Derrick L. Gibson, Sr. v. John Doe , 629 F. App'x 868 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-12242
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cv-00117-MW-GRJ
DERRICK L. GIBSON, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOHN DOE,
Chief of Bureau of Central Records for Years 2005-2010
in his/her individual capacity,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(October 22, 2015)
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Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Derrick Gibson, Sr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal
of his first amended complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against “John
Doe, Chief of Bureau of Central Records,” in the Chief’s individual capacity
(“Records Custodian”). 1 Briefly stated, Gibson seeks damages and complains that
the Records Custodian’s failure to produce certain evidence during Gibson’s post-
conviction proceedings violated Gibson’s constitutional rights. 2 Gibson also
challenges the district court’s denial of leave to file a second amended complaint.
No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
This action arises out of Gibson’s challenge earlier to his 15-year Florida
court sentence for robbery. In state court, Gibson filed a motion to correct illegal
sentence, pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a). Relying on intervening state case
law, 3 Gibson argued that he should not have been sentenced under Florida’s
1
Gibson has abandoned expressly his claim against Michael Crews, in his official capacity, as
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
2
Gibson’s complaint also included a state law claim for negligence. On appeal, Gibson raises no
challenge to the district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law
claim or to the district court’s dismissal of his state law claim. These arguments are abandoned.
See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1217 n.4 (11th Cir. 2008).
3
In Brinson v. State, 851 So. 2d 815 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003), the state court concluded that the term
“release,” as used in Florida’s PRR statute, means “actual release from a state prison sentence,
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prisoner releasee reoffender (“PRR”) statute, Fla. Stat. § 775.082; he stressed his
1999 robbery offense was committed more than three years after he was last
“released from a state correctional facility,” within the meaning of the PRR statute.
Gibson contended the 1997 release date used by the trial court was from a
temporary detention pending a ruling on Gibson’s alleged parole violation and,
thus, was no valid release date for purposes of PRR sentencing.
The state trial court denied summarily Gibson’s motion, in the light of
records provided by the Department of Correction’s Bureau of Central Records
(“Bureau”). The state appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that the
Bureau’s records -- which showed only that Gibson’s last release date was in 1997
-- failed to address Gibson’s contention that his 1997 release was only from a
temporary detention. On remand, the state trial court again denied Gibson’s
motion based on additional documents provided by the Bureau. The state appellate
court reversed and remanded again. The trial court conducted an evidentiary
hearing and again denied Gibson’s motion. The state appellate court reversed and
remanded a third time, concluding that the state failed to refute Gibson’s claim that
his 1997 release was from a temporary detention and, thus, was no valid release
not release from a temporary confinement that happens to be in state prison,” such as a
temporary detention pending resolution of a parole violation charge. See also Wencel v. State,
915 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005) (instructing the trial court -- when determining whether a
defendant was sentenced properly under the PRR statute -- to take judicial notice of the parole
commission’s order showing that defendant’s controlled release had not been revoked).
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date for purposes of PRR sentencing. Then, Gibson was resentenced (as a non-
PRR) to 21 months’ imprisonment, was credited for time served, and was released
immediately.
Gibson filed this civil action against the Chief of Bureau of Central Records,
an action purporting to allege violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The district court dismissed Gibson’s first amended complaint for
failure to state a claim and denied, as futile, Gibson’s motion for leave to file a
second amended complaint.
We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and
construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Am. Dental Ass’n v.
Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). “We may affirm the district
court’s judgment on any ground that appears in the record, whether or not that
ground was relied upon or even considered by the court below.” Thomas v.
Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007). Although we
construe liberally pro se pleadings, pro se litigants must still conform to procedural
rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotation omitted).
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“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. A complaint containing only “naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quotations
and alterations omitted).
To avoid dismissal of his section 1983 claim, Gibson must allege facts
demonstrating that he was deprived of a constitutional right by a person acting
under color of state law. See Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303
(11th Cir. 2001). Gibson must also allege facts demonstrating “an affirmative
causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged
constitutional deprivation.” See Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th
Cir. 1986).
In his first amended complaint, Gibson alleged that the unnamed Records
Custodian acted with deliberate indifference by refusing to produce exculpatory
evidence to the state attorney and by giving “momentum and impetus to the
prosecution” to oppose Gibson’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. Gibson
provides no factual support for his conclusory allegations.
Among other things, never has Gibson identified “exculpatory evidence”
that the Records Custodian allegedly concealed intentionally or otherwise failed to
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produce. Gibson has also alleged no facts demonstrating a causal connection
between the Records Custodian’s alleged acts and delay in Gibson’s obtaining
relief.
The record demonstrates that the state appellate court concluded repeatedly
that the Bureau’s records were insufficient to establish Gibson’s PRR status. Yet
the state attorney continued to argue -- and the state trial court continued to rule --
that Gibson was unentitled to relief. On this record, it appears that the delay in
Gibson’s resentencing was proximately caused by the state attorney’s and the state
trial court’s continued misapplication of the PRR statute, not by the Records
Custodian’s alleged failure to produce some evidence. Because Gibson failed to
state a claim for relief that was plausible on its face, Gibson’s first amended
complaint was dismissed properly.
The district court also committed no error in denying Gibson’s motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint. We review the district court’s denial of
a motion to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion, but review de novo whether
a proposed amendment would be futile. Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty, 605 F.3d
865, 869 (11th Cir. 2010).
“Ordinarily, if the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a
plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, leave to amend should be freely given.”
Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotations
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and citations omitted). But leave to amend may be denied properly when the
proposed amendment would be futile. Id. at 1262-63. A proposed amendment is
“futile” “when the complaint as amended is still subject to dismissal.” Id. at 1263.
In his proposed second amended complaint, Gibson first sought to replace
the unnamed “John Doe” with two named former Chiefs of Bureau of Central
Records, McKinnley Crockett and John McLaughlin. Gibson alleges no facts
supporting his conclusory allegations against Crockett or McLaughlin or
establishing a causal connection between the two proposed defendants’ alleged
acts and the delay in Gibson’s obtaining relief. As a result, Gibson’s claims
against Crockett and McLaughlin are subject to dismissal for the same reasons that
Gibson’s claim against “John Doe” was dismissed.
Gibson also sought to add as defendants former Secretaries of the Florida
Department of Corrections Walter McNeil and James McDonough, in their official
capacities. Gibson’s claims against McNeil and McDonough are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. See Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Serv., 779
F.2d 1509, 1512 (11th Cir. 1986) (the Eleventh Amendment bars “damages awards
against state officers sued in their official capacities in suits brought in federal
court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
Because Gibson’s proposed second amended complaint was subject to
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dismissal, the district court committed no error in denying Gibson leave to amend.
See Hall, 367 F.3d at 1263.
AFFIRMED.
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