanation. Id. at 274. An officer can detain a motorist for a brief
investigation when the officer, through his training and experience, can point to
specific factors that lead him to suspect other legal wrongdoing, but cannot rely on
a mere “hunch.” Id. at 273-74. The standard we apply “falls considerably short of
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satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. at 274.
Reasonable suspicion may exist even if each fact alone is susceptible of innocent
explanation. United States v. Bautista-Silva, 567 F.3d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir.
2009).
In this case, Mincey does not challenge the initial traffic stop; he challenges
only the duration of the stop, and we can find no constitutional error in its duration.
From the moment Deputy Bruce initiated the traffic stop, Mincey acted in ways
that distinguished himself from the average traveler. For example, upon pulling to
the side of the road, Mincey stopped his vehicle for a brief second, and then -- for
reasons not clearly related to safety concerns -- proceeded to move again before
coming to a complete stop. When Deputy Bruce approached the vehicle and
ordered Mincey to exit, Mincey moved his hand towards the gearshift, refused to
exit the vehicle, and asked on at least two occasions what “cause” Bruce had to
order him out. Mincey remained in the car against Bruce’s orders, and did not exit
until Bruce notified him of the consequences of his failure to comply. After finally
exiting the vehicle, Mincey was visibly nervous, so nervous that Bruce could see
his carotid artery and heart pulsating. Mincey’s responses to Bruce’s questioning
did not allay any of the concerns Bruce was noticing; to the contrary, as the stop
progressed, Bruce learned that Mincey was traveling in a direction inconsistent
with his destination, that Mincey could not correctly describe the terms of the
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rental car agreement, and that the price paid for the rental was $2,300, even though
Mincey admitted he was unemployed. Last, but not least, Mincey curiously
answered Bruce’s question regarding whether he had large amounts of U.S.
currency in his vehicle by stating that he was not a drug dealer. Moreover, the
record indicates that Deputy Bruce is an officer with a significant amount of
training and experience in narcotics investigations.
When viewed under the totality of the circumstances standard, and in the
light most favorable to the government, the record supports Deputy Bruce’s
reasonable suspicion that Mincey was involved in criminal activity. As a result,
the continued detention of Mincey was not unconstitutional because Deputy Bruce
had reasonable suspicion to continue to detain Mincey beyond the initial purpose
of the traffic stop, and the evidence found as a result of Deputy Bruce’s additional
investigation was admissible. The district court did not err in denying Mincey’s
motion to suppress evidence.
AFFIRMED.
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