United States v. Rodriguez , 218 F.3d 1243 ( 2000 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 14 2000
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 99-4098 CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 98-00417-CR-SH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LEODON RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 14, 2000)
Before COX, WILSON and RONEY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant Leodon Rodriguez appeals his conviction under the Hobbs Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1951(a), for committing six motel robberies. Two elements are essential for
a Hobbs Act prosecution: robbery and an effect on commerce. See 18 U.S.C. §
1951(a). This appeal focuses on the effect-on-commerce element. Rodriguez alleges
that the evidence did not prove the robberies had the requisite effect on interstate
commerce required under the Act, and that the district court erred in admitting
testimony of the motel clerks regarding the registering of out-of-state guests to show
this element. We affirm.
Between February 6 and February 28, 1998, Rodriguez and a co-defendant not
a party to this appeal robbed five Miami/Dade County motels, one of them twice, for
a total of $2,090 by holding up the motels’ front desk clerks at gunpoint. A jury
convicted Rodriguez of one count of conspiracy to obstruct commerce in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); five counts of obstructing commerce by robbery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and six counts of carrying a firearm during and in relation to the
robberies, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Defendant was sentenced to a total of 1,381 months
in prison. On this appeal, defendant challenges only his convictions for the Hobbs Act
violations.
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I. Insufficiency of the evidence to prove interstate commerce
We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support Rodriguez’s conviction
de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and
drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jury's verdict.
See United States v. Guerra, 164 F.3d 1358, 1359 (11th Cir.1999). The district court's
denial of the motions for a judgment of acquittal will be upheld if a reasonable trier
of fact could conclude that the evidence establishes the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. See United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384, 1388 (11th
Cir.1997).
The Hobbs Act literally prohibits any act that "in any way or degree obstructs,
delays, or affects commerce ...by robbery or extortion....” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The
Supreme Court has made it clear that the Hobbs Act's broad jurisdictional language
is to be read as meaning what it says: "[The] Act speaks in broad language,
manifesting a purpose to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish
interference with interstate commerce by extortion, robbery or physical violence. The
Act outlaws such interference 'in any way or degree.'” Stirone v. United States, 361
U.S. 212, 215 (1960). The government needs only to establish a minimal effect on
interstate commerce to support a violation of the Hobbs Act. See United States v.
Guerra, 164 F.3d 1358, 1360 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d
31384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1997). A mere “depletion of assets” of a business engaged in
interstate commerce will meet the requirement. See United States v. Guerra, 164 F.3d
1358, 1360 (11th Cir. 1999).
This is the evidence offered to establish that the motel was part of interstate
commerce. The motel desk clerks testified that they personally had registered guests
from out-of-state at some point. All but one motel desk clerk testified that they had
registered guests from outside the country. An FBI agent testified that his review of
the guest registration cards at two of the motels indicated there were out-of-state
guests. Three of the motels had available in their lobbies brochures, fliers and other
advertisements for tourist attractions in the local area and other parts of Florida.
Rather than citing cases where the evidence was held to be insufficient,
defendant compares this relatively sparse amount of evidence to the evidence held
sufficient in four other cases: United States v. Castleberry,116 F.3d 1384(11th Cir.
1997); United States v. Kaplan, 171 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, _U.S. _, 120
S.Ct. 323 (1999); United States v. Guerra, 164 F.3d 1358(11th Cir. 1999); and United
States v. Paredes, 139 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 1998). These cases do not require a
reversal in this case.
First, such a comparison overlooks the factual distinctions in these cases which
require different types of proof. Both Castleberry and Kaplan involve extortion
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schemes where the effect on interstate commerce was not readily apparent. In
Castleberry, the defendant took money from his clients who were charged with
Driving Under the Influence (DUI), and paid money to the prosecutor to “dispose” of
their cases. The government introduced evidence regarding the effect on commerce
of non- prosecuted DUI cases as well as evidence regarding the flow in commerce of
fines paid in such cases. At issue in Kaplan was an extortion scheme involving the
defendant and a Panamanian lawyer. In that case, the government introduced
evidence of foreign travel and interstate phone calls. Unlike Castleberry and Kaplan,
the interstate commerce connection in this case is straightforward, involving the
robbery of a commercial establishment engaged in interstate commerce.
United States v. Guerra, 164 F.3d 1358(11th Cir. 1999) and United States v.
Paredes, 164 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 1998) involved cash robberies of establishments
that sell products in interstate commerce. In both cases, the Court held that the
government’s evidence that the establishments sold goods manufactured from out of
state was sufficient to establish the necessary interstate nexus. See Guerra, 164 F.3d
at 1361($300 from service station that was part of a nationwide network of gas
stations and primarily sold fuel products drawn from outside the state; forced to close
for more than two hours during police investigation and lost business over next
several days); Paredes, 139 F.3d at 844(Less than $170 in cash from two local
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convenient stores not connected to out-of-state stores; small amount of stores’
merchandise manufactured outside of the state). These cases differ from this case.
The proof of interstate commerce in this case is established by the traveling guests of
the motels rather than interstate sales of products.
Second, in determining whether there is a minimal effect on commerce, each
case must be decided on its own facts. Rodriguez correctly states that government
did not present evidence here that the motels closed operations or turned away
customers as in Guerra. See Guerra, 164 F.3d at 1361(“The service station here lost
more than just the money the store clerk handed over to Guerra; it was forced to close
for more than two hours while police investigated the robbery, and it lost business
over the next several days.”). While such evidence obviously would have
strengthened the government’s case, it is not required to satisfy § 1951(a). Nor does
defendant’s evidence that these establishments do not require reservations; that they
do not belong to a national chain; or that the majority of their business is from
clientele that register at the hotel on a one-day basis rather than for an extended stay
alter the determination. Evidence that these establishments have at some point
registered guests from out-of state is sufficient to establish their connection to
interstate commerce. See United States v. Pearson, 508 F.2d 595 (5th Cir.
1978)(Court held that government’s evidence of 1,000 guest registration cards from
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a large Miami beach hotel sufficient to establish the requisite nexus to interstate
commerce). The government offered evidence that the defendant took $2,090 from
the motels, thereby depleting the assets of these establishments that operate in
interstate commerce.
No cases have been cited or found in which the robbery of motels such as these
were held not to involve interstate commerce. The district court correctly held there
to be sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury’s finding that defendant’s
robberies had at least a minimal effect on interstate commerce.
II. Hearsay Argument
As to the evidence relied upon in the sufficiency evaluation, defendant argues
that the testimony from the motel employees that motel guests were from outside of
Florida was inadmissible hearsay. He contends for the first time on appeal, that the
admission of this evidence violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.
The district court admitted the testimony pursuant to the catch-all exception to the
hearsay rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 807, which permits admission of hearsay if it
is particularly trustworthy; it bears on a material fact; it is the most probative evidence
addressing that fact; its admission is consistent with the rules of evidence and
advances the interests of justice; and its proffer follows adequate notice to the adverse
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party.1 Defendant’s challenge focuses on the first element: whether the motel clerks’
statements have the appropriate “guarantees of trustworthiness.” Fed.R.Evid. 807.
The district court did not err in determining that the testimony met this requirement.
All of the motel employees testified that they registered out-of-state or foreign guests.
Employees of four of the motels, Villa Cortez Motel, Las Palmas, Cheo’s Motel and
Sunnyside Motel, all testified that their statements were based on their review of
documents such as a driver’s license or passport that indicated the guest was from out
of state. Although the motel employee for Miami Executive Hotel did not so testify,
an FBI agent testified that his review of guest registration cards at the hotel indicated
there were guests registered from out of state. “The district court has considerable
discretion in determining admissibility under [former] Rule 804(b)(5).” See United
States v. Munoz, 16 F.3d 1116,1122 (11th Cir. 1994)(In 1997, the contents of Federal
Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5) were combined and transferred to the new
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Fed.R.Evid. 807:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not exclude by the hearsay rule, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (c) the general purposes
of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement
into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name
and address of the declarant.
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Rule 807.) Under the circumstances of this case, the court did not abuse that
discretion. Nor was there plain error in evaluating defendant’s Confrontation Clause
claim. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813-21(1990)(indicating that under the
Confrontation Clause, as under the hearsay rules, courts must evaluate the totality of
the circumstances to determine whether a statement contains particular guarantees of
trustworthiness that make the declaration especially worthy of belief).
The district court’s decision to admit the statements was proper under both Rule
807 and the Confrontation Clause.
AFFIRMED.
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