[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FILED
U.S. COURT OF
No. 04-10646 APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 25, 2005
D. C. Docket No. 03-00281 CR-J-21-HTSTHOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CARLOS DASILVA-HERNANDEZ,
a.k.a. Alan Lopez-Martinez,
a.k.a. Alan Lopez,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 04-10840
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D. C. Docket No. 03-00330-CR-J-20-HTS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MAXIMILIANO PEREZ-PEREZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(May 25, 2005)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BIRCH and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is a consolidated appeal from two final judgments of the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida in separate criminal cases.
A federal grand jury indicted Carlos Dasilva-Hernandez and Maximiliano
Perez-Perez in separate, unrelated cases and charged each with being found
unlawfully in the United States in violation of
8 U.S.C. § 1326, after previously
having been arrested and deported from the United States. Both Defendants moved
for dismissal of their indictments for lack of venue. The district court denied both
motions. Dasilva-Hernandez was found guilty following a bench trial on stipulated
facts and ordered to serve thirty months followed by thirty-six months of supervised
release. Perez-Perez pleaded guilty to the charge and was ordered to serve six months
followed by thirty-six months of supervised release. The Defendants filed notices of
appeal and moved for consolidation based on their challenges to venue. We granted
that motion. On appeal, Dasilva-Hernandez also challenges his sentence.
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The Defendants contend that the district court erred by denying their motions
to dismiss the indictments. They argue that had United States Border Patrol Agent
Jennifer Dixon performed her duties properly she would have “found” them at the
Lowndes County Jail in Valdosta, Georgia rather than at the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (“INS”) office in Jacksonville, Florida. We find no error on
the part of the district court.
An indictment is sufficient “if it: (1) presents the essential elements of the
charged offense, (2) notifies the accused of the charges to be defended against, and
(3) enables the accused to rely upon a judgment under the indictment as a bar against
double jeopardy for any subsequent prosecution for the same offense.” United States
v. Steele,
178 F.3d 1230, 1233-34 (11th. Cir. 1999). The indictments here facially
satisfy these requirements. See United States v. Salman,
378 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th
Cir. 2004); United States v. Critzer,
951 F.2d 306, 307 ( 11th Cir. 1992) (“The
sufficiency of a criminal indictment is determined from its face.”). And, even if
pretrial hearings on Defendants’ motions were appropriate and necessary, see Salman,
378 F.3d at 1268 n.3 (acknowledging that trial court may accept proffers of evidence
on venue issue where defendant has consented to a bench trial), the district court’s
findings are not erroneous. See United States v. Smith,
918 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th
Cir. 1990) (“This court reviews a challenge to venue in the light most favorable to the
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government and makes all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of
the jury verdict when deciding whether the government has proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that an offense occurred in the trial district.”).
Dasilva-Hernandez also argues that a prior conviction for an aggravated felony
is an element of a
8 U.S.C. § 1326 offense that must be alleged in the indictment and
presented to the fact-finder in order to increase the statutory maximum penalty under
8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). However, this argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres
v. United States,
523 U.S. 224,
118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998), which held that a defendant’s
prior conviction is a sentencing factor to be found by the sentencing court, not an
element of a § 1326 offense. See also United States v. Orduno-Mireles, __ F.3d __
(11th Cir. April 6, 2005) (stating that the holding in Almendarez-Torres was left
undisturbed by United States v. Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005)).
Dasilva-Hernandez’s last argument is also without merit. He argues that the
district court erred by calculating his sentence based on his prior convictions and
status as a probationer when he committed the instant offence, matters neither
charged in the indictment nor presented to the fact-finder at trial. As stated above,
his argument with regard to the prior convictions is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres.
Nor do we find any reversible error in the district court’s findings that the Defendant
was on probation at the time he committed the § 1326 violation. Even if Almendarez-
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Torres is inapplicable to such a finding, Desilva-Hernandez was not sentenced above
the statutory maximum for § 1326(a) on the grounds that he committed the instant
offense while on probation and/or incarcerated. Rather, the statutory maximum was
increased by virtue of the district court’s finding that he had previously been
convicted of an aggravated felony.
AFFIRMED.
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