Darwin G. Cain v. Mark E. Polen , 454 F. App'x 716 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                  FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 11-10394                ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Non-Argument Calendar            NOVEMBER 9, 2011
    ________________________               JOHN LEY
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cv-14078-JEM
    DARWIN G. CAIN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    MARK E. POLEN,
    DURIAN DAMOORGIAN,
    CAROLE Y. TAYLOR,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (November 9, 2011)
    Before CARNES, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Darwin G. Cain appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
    action for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Cain
    asserts his allegations of an equal protection violation were sufficiently plausible
    on their face to survive dismissal. Alternatively, Cain argues the district court
    erred by not offering him an opportunity to amend his complaint. After review,1
    we affirm.
    I.
    The facts pleaded in a complaint must state a claim for relief that is
    plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , __, 
    129 S. Ct. 1937
    , 1949
    (2009). Although courts liberally construe pro se pleadings, Tannenbaum v.
    United States, 
    148 F.3d 1262
    , 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), when a plaintiff proceeds in
    forma pauperis, Section 1915 of the United States Code accords courts the
    “unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss
    those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams,
    
    490 U.S. 319
    , 327 (1989).
    To successfully allege an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must show (1)
    he is similarly situated to others who received more favorable treatment, and (2)
    1
    We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), viewing the allegations in the complaint as true. See Mitchell v. Farcass,
    
    112 F.3d 1483
    , 1489-90 (11th Cir. 1997).
    2
    his discriminatory treatment was based on a constitutionally protected interest.
    See Jones v. Ray, 
    279 F.3d 944
    , 946-47 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, Cain rests his
    allegation of disparate treatment on three Florida appellate court decisions, two of
    which are factually distinguishable from Cain’s conviction, and two of which
    make no mention of the defendant’s race or economic status.2 Moreover, Cain
    makes conclusory statements, but offers no facts to support his contention that his
    race or economic status served as the basis for the defendant judges’ denial of his
    state habeas petition. Cain’s complaint contains no allegations sufficient to make
    his claims plausible on their face. Thus, the district court did not err when it
    dismissed Cain’s complaint for failure to state a claim. See 
    Jones, 279 F.3d at 947
    .
    II.
    According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(a)(1), a party
    may amend its pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive
    pleading is served. However, a district court need not allow any amendment when
    2
    Anderson v. State, 
    946 So. 2d 579
    , 582 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding two of four show-up
    identifications impermissible, but making no mention of race or economic status of the
    defendant); Davis v. State, 
    683 So. 2d 572
    , 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (holding show-up
    identification impermissible and noting the gunman was darker in complexion than the driver);
    Henry v. State, 
    519 So. 2d 84
    , 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (holding witness’s identification in a
    photo line-up was impermissible, but making no mention of the defendant’s race or economic
    status).
    3
    amendment would be futile. See Cockrell v. Sparks, 
    510 F.3d 1307
    , 1310 (11th
    Cir. 2007).
    In this case, there is no indication Cain might more carefully word his
    complaint or allege further facts that would make his complaint sufficient to state
    a claim for equal protection that is plausible on its face. See Hall v. United Ins.
    Co. of America, 
    367 F.3d 1255
    , 1263 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, the district court did
    not err by not offering Cain an opportunity to amend his complaint.
    AFFIRMED.
    4