United States v. Richard Miter , 446 F. App'x 244 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-12264 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar NOVEMBER 9, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-00005-MCR-GRJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff–Appellee,
versus
RICHARD MITER,
a.k.a. Steve Miter,
a.k.a. Coolio,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant–Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(November 9, 2011)
Before CARNES, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Richard Miter was found guilty of conspiring to possess and distribute more
than 500 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 842, and 846. Before
Miter was tried, the government filed an information under 21 U.S.C. § 851 to
enhance his sentence based on an earlier drug conviction. With the enhancement,
Miter was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment to be followed by 8 years’
supervised release. Miter appeals his sentence, which he argues was imposed in
violation of his speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment, as well as his right
to be promptly sentenced under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(b)(1) and
the district court’s local rules. Because we find that Miter has not suffered any
prejudice, we affirm.
I.
Shortly after Miter was indicted, the government filed an information under
21 U.S.C. § 851 to enhance his sentence based on a 1995 felony conviction for
possession and sale of cocaine. But that conviction was under an alias, Steve
Meter. The government attempted to prove that the 1995 conviction was Miter’s
by comparing fingerprint records from that conviction with Miter’s. During the
trial, an expert from a state agency testified that the 1995 fingerprints were
Miter’s, but that was apparently insufficient to establish that the conviction was
Miter’s beyond a reasonable doubt. A second expert, from the Drug Enforcement
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Agency, could not testify about the comparison during the trial due to an agency
policy. That policy changed, and the district court continued the January 28, 2011
sentencing hearing until April 29, 2011 to allow the DEA expert to review the
fingerprints and offer her opinion. Miter objected to the continuance.
At the April sentencing hearing, the DEA expert testified that the
fingerprints from the 1995 conviction were Miter’s. Miter then admitted that the
1995 conviction was his. After Miter’s allocution, the district court imposed a
120-month sentence, the statutory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 851. Miter now
appeals and argues that the continuance violated his right to a speedy trial under
the Sixth Amendment, as well as his right to be promptly sentenced under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 and the district court’s local rules.
II.
Our review of a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim is mixed. We review
the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear
error. United States v. Villareal, 613 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2010). We have
recognized that the constitutional speedy trial right applies to sentencing. United
States v. Howard, 577 F.2d 269, 270 (5th Cir. 1978).1 In that decision we noted
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In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted the
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit as binding precedent.
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that, although the balancing approach from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972),
should guide our analysis of sentencing-related speedy trial claims, delayed
sentencing implicates different concerns than most speedy trial claims. Id. Under
Barker a court examines four factors in deciding whether a speedy trial violation
occurred. First, the length of the delay. Second, the reason for the delay. Third,
the defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial rights. And last, the prejudice to the
defendant for the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
Here, even if Miter established the first three factors in the Barker test, he is
unable to establish prejudice. In his allocution, Miter admitted that the 1995
conviction was his, and that justified the imposition of the 120-month statutory
minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 851. Thus Miter’s enhanced sentence was
not attributable to the delay, but rather to his admission. For that same reason,
Miter’s claims that his delayed sentencing violated the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the district court’s local rules also fail. Non-constitutional errors
are harmless when they do not affect a defendant’s substantial rights. United
States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 492 (11th Cir. 2011). And again, here Miter’s
admission, rather than the delay, resulted in his enhanced sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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