United States v. Katay Joseph ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-14300
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:14-cr-80064-JIC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
KATAY JOSEPH,
a.k.a. Tyler Jones,
a.k.a. David Johnson,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(May 12, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Katay Joseph appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). He argues
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that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress guns that were found
during an inventory search of the rental car that he was driving after he and his
passenger were arrested during a traffic stop. Mr. Joseph bases his argument on
two grounds: (1) that the traffic stop was pretextual, and therefore, violated his
Fourth Amendment rights; and (2) that the inventory search was illegal because the
officers failed to follow established procedures prior to searching the rental car.
Mr. Joseph also challenges his 180-month sentence. He contends that the
district court erred in applying the 15-year mandatory sentence under the Armed
Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because his three prior drug convictions,
for violations of Florida Statute § 893.13, were not “controlled substance offenses”
as defined in § 4B1.2(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines. After careful review of the
parties’ briefs, we affirm.
II
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district
court’s “findings of fact for clear error and its application of the law to those facts
de novo.” United States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2007). We
construe all facts in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the
district court, which, in this case, is the government. See id. at 1235-36. “We
review de novo whether a prior conviction is a serious drug offense within the
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meaning of the ACCA.” United States v. Robinson, 583 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th
Cir. 2009).
III
Binding precedent forecloses all but one of Mr. Joseph’s arguments.
As for his first claim—that the traffic stop was unlawful because it was
pretextual—the Supreme Court has held that “the constitutional reasonableness of
traffic stops [does not] depend[ ] on the actual motivations of the individual
officers involved.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
Accordingly, as long as an officer had “probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation . . . occurred[,]” the traffic stop will be deemed lawful. Id. at 810. At
Mr. Joseph’s suppression hearing, Officers McGriff and Christoffel (the officers
who conducted the traffic stop) testified that they observed Mr. Joseph operating
the vehicle without wearing a seat belt, which is a traffic violation under Florida
law. See Fla. Stat. § 316.614(4)(b). Because Mr. Joseph did not present any
evidence to controvert the police officers’ testimony, the district court did not
clearly err in crediting that testimony and finding that the traffic stop was
constitutional.
With respect to the assertion that the district court improperly applied the
ACCA enhancement, we recently held that violations of § 893.13(1) of the Florida
Statutes qualify as “controlled substance offenses” under § 4B1.2(b) of the
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Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir.
2014). Thus, we conclude that the district court properly classified Mr. Joseph as
an armed career criminal for purposes of ACCA.
Mr. Joseph’s remaining argument—that the inventory search was illegal—is
not foreclosed by precedent, but it is without merit. The Supreme Court has held
that inventory searches of lawfully impounded vehicles are an exception to the
general warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987). For an impoundment of a vehicle to be lawful, it must
be done according to an established routine practice and “on the basis of something
other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S.
1, 4 (1990). The established procedure, however, need not be detailed. United
States v. Johnson, 777 F.3d 1270, 1277 (11th Cir. 2015). For example, we have
upheld an inventory search where the district court had indicated that a police
department’s policy “‘permitted impoundment under the circumstances’ and ‘the
defendant had not countered th[e] assertion.’” Id.Mr. Joseph first points to Florida’s Nonresident Violator Compact, Fla. Stat.
§ 322.50, as evidence that the officers failed to follow established procedures. He
contends that because he was an out-of-state resident, the Compact required the
officers to issue him a citation for the seat belt violation and release him on his
own recognizance instead of detaining him. Mr. Joseph’s argument, however, fails
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to recognize a major point—the Compact only permits a police officer to release a
motorist on his promise to appear if he possesses a “driver license issued by a party
jurisdiction.” Fla. Stat. § 322.50, Art. III. Mr. Joseph admitted that he did not
have a driver license, and the officers arrested him based on his admission. The
officers also arrested the passenger, Michael Jeon-Poix, for possession of
marijuana after he admitted that he had a small quantity of weed in his pocket.
Thus, the officers were well within their rights to arrest both men and subsequently
impound and search the rental car.
Mr. Joseph also claims that the officers violated the Riviera Beach Police
Department’s impoundment policy by not granting him the opportunity to call
someone to recover the rental car prior to impounding it. Although the officers
generally agreed with Mr. Joseph’s characterization of the Department’s policy,
Officer McGriff testified at the suppression hearing that, due to liability concerns,
police officers are only permitted to release the vehicle to its owner or the person
who rented the car. Officer Christoffel testified that he did not recall finding a
rental agreement or any other document that would have indicated who rented the
vehicle, and under such circumstances, rental companies have requested that the
Department automatically tow the vehicle without first contacting them. Again,
Mr. Joseph did not offer any evidence to counter this testimony. Accordingly, the
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district court did not clearly err in finding that the officers acted pursuant to the
Department’s policy and that the impoundment and inventory search were legal.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Joseph’s conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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