United States v. Clifford Timmons ( 2002 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-15795 FEBRUARY 26, 2002
THOMAS K. KAHN
D.C. Docket No. 99-00674-CR-1-1-WBH CLERK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CLIFFORD TIMMONS,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________
No. 00-16326
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 99-00674-CR-1-1-WBH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLIFFORD TIMMONS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
(February 26, 2002)
Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, BLACK, Circuit Judge, and MORENO*,
District Judge.
MORENO, District Judge:
This appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence at trial of two separate
charges of possessing a firearm illegally, as well as a challenge to the sentence
imposed pursuant to guilty pleas to drug offenses. The defendant appeals the refusal
of the district court to grant a post-verdict judgment of acquittal on Count One, which
charged the defendant with using and carrying a firearm on October 23, 1998 “during
and in relation to” a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The
government appeals the same district court’s grant of a post-verdict judgment of
acquittal on Count Two, which charged the defendant with possession of a firearm on
November 12, 1999 “in furtherance of” drug trafficking in violation of another section
of the same statute.
We find the evidence sufficient as to both counts. Therefore, we affirm the
district court’s judgment as to Count One but reverse as to Count Two and remand
*Honorable Federico A. Moreno, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida,
sitting by designation.
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for sentencing on the November 12, 1999 firearm possession charge, “in furtherance
of” drug trafficking. We also vacate the sentence for the underlying drug offenses
because it included a weapon enhancement for the possession of the weapons that
were part of the same course of conduct for which the defendant has been convicted.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 8, 2000 the grand jury returned a second superseding indictment,
which charged Clifford Timmons with three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Count One charged Timmons with using and carrying a 9mm semi-automatic handgun
on October 23, 1998 “during and in relation to” a drug trafficking crime. Count Two
charged Timmons with possessing on November 12, 1999, a .380 caliber handgun “in
furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime. Count Three, charging Timmons with
possessing a semi-automatic assault weapon “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking
crime, was dismissed prior to trial.
Before trial, Timmons pled guilty to possessing crack cocaine with intent to
distribute it on both October 23, 1998 and November 12, 1999. Thus, only the firearm
counts, “during and in relation” to the October 23, 1998 drug trafficking, and “in
furtherance” of the drug trafficking on November 12, 1999, were tried before a jury.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. Subsequently, Timmons filed a
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renewed motion for judgment of acquittal on both counts. The court denied the
motion for judgment of acquittal on Count One but granted judgment of acquittal on
Count Two. Both Timmons and the government appeal these orders.
Pursuant to Timmons’ guilty plea, he was sentenced to 115 months
imprisonment on the drug crimes. He was also sentenced to a consecutive five year
term on Count One, the firearm possession “during and in relation” to the October 23,
1998 drug trafficking. Even though the district court found the evidence insufficient
as to the November 12, 1999 firearms possession “in furtherance” of a drug trafficking
crime, it used the evidence of such possession to enhance by two levels the sentence
on the drug trafficking crimes to which Timmons had pled guilty. Timmons appeals
the sentence on the drug counts claiming error in the enhancement.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. The October 1998 Incident (Count One)
On the morning of October 5, 1998, Investigators Tullis and Brown from the
Atlanta Police Department Gang Unit went to Lakewood Village Apartments in an
undercover capacity. The investigators drove into the apartment complex in an
undercover vehicle, and were approached by several males who offered to sell them
marijuana and crack cocaine. One of the individuals who was present but did not
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participate in the sale was Clifford Timmons.
The officers also agreed to purchase a handgun later that day from two men,
“Shorty” and “Black.” While attempting to purchase the gun, a situation developed
between the undercover officers and the gun sellers. At this point, Timmons
approached and diffused the situation by taking the handgun from the individuals and
removing the clip and all the bullets from the gun. He then gave the clip to the
officers, received the money and gave them the gun. Shortly after completing this gun
sale, Timmons offered to sell the undercover officers another handgun with a laser
sight for $300. The officers and Timmons agreed to do future business and Timmons
gave the officers his beeper number and code.
On October 23, 1998, during a subsequent recorded telephone conversation,
Timmons again offered to sell the undercover officers a handgun with a laser sight for
$300. The portion of the transcript of the October 23, 1998 sale of the gun reads:
Officer R. Tullis: You got something?
Clifford Timmons: Yeah I got something.
Tullis: Hey, uh, you got that, uh, laser?
Timmons: Yeah I still got it.
Tullis: You still got it?
Timmons: Yeah.
Tullis: You wanna get rid of it today?
Timmons: Yeah I’ll get rid of it today.
R4-29 at 1.
Timmons claims that he did not explicitly discuss the sale of drugs on October
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5, 1998. The Government points out, however, that Timmons was not surprised when
the undercover officers asked about getting two “slabs” ($200 worth of drugs) during
their phone conversation of October 23, 1998. The relevant portion of the transcript
from that conversation reads:
Officer R. Tullis: Okay, what about, uh, that breakdown we, we discussed?
Clifford Timmons: The breakdown?
Tullis: Yeah.
Timmons: Yeah I got that too.
Tullis: Uh, cause uh myself and my partner we got like two...
Timmons: Uh-uh.
Tullis: ...that the wanna, we wanna try to get like uh two, you
can’t
give us two slabs?
Timmons: Yeah I can get for you.
R4-28 at 2.
The sale as negotiated was completed later that day after Officer Tullis met
Timmons in the quad area of Lakewood Apartments. Timmons approached the car
and handed the investigator a shoe box containing a Lorcin pistol and 2.3 grams of
crack cocaine. The officers handed Timmons the $300 for the pistol and then $200
for the crack cocaine. The officers drove off after completing the sale.
II. The November 1999 Incident (Count Two)
On November 12, 1999, agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
obtained a warrant to arrest Timmons and to search his apartment. The warrant was
executed at 8:30 p.m. that evening. When the officers arrived, Timmons was standing
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outside between his apartment and the apartment next door. Timmons was arrested
outside his apartment and agents recovered a cellular telephone and a pager from his
person and a two-way radio from the ground a few feet away. Inside the apartment,
the officers recovered photographs and documents confirming that it was his
apartment.
In the living room was a stove top oven. On top of the oven were two fully
loaded firearms, an Intratec Model A B10 9mm luger and a Lorcin model 380. Inside
the oven was an empty ammunition box of 9mm cartridges. In a closet next to the
living room, agents found a bullet-proof vest. In addition, agents found crack cocaine
and $350 inside a drawer under the stove. A clear plastic baggy with individual hits
of crack cocaine was found under the cushions of the couch. Six individually
packaged rocks of crack cocaine were recovered from a shoe of Timmons’ size
located in the bedroom of the apartment. In total, agents found 35.67 grams of crack
cocaine in Timmons’ apartment.
III. ANALYSIS
Both counts that were the subject of the trial and this appeal involve 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) which reads in pertinent part:
(1)(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise
provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person
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who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that
provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly
or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted
in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to
the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime— (i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5
years[.]
This version of § 924(c) was passed in 1998 in response to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995). See United
States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ceballos-Torres,
218 F.3d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court “has described the statute’s
basic purpose broadly, as an effort to combat the ‘dangerous combination’ of ‘drugs
and guns.’” Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1916
(quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2060 (1993)).
As Timmons pled guilty to the two underlying counts of possession with intent
to distribute cocaine, the issues left for trial were: (1) whether Timmons used or
carried a 9mm semi-automatic handgun on October 23, 1998, “during and in relation
to” a drug trafficking crime, and (2) whether on November 12, 1999, Timmons
possessed a .380 caliber handgun “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime. We
find sufficient evidence as to both counts. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s
denial as to Count One (the October 23, 1998 charge) but reverse the judgment of
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acquittal on Count Two (the November 12, 1999 charge), remanding it for sentencing
on that count pursuant to the jury’s guilty verdict. In addition, because we find that
the district court erred when it included a weapon enhancement in its sentence on the
drug counts, we vacate that sentence and remand for re-sentencing.
I. The § 924(c) Conviction for Use or Carrying of a Firearm “During and in
Relation To” a Drug Trafficking Offense
Timmons challenges the conviction on Count One, which involved using or
carrying a 9mm semi-automatic handgun on October 23, 1998 “during and in relation”
to a drug trafficking crime. To sustain this conviction the government must have
sufficient evidence on both the “uses or carries” prong and the “during and in relation
to” prong. Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction where “after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979).
A. “Use or Carry” Under § 924(c)
The government need only show either that Timmons used or carried the
firearm during and in relation to the drug trafficking crime, not both. Here, we need
not reach whether there was “use” of the firearm because the facts clearly prove the
“carry” element. We similarly conclude that any error in instructing the jury on “use”
is of no consequence since there is sufficient evidence on the “carry” prong.
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The Supreme Count in Muscarello adopted the primary meaning for the word
“carry,” defining it as to “convey, originally by cart or wagon, hence in any vehicle,
by ship, on horseback, etc.” Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128, 118 S.Ct. at 1914. The
Muscarello Court ultimately held that “[g]iven the ordinary meaning of the word
‘carry,’ it is not surprising to find that the Federal Courts of Appeals have
unanimously concluded that ‘carry’ is not limited to the carrying of weapons directly
on the person but can include their carriage in a car.” Id. at 131, 118 S.Ct. at 1916
(citations omitted). See also United States v. Wilson, 183 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir.
1999) (finding a firearm on the dashboard of the vehicle in which the defendant was
apprehended sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was “carrying” a
firearm); United States v. Range, 94 F.3d 614, 618 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that the
firearm under the floor mat of the car the defendant drove to the site of a drug
transaction was sufficient to support a jury verdict that defendant was “carrying” a
firearm).
The government’s case against Timmons is stronger than it was against the
defendants in Wilson and Range. On October 23, 1998, Timmons carried a shoe-box
that contained both the gun and the drugs in his hands. Given that the facts clearly
indicate that Timmons “carried” the firearm, even if the evidence was insufficient to
sustain a conviction under the “use” prong as defined by the Supreme Court in Smith
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v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 237, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2058 (1993) and Bailey, 516 U.S.
at 146, 116 S.Ct. at 507, we must affirm the conviction, so long as the evidence
sufficiently supports the “during and in relation to” element of § 924(c). See Wilson,
183 F.d at 1298 (affirming the conviction holding that error committed in defining use
was of no moment as the evidence supported a conviction under the “carry” element
of § 924(c)).
B. “During and in Relation To” under § 924(c)
The inclusion of the “during and in relation to” requirement of § 924(c) was
intended to be a limiting phrase to “prevent the misuse of the statute [from]
penaliz[ing] those whose conduct does not create the risks of harm at which the statute
aims.” Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 139, 118 S.Ct. at 1919. There is little question that to
the extent that an offense occurred, it happened “during” the commission of a drug
offense as the gun was sold along with the drugs. Timmons’ challenge therefore rests
on whether the carrying of the firearm occurred “in relation to” a drug trafficking
offense. In Smith the Supreme Court defined “in relation to” as follows:
The phrase “in relation to” thus, at a minimum, clarifies that the firearm
must have some purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking
crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or
coincidence. As one court has observed, the “in relation to” language
“allay[s] explicitly the concern that a person could be” punished under
§ 924(c)(1) for committing a drug trafficking offense “while in
possession of a firearm” even though the firearm’s presence is
coincidental or entirely “unrelated” to the crime. Instead, the gun at least
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must “facilitat[e], or ha[ve] the potential of facilitating,” the drug
trafficking offense.
Smith, 508 U.S. at 238, 113 S.Ct. at 2058-59 (internal and subsequent citations
omitted).
The Smith Court also directed that, “[t]he phrase ‘in relation to’ is expansive,
as the Courts of Appeals construing § 924(c)(1) have recognized.” Id. at 237, 113
S.Ct. at 2058 (internal citation omitted). The Smith Court ultimately determined:
The fact that a gun is treated momentarily as an item of commerce does
not render it inert or deprive it of destructive capacity. Rather, as
experience demonstrates, it can be converted instantaneously from
currency to cannon. We therefore see no reason why Congress would
have intended courts and juries applying § 924(c)(1) to draw a fine
metaphysical distinction between a gun’s role in a drug offense as a
weapon and its role as an item of barter; it creates a grave possibility of
violence and death in either capacity.
Id. at 240, 113 S.Ct at 2060 (internal citation omitted).
In this case, the evidence demonstrates that the gun was not there
“coincidentally,” nor was “entirely unrelated” to the drug crime. If the gun did not
facilitate the drug offense, it certainly had the “potential of facilitating” the drug
offense. The evidence revealed that on the morning of October 23, 1998, the
undercover officers and Timmons finalized the negotiations for the gun by
determining that it was still available and that Timmons would sell it that day, and
then proceeded to arrange for the sale of $200 worth of crack cocaine. Timmons
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brought the gun and the drugs together to the officers in a shoe-box. If indeed the
purpose of the statute is to combat the dangerous combination of drugs and guns, as
Muscarello held, and Timmons combined the drugs and gun in a single shoe-box in
what essentially amounts to a single transaction, as the jury found, it would flout the
purpose of the statute to hold anything but that the gun was carried “during and in
relation” to the drug offense.
II. The Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal on the “In Furtherance Of”
Requirement of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
Timmons challenged and succeeded in convincing the district court that the
evidence was insufficient for a conviction based on the firearm possession “in
furtherance of” a drug-trafficking offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Timmons
does not challenge that the firearms were in his possession. The basis of his claim is
that there was insufficient evidence that the firearms were possessed “in furtherance
of” drug trafficking. We analyze here, for the first time, the sufficiency of the
evidence required to support a conviction for possession of a firearm in a “furtherance
of” a drug trafficking crime.
We start with the language of the statute. The word “furtherance” should be
given its plain meaning where as here it is not defined within the statute. See
Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128, 118 S.Ct. at 1914. “Furtherance” means “a helping
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forward.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 924 (1981). Thus, a
conviction under this portion of § 924(c) requires that the prosecution establish that
the firearm helped, furthered, promoted, or advanced the drug trafficking.
Further, we agree with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ determination in Ceballos-
Torres, 218 F.3d at 415, and in Mackey, 265 F.3d at 461, that the plain meaning of
“furtherance” is consistent with the legislative intent of the amendment and not in
violation of the canons of statutory construction. To properly understand this 1998
amendment to § 924(c), we must look to the reason for its genesis. In 1995, the
Supreme Court in Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143, 116 S.Ct. at 505, narrowed the definition
of “use” under § 924(c), holding that “§ 924(c)(1) requires evidence sufficient to show
an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an
operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.” Id. The legislative history
indicates that the amended versions of the statute added the phrase criminalizing
possession “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime in order to “revers[e] the
restrictive effect of the Bailey decision.” H.R. Rep. 105-344, at 6 (1997) . The House
Judiciary Committee explained, “[t]he word ‘possession’ has a broader meaning than
either ‘uses’ or ‘carries’ . . . . In order to sustain a conviction under § 924(c), the
government must prove that a firearm was possessed ‘in furtherance of’ the
commission of the federal crime of violence or drug trafficking offense.” Id. The
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congressional analysis elaborated on what the prosecution must show.
The government must clearly show that a firearm was possessed to
advance or promote the commission of the underlying offense. The mere
presence of a firearm in an area where a criminal act occurs is not a
sufficient basis for imposing this particular mandatory sentence. Rather,
the government must illustrate through specific facts, which tie the
defendant to the firearm, that the firearm was possessed to advance or
promote the criminal activity.
The facts of the Bailey decision, reiterated above, proved a good
example. The Committee believes that the evidence presented by the
government in that case may not have been sufficient to sustain a
conviction for possession of a firearm “in furtherance of” the
commission of a drug trafficking offense. In that case, a prosecution
expert testified at Mr. Bailey’s trial that drug dealers frequently carry a
firearm to protect themselves, as well as their drugs and money.
Standing on its own, this evidence may be insufficient to meet the “in
furtherance of” test. The government would have to show that the
firearm located in the trunk of the car advanced or promoted Mr.
Bailey’s drug dealing activity. The Committee believes that one way to
clearly satisfy the “in furtherance of” test would be additional witness
testimony connecting Mr. Bailey more specifically with the firearm.
Id. at *12.
Thus, the plain meaning of § 924(c), uncontradicted by the accompanying
legislative intent, dictates that the presence of a gun within the defendant’s dominion
and control during a drug trafficking offense is not sufficient by itself to sustain a §
924(c) conviction. As the Second Circuit explained in United States v. Finley, 245
F.3d 199, 202 (2d Cir. 2001), there must be “a showing of some nexus between the
firearm and the drug selling operation.” Id. The nexus between the gun and the drug
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operation can be established by “the type of drug activity that is being conducted,
accessibility of the firearm, the type of the weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, the
status of the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is loaded, proximity
to the drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under which the gun is
found.” Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d at 414-15; accord Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462.
While these factors are not exclusive, they “distinguish possession in furtherance of
a crime from innocent possession of a wall-mounted antique or an unloaded hunting
rifle locked in a cupboard.” Id.
The facts of this case are similar to those of either Ceballos-Torres or Mackey.
See Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d at 411 (involving a loaded 9mm gun found in the open
on defendant’s bed, which defendant claimed was for personal protection, along with
569.8 grams of cocaine and $1,360 found nearby in a bedroom closet); Mackey, 265
F.3d at 462 (involving an illegally possessed, loaded, short-barreled shotgun in the
living room located near the scales and razor blades in a house from which the
defendant sold drugs). Yet, after considering the evidence in light of the relevant
factors, we find that the evidence against Timmons (bullet proof vest, crack cocaine
on the stove and under the cushions of the couch, two fully loaded firearms on top of
the oven and ammunition inside the oven in the living room of his apartment) was
sufficient for the jury to have concluded that Timmons was guilty of possessing the
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firearms “in furtherance of” drug trafficking.1 Therefore, the district court erred in
setting aside the guilty verdict.
III. Sentencing Enhancements
Finally, we address Timmons’ appeal of the district court’s sentence for the
drug offenses to which Timmons pled guilty. Timmons argues, and the government
concedes, that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement to
Timmons’ sentence. The district court applied the enhancement pursuant to USSG
§ 2D1.1(b)(1), based on the two weapons seized pursuant to the November 12, 1999
search warrant. The commentary to USSG § 2K2.4 states, however, that a sentence
imposed for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) accounts for any enhancement that
would apply to the underlying offense based on any relevant conduct for which the
defendant is accountable. Timmons contends that the October 23, 1998 and
November 12, 1999 drug charges are relevant conduct to each other under § 1B1.3 of
the Sentencing Guidelines because they are part of the same course of conduct or
1
Timmons moved to strike references in the government's brief to expert
testimony showing that drug dealers keep guns. Because the district court gave an
instruction to the jury limiting this testimony to show that the drugs were for
distribution rather than personal use, the testimony could not have been used by the
jury to determine whether the firearms were possessed "in furtherance of" the drug
trafficking offense. We therefore grant Timmons' motion to strike. However, we
find that there was sufficient evidence even without this expert testimony.
Likewise, Timmons' motion to file a supplemental letter brief is granted.
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common scheme or plan. We agree. Therefore, because Timmons was convicted and
sentenced for violating § 924(c) by possession of a firearm during and in relation to
the drug-trafficking crime he committed in October 23, 1998, and in accordance with
this opinion will be sentenced on the firearm possession of November 12, 1999, the
district court is precluded from applying a weapons enhancement pursuant to USSG
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) to the underlying drug charges. When a defendant is convicted of a §
924(c) violation as well as an underlying offense, his possession of a weapon cannot
be used to enhance the level of the underlying offense. United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d
1065, 1107 (11th Cir. 2001).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment with respect to Count One
but vacate and remand with directions to reinstate the conviction of Count Two. We
also vacate Timmons’ sentence for the drug offenses and remand for re-sentencing
consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED, VACATED AND REMANDED.
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