United States v. Lorenza E. Flint , 625 F. App'x 383 ( 2015 )

Case: 15-10922 Date Filed: 08/24/2015 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-10922
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:04-cr-20203-DMM-6
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LORENZA E. FLINT,
a.k.a. Lo,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(August 24, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, HULL and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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In 2005, Lorenza Flint was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment, to be
followed by 60 months’ supervised release, for conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and
841(a)(1). Flint was discharged from prison in January 2013, and placed on
supervised release. In October 2013, Flint was arrested in Palm Beach County,
Florida, charged with sexual battery, and detained. On November 3, 2014, he pled
guilty to that charge and received one year’s imprisonment. Shortly thereafter, a
warrant for his arrest issued for violating the conditions of supervised release. On
February 17, 2015, following a revocation hearing, the District Court revoked
Flint’s supervised release and sentenced him to nine months’ imprisonment, to be
followed by 48 months’ supervised release. To meet the conditions of his
supervised release, Flint had to comply with the requirements of the Sexual
Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) and participate in a sex-
offender program. Flint appeals the District Court’s judgment, arguing that the
court abused its discretion in imposing those conditions.
We review the decision to revoke supervised release for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). We review
any sentence imposed after a revocation of supervised release for reasonableness,
id., and the imposition of a special condition for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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Upon finding that the defendant violated a condition of his supervised
release, a district court may revoke that supervised release and impose a term of
imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The court may also “modify, reduce, or
enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or
termination of the term of supervised release.” Id. § 3583(e)(2). In determining an
appropriate sentence upon revocation of supervised release, the court must
consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the
nature and characteristics of the offense and the defendant, the need to deter future
criminal acts, the need to protect the public, the need to provide the defendant with
medical care or other correctional treatment, the applicable Guidelines range, the
pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims.
Id. §§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)-(D), (a)(4)-(7), and 3583(e)(3). The court has broad
discretion to determine the weight due any particular sentencing factor. United
States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). A district court can abuse its
discretion, however, if it “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that
were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or
irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper
factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(quoting United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1174 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)).
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In July 2006, Congress enacted SORNA “‘to protect the public from sex
offenders and offenders against children’ by establishing ‘a comprehensive
national system for the registration of those offenders.’” See United States v.
Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 16901). Given
the seriousness of the problem it was designed to address, SORNA extends to “all
sex offenders” and applies retroactively to qualifying offenses committed before
2006. See 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (“The requirements of SORNA apply to all sex
offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the offense for which registration is
required prior to the enactment of [SORNA].”). For purposes of SORNA, a “sex
offender” is defined as an “individual who was convicted of a sex offense.”
42 U.S.C. § 16911(1). A “sex offense” includes any criminal offense—defined as
a state, local, tribal, foreign, or military offense—that has an element involving a
sexual act or sexual contact with another. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(i), (6).
When tailoring sentences, district courts are required to “order, as an explicit
condition of supervised release for a person required to register under [SORNA],
that the person comply with the requirements of that Act.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). A
court may also impose additional conditions so long as those conditions are
reasonably related to the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors, involve no greater
deprivation of liberty than is necessary, and are consistent with any pertinent
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id. § 3583(d)(1)-(3).
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We find no abuse of discretion here. Flint’s compliance with SORNA as a
condition of supervised release was statutorily mandated because of a prior rape
conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(i), (6); see also 28
C.F.R. § 72.3. That conviction combined with the recent sexual-battery charges
against Flint supported the court’s determination that he should participate in a
sex-offender program. Moreover, the conditions imposed by the court were not
unreasonable, as the court complied with statutory requirements, considered the
relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and articulated its reasons for the imposing
the conditions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)-(D).
AFFIRMED.
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