Tracy Alan Cotresllv. Warden , 631 F. App'x 723 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-11177
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cv-00145-LGW-RSB
TRACY ALAN COTRELL,
Petitioner–Appellant,
versus
WARDEN,
Respondent–Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(November 10, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The
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district court determined that the petition did not fall within the savings clause of
§ 2255(e), as would be required to consider its merits. After careful review, we
affirm.
I. Background
In August 2001, Appellant pled guilty and was convicted of (1) conspiracy
to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine and more than 500 grams of
a substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841and 846
and (2) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g). He was sentenced to life on the conspiracy charge and to 120 months on
the firearm charge, to be served concurrently. The life sentence was imposed
pursuant to an enhancement under § 841, based on Appellant’s prior Ohio felony
convictions for (1) trafficking marijuana and aggravated trafficking and (2) drug
abuse.1 Appellant filed a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, but
subsequently moved to dismiss the appeal.
In 2002, Appellant filed a petition for relief from his conviction and sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In support of his § 2255 petition, Appellant argued that
his plea was not voluntary and that trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to
1
Section 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) imposes a mandatory minimum life sentence when a person is
convicted of a drug distribution offense involving 50 grams or more of methamphetamine “after
two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). For
purposes of this statute, a “felony drug offense” is defined as “an offense that is punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State . . . that
prohibits or restricts conduct relating to” various illegal drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 802(44).
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help him obtain a sentencing reduction based on substantial assistance. The district
court denied the petition, and this Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal of the denial
for lack of prosecution.
Appellant filed this § 2241petition approximately twelve years later, in
2014. As grounds for the petition, Appellant argued that (1) his Ohio drug abuse
conviction was not a proper predicate for the sentencing enhancement he received
under § 841 and (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
object when the sentencing court aggregated methamphetamine sales from four
separate occasions to trigger a § 841 violation. The magistrate judge issued an
R&R recommending that Appellant’s § 2241 motion be dismissed because it was,
in reality, a successive § 2255 petition that was not authorized by the savings
clause of § 2255(e). The district court supplemented and adopted the R&R, and
dismissed Appellant’s § 2241 petition.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
“Whether a prisoner may bring a . . . § 2241 petition under the savings
clause of § 2255(e) is a question of law we review de novo.” Williams v. Warden,
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 713 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013). The “applicability
of the savings clause is a threshold jurisdictional issue.” Id. We cannot reach the
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merits of Appellant’s petition unless the district court had jurisdiction to entertain
it. Id. (holding that § 2255(e) imposes a jurisdictional limit on § 2241 petitions).
B. Availability of Habeas Relief under §§ 2241 and 2255
In his § 2241 petition, Appellant seeks an order vacating his life sentence on
the ground that it is “illegal.” Appellant’s habeas claim is thus expressly covered
by and ordinarily would have to be asserted under § 2255(a), which authorizes a
motion to “vacate, set aside or correct” a sentence that a federal prisoner claims is
unconstitutional or illegal. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). See also Bryant v. Warden, FCC
Coleman-Medium, 738 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that a federal
prisoner ordinarily may only collaterally attack his final conviction and sentence
through a § 2255 habeas petition); Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d
1348, 1352 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2008) (“A prisoner in custody pursuant to a federal court
judgment may proceed under § 2241 only when he raises claims outside the scope
of § 2255(a).”)
As noted, Appellant has previously filed an unsuccessful § 2255 petition.
The district court may only consider a second or successive § 2255 petition by
Appellant if the petition has been certified by this Court to contain: (1) newly
discovered evidence sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
no reasonable factfinder would have found Appellant guilty, or (2) a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
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Court, that was previously unavailable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). We have not
certified this case as appropriate for review under either prong of § 2255(h). Relief
under § 2255(a) is thus unavailable here. See Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d
1293, 1311 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“The statutory bar against second or
successive motions is one of the most important AEDPA safeguards for finality of
judgment.”).
Appellant argues that habeas relief is nevertheless available to him via a
§ 2241 petition that falls within the “savings clause” of § 2255(e). The savings
clause permits a prisoner to file a § 2241 petition where the remedy provided by
§ 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s]
detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see also Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1256. As applied to
sentencing claims such as Appellant’s, this Court has interpreted the “inadequate
or ineffective” language to permit a § 2241 petition when: (1) throughout
sentencing, direct appeal, and the first § 2255 proceeding, Circuit precedent
specifically addressed and squarely foreclosed the claim raised in the § 2241
petition, (2) subsequent to the first § 2255 proceeding, a Supreme Court decision
overturned the Circuit precedent that had squarely foreclosed the claim, (3) the
new rule announced by the Supreme Court applies retroactively on collateral
review, (4) as a result of the new rule being retroactive, the petitioner’s current
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum authorized by Congress, and (5) the
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savings clause of § 2255(e) reaches the petitioner’s claim. Bryant, 738 F.3d at
1274.
Appellant’s claim does not meet any of the requirements set forth above.
Appellant does not point to any Circuit precedent that prevented him from raising
the claims he now asserts in his initial § 2255 petition. Nor does he cite any “new”
Supreme Court rule, much less a retroactively applicable rule, that even arguably
supports his claims. The only recent decision cited by Appellant, Burgess v.
United States, 553 U.S. 124, 129 (2008), undermines his claims because it
establishes that Appellant’s Ohio drug abuse conviction, which was punishable by
up to three years imprisonment, was in fact a qualifying predicate under § 841. See
Burgess, 553 U.S. at 129-132 (interpreting the term “felony drug offense” as used
in § 841 to include offenses punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,
regardless of how those offenses are categorized under State law). All of the other
Supreme Court cases cited by Appellant were issued prior to his conviction in
2001. 2 In the absence of any new, retroactively applicable Supreme Court
authority in support of his claims, there is no basis for permitting Appellant to
pursue habeas relief under § 2241 and the savings clause of § 2255(e).
2
Although Persaud v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1023 (2014) is more recent, it does not establish
a new rule, as it is simply a grant of certiorari and remand to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
to further consider an issue raised in one of the party’s briefs.
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III. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the district court’s decision to dismiss
Appellant’s § 2241 petition is AFFIRMED.
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