Maughon v. Bibb County , 160 F.3d 658 ( 1998 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FILED
No. 98-8517 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Non-Argument Calendar ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ 11/02/98
D. C. Docket No. 5:95-Cv-445-1-WDO THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
JAMES D. MAUGHON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BIBB COUNTY; BUTTS COUNTY;
JOSEPH E. EVANS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
______________________
No. 98-8518
Non-Argument Calendar
______________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:95-CV-446-2-WDO
HERMAN E. MAUGHON and BETTY J. MAUGHON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
BIBB COUNTY; BUTTS COUNTY;
JOSEPH E. EVANS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia, Macon Division
_______________________
(November 2, 1998)
Before HATCHETT, Chief Circuit Judge; BARKETT, Circuit Judge, and GODBOLD, Senior
Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
James Dan Maughon and his mother Betty Maughon appeal from judgments entered by
the district court granting summary judgment to the defendants Bibb County, Butts County,
Joseph Evans, and John Doe #1-5. Because the facts in these cases are identical and each appeal
raises the same issues, we consolidate their cases for the purposes of this decision.
Plaintiffs each own land located in Butts County, Georgia. Their property shares a
common boundary, road and fence. The land is undeveloped and neither party resides there.
The defendants received tips that James Maughon had stolen a backhoe from Bibb County
Public Works and that the backhoe was located on the land. Evans obtained a search warrant for
the property but he was unaware that half of the property was owned by Betty Maughon, thus the
warrant described the property as the “Dan Maughon Farm.” Barry Fincher, a game warden to
whom the Maughons had given a gate key, let the officers onto the property. From the dirt road
on the property the officers visually located the backhoe, and a Bibb County employee identified
it as the one stolen. The employee also saw the backhoe’s buckets and streetpads lying in plain
view on Betty Maughon’s property. The officers seized the equipment, signed a receipt for the
backhoe, bucket, and pads and left the property. The Maughons contend that the backhoe, pads,
and bucket belonged to them and were wrongfully seized, and Betty Maughon claims that tools
and logging chains belonging to her were stored in the cab of the backhoe when it was seized.
The Maughons brought suit against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
violations of their Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment rights. They also alleged state law claims
for trespass and conversion of property. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
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all of the defendants on all claims. The court found that the individual defendants were entitled
to qualified immunity for the constitutional allegations. It further held that the Maughons’
constitutional claims against the counties were without merit because they did not offer proof
that the counties had an official policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional
violations. As for the Maughons’ state law claims, the court found that the counties were
entitled to sovereign immunity and that the plaintiffs had provided no basis for it to conclude that
the counties had waived this immunity. The district court did not address the state law claims
against the individual defendants.
After reading the briefs and record in this case, subject to our de novo review, we affirm
the district court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Bibb County and Butts
County. The district court correctly concluded that the Maughons failed to offer any proof that
the counties maintained an official policy or custom that caused the alleged violations of their
rights. Without proof of a custom or policy that furthered the unconstitutional behavior of
individual officers, municipalities are not subject to liability under § 1983. See Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1972). The district court also correctly
ruled for the counties on the Maughons’ state law claims. Counties are entitled to sovereign
immunity under the Georgia Constitution. Ga. Const. of 1983, art. I, § II, ¶ IX(e). Georgia has
not statutorily waived this immunity with regard to counties, and the Maughons have not offered
any sufficient basis for this court to find a waiver of sovereign immunity.1
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The Maughons assert in their briefs that the procurement of liability insurance by the counties
waives immunity. Georgia law does recognize a waiver of immunity to the extent an entity is
insured; however the Maughons did not offer any proof of this insurance in the district court nor
did they even note its existence. Furthermore, they have not explained whether the insurance
covers liability for the type of torts for which they brought suit. Because the Maughons failed to
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We also affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants for
the reasons specified in this opinion. The Maughons assert that the district court settled disputed
factual issues in favor of the defendants, ignoring its burden to consider all evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and that these findings of fact caused the district court to
rule in favor of the defendants. The district court may have improperly decided credibility issues
in favor of the defendants, but we find that construing these factual issues in the plaintiffs’ favor
does not make the grant of summary judgment improper.
"[T]he issue of a government official's qualified immunity from suit presents a question
of law, and 'like the generality of such questions, must be resolved de novo on appeal.' " Jordan
v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir.1994) (quoting Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510 (1994)).
Qualified immunity shields government agents engaged in discretionary functions from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The relevant inquiry, then, is first, whether “the defendant government
official was performing a discretionary function” and second, whether “the defendant should
reasonably have known that the action violated an individual's clearly established federal
statutory or constitutional rights.” Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1997).
Evans and the unnamed co-defendant officers were acting within their discretionary authority
during the incidents involved in this case. Thus, it is only the second part of the inquiry that is
relevant here. We must decide whether the officers violated clearly established law. The
offer proof of this waiver in its response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, we
decline to consider it now.
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Maughons contend that the search warrant was invalid because it was not based on a sufficient
affidavit and because it did not properly describe the property to be searched as belonging to two
different owners. They also contend that even if the warrant was valid the seizure of property
was unreasonable because it was not the property stolen from Bibb County.
Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find the warrant to
be valid and the seizure of the property reasonable. Negligent or innocent mistakes do not
violate the Fourth Amendment. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); see also
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 (U.S. 1987)(recognizing the "need to allow some latitude
for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of making
arrests and executing search warrants"). To invalidate a warrant based on incorrect information
provided in a supporting affidavit one must show that officers intentionally or recklessly
included false information or omitted necessary true information. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
Neither of the Maughons has offered proof of intentional or reckless wrongdoing on the part of
the officers in obtaining the warrant. Failure to ascertain that Betty Maughon owned one half of
the land to be searched was at most a negligent mistake. This mistake did not invalidate the
search warrant. Likewise the seizure of property was not unreasonable. An officer is entitled to
qualified immunity for the seizure of property if “the facts known to him at the time of the
seizure at least arguably created a reasonable suspicion ‘associat[ing] the property with criminal
activity.’" Lindsey v. Storey, 936 F.2d 554 559 (11th Cir. 1991)(quoting Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980)).
Furthermore, even if the warrant were invalid the officers would still be entitled to
qualified immunity for two reasons. First, that an officer conducts a warrantless search does not
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prevent his being immune. "[I]t is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases
reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have indicated that in
such cases those officials--like other officials who act in ways they reasonably believe to be
lawful--should not be held personally liable." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
Second, the search was conducted on uninhabited property or an “open field” that is subject to
search without a warrant. See Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 179(1984)(“[O]pen fields do not
provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from
government interference or surveillance [, and] . . . [i]t is not generally true that fences or ‘No
Trespassing’ signs effectively bar the public from viewing open fields in rural areas.”); U.S. v.
Berrong, 712 F.2d 1370, 1374 (11th Cir. 1983) (“there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in
outbuildings and open fields, even if fenced, unless they are part of the curtilage”).
No characterization of the facts of this case or of existing law would allow this court to
find that the officers violated the clearly established constitutional rights of the Maughons.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the individual defendants
on each of the federal causes of action.
As for the state claims against the individual defendants, we agree with the defendants
that they are entitled to official immunity under Georgia law. The Georgia Constitution provides
that employees of the state shall be subject to suit for performing their discretionary functions
only “if they act with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury in the performance of
their official functions.” Ga. Const. of 1983, art. I, § II, ¶ IX(d); Gilbert v. Richardson, 452
S.E.2d 476, 483 (Ga. 1994)(deputy sheriff immune from personal liability when performing
official law enforcement function). Because sheriff’s department employees are entitled to this
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immunity and because the Maughons have presented no proof that the defendants acted with
intent to cause them harm, we hold Georgia’s doctrine of official immunity extends to the
individual defendants in this case.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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