Bliss v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration , 254 F. App'x 757 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-12136 NOVEMBER 7, 2007
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00481-CV-OC-10-GRJ
JAMES BLISS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(November 7, 2007)
Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James Bliss appeals the judgment of the district court that affirmed the
denial of Bliss’s application for supplemental security income and disability
insurance benefits. Bliss argues that the ALJ erred when it assigned minimal
weight to the opinion of Bliss’s treating physician and failed to obtain the
testimony of a vocational expert. We affirm.
We review a social security appeal to determine whether the decision of the
ALJ is supported by substantial evidence and whether the ALJ applied the correct
legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363
F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence
as the reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Walden
v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982). We review de novo the decision
of the district court regarding whether substantial evidence supports the findings of
the ALJ. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002).
Bliss first argues that the ALJ erred when it discounted the testimony of
Bliss’s treating psychologist, C. Brooks Henderson, Ph.D. An ALJ may reject the
opinion of a treating physician, which ordinarily receives substantial weight, where
“good cause” is established. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir.
2004). “This Court has concluded ‘good cause’ exists when the: (1) treating
physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a
contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent
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with the doctor’s own medical records.” Id. at 1240–41. If the ALJ disregards the
opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ must clearly articulate his reasons. Id. at
1241.
The ALJ articulated several reasons for discounting the opinion of Dr.
Henderson, and the record supports the decision of the ALJ. The ALJ determined
that Dr. Henderson’s ultimate conclusion of mental impairment was inconsistent
with his own treatment notes that characterized Bliss as “pleasant, friendly,
cooperative, oriented, alert, bright, and introspective with no thought disorder.”
The record also established that Dr. Henderson observed Bliss on only two
occasions during the relevant period and the evaluation form containing Dr.
Henderson’s conclusions was completed five years later. Several other examining
doctors confirmed that Bliss’s Post Traumatic Stress Disorder did not severely
limit his ability to work, and the daily activities reported by Bliss contradicted Dr.
Henderson’s responses on the evaluation form. Because “good cause” existed to
reject the opinion of Dr. Henderson and the ALJ articulated specific reasons that
are supported by the record, the ALJ did not err when it assigned minimal weight
to Henderson’s opinion.
Bliss next argues that the ALJ erred when it failed to obtain testimony from
a vocational expert. Vocational expert testimony is not necessary when the ALJ
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concludes a claimant can perform his past relevant work. See Lucas v. Sullivan,
918 F.2d 1567, 1573 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990). Testimony from a vocational expert
becomes relevant at the fifth step of the evaluation process, when determining
whether jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002). Bliss does not
challenge the finding of the ALJ that Bliss possessed the residual functional
capacity to perform his past relevant work. Despite Bliss’s contention to the
contrary, testimony from a vocational expert was unnecessary.
Because the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence, the
judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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