McClendon v. Department of Juvenile Justice , 701 F. App'x 771 ( 2017 )


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  •              Case: 16-16317    Date Filed: 06/30/2017   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 16-16317
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-03588-WBH
    JOSHUA MCCLENDON,
    DELVIA ROBINSON,
    as next of friend of Joshua McClendon,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, et al.,
    Defendants,
    CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (June 30, 2017)
    Case: 16-16317        Date Filed: 06/30/2017        Page: 2 of 6
    Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    After his probation was revoked, Joshua McClendon became a juvenile
    detainee at the Metro Regional Youth Detention Center in Atlanta, Georgia. While
    he was detained there, Christopher Williams, one of the Center’s guards, slammed
    McClendon’s cell door on his hand, crushing three of his fingers. McClendon
    brought this lawsuit against Williams and other defendants, asserting, among other
    things, a 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     claim for use of excessive force in violation of the
    Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed all claims except the Eighth
    Amendment excessive force claim, and then granted Williams’ motion for
    summary judgment. McClendon appeals the district court’s entry of summary
    judgment. 1
    Cells in the Center are fully enclosed rooms, without bars, and the cell doors
    are made of solid steel. 2 The only way to see into a cell from the outside is to look
    through a window in the cell door. At his deposition McClendon testified that light
    coming through the window in his door made it difficult for him to sleep. So he
    often jammed a blanket between the door and the door frame so that it would drape
    over the window and block the light.
    1
    McClendon does not appeal the dismissal of his other claims, and the other defendants
    (other than Williams) are not parties to this appeal.
    2
    Unlike in many jails, detainees in the Center are not literally “behind bars.”
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    On the night of the incident, Williams performed a routine check on all the
    cells in McClendon’s wing of the Center. According to McClendon’s testimony,
    Williams knocked on his door, unlocked it, and opened it while telling McClendon
    to take down the blanket that was covering the window. McClendon began to
    comply, but while he was pulling the blanket Williams slammed the door on his
    hand. The door crushed three of McClendon’s fingers and resulted in the
    amputation of part of his middle finger.
    Williams submitted into evidence a videotape recorded by a security camera
    outside McClendon’s cell. The video shows Williams making his rounds and
    stopping at McClendon’s door. Williams unlocks the door, which flies open so
    quickly that it must have been pushed from the inside by McClendon. The door
    continues swinging open until it is stopped by Williams’ foot. It then remains ajar
    for about one second before Williams begins trying to shut it. McClendon pushes
    against the door and is able to prevent Williams from shutting it for another second
    or two, but Williams is eventually able to slam it closed. Finally, the door pops
    open slightly for a moment, and then is shut completely.
    The district court granted summary judgment to Williams. It concluded that,
    based on the evidence in the record, “no jury could reasonably find in
    [McClendon’s] favor.”
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    “We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment and draw
    all inferences and review[ ] all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
    moving party.” Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 
    680 F.3d 1316
    , 1318
    (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). “Summary judgment is appropriate
    only if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
    and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks
    omitted). For a dispute of material fact to be “genuine,” the nonmoving party must
    point to sufficient evidence such that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
    [him].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 248, 
    106 S. Ct. 2505
    , 2510
    (1986). In cases where a video in evidence “obviously contradicts [p]laintiff’s
    version of the facts, we accept the video’s depiction instead of [p]laintiff’s
    account,” Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 
    625 F.3d 1313
    , 1315 (11th Cir. 2010),
    and “view[ ] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape,” Scott v. Harris, 
    550 U.S. 372
    , 380–81, 
    127 S. Ct. 1769
    , 1776 (2007).
    To prove an Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force by a guard, the
    plaintiff must show that “force was applied” by the defendant “maliciously and
    sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Campbell v. Sikes, 
    169 F.3d 1353
    , 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). Negligence or deliberate indifference on the part of
    the defendant is not enough to sustain a claim in this context. 
    Id.
     As the Supreme
    Court has explained, “[t]he infliction of pain in the course of a prison security
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    measure . . . does not amount to [an Eighth Amendment violation] simply because
    it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied for
    security purposes was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict sense.”
    Whitley v. Albers, 
    475 U.S. 312
    , 319, 
    106 S. Ct. 1078
    , 1084 (1986).
    Based on the evidence in the record, no reasonable jury could find that
    Williams acted “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
    harm.” See Campbell, 169 F.3d at 1374. At this stage, the facts must be viewed
    “in the light depicted by the videotape,” see Scott, 
    550 U.S. at 381
    , 
    127 S. Ct. at 1776
    , and the tape shows that McClendon pushed open his cell door quickly and
    forcefully, as if he were attempting to escape his cell, and held it open as Williams
    tried to close it. In light of that, it is not clear that Williams’ response — slamming
    the cell door — was unreasonable, let alone “malicious and sadistic,” as required to
    sustain an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment. As a result, there
    was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Williams violated
    McClendon’s constitutional rights. Summary judgment was proper. See
    Hamilton, 
    680 F.3d at 1318
    .
    McClendon also contends that he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
    whether Williams was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need because
    Williams did not immediately treat his injuries. But he did not assert a deliberate
    indifference claim in his second amended complaint, and he cannot “raise new
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    claims at the summary judgment stage” or on appeal. See Gilmour v. Gates,
    McDonald & Co., 
    382 F.3d 1312
    , 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2004). If he wished to assert
    a deliberate indifference claim, the proper procedure was to seek to amend his
    complaint once again in the district court. 
    Id. at 1315
    . He failed to do that.
    Because he did not properly raise his deliberate indifference claim in the district
    court, we will not consider it. See 
    id.
     at 1314–15.
    AFFIRMED.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-16317 Non-Argument Calendar

Citation Numbers: 701 F. App'x 771

Judges: Carnes, Martin, Anderson

Filed Date: 6/30/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024