United States v. Charlie Williams , 307 F. App'x 273 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                            [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                  FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 08-10094                ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    JANUARY 9, 2009
    Non-Argument Calendar
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 07-00104-CR-ORL-22KRS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CHARLIE WILLIAMS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (January 9, 2009)
    Before CARNES, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Charles Williams appeals his total sentence of 352 months’ imprisonment,
    imposed after he pled guilty to: conspiracy to commit a robbery, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1951
    (Count 1); conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a mixture containing five
    or more kilograms of cocaine, 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    , 846 (Count 2); conspiracy to use
    a firearm during a crime of violence and drug trafficking offense, 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2
    ,
    924(c) (Count 3); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2
    ,
    924 (Count 4). The district court imposed a sentence of 292 months’
    imprisonment for Counts 1, 2, and 4, followed by 60 months’ imprisonment for
    Count 3, which was the statutory mandatory minimum.
    On appeal, Williams argues that his mandatory minimum sentence, like all
    mandatory sentences, is unlawful. However, we have previously held that district
    courts are bound by statutory minimums, and that mandatory minimum sentences
    do not deprive defendants of individualized sentences or due process. United
    States v. Shelton, 
    400 F.3d 1325
    , 1333 n.10 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v.
    Holmes, 
    838 F.2d 1175
    , 1177 (11th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, we reject Williams’s
    argument on this issue.
    Williams also argues that the district court erred by not departing from the
    guideline range. However, because there is nothing in the record to indicate that
    the court believed it was not authorized to depart from the guideline range, we lack
    jurisdiction to review its decision not to do so. United States v. Dudley, 
    463 F.3d
                                   2
    1221, 1228 (11th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we decline to consider this argument.
    Williams’s final argument on appeal is that his sentence is unreasonable,
    because it does not reflect the court’s consideration of the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)
    sentencing factors or his low risk for recidivism.
    In United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 261, 
    125 S.Ct. 738
    , 765-66,
    
    160 L.Ed.2d 621
     (2005), the Supreme Court held that sentences are to be reviewed
    for "unreasonable[ness]." In doing so, we "merely ask[] whether the trial court
    abused its discretion." United States v. Pugh, 
    515 F.3d 1179
    , 1189 (11th Cir.
    2008) (quotation removed). The burden of establishing that the sentence is
    unreasonable lies with the party challenging the sentence. 
    Id.
    Pursuant to Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. __, 
    128 S.Ct. 586
    , 
    169 L.Ed.2d 445
     (2007), appellate review for reasonableness is a two-step process. Id. at 1190.
    First, we "must . . . ensure that the district court committed no significant
    procedural error," like "failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors," or "failing to
    adequately explain the chosen sentence." Id. (quotation removed). Second, we
    must consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id.
    Section 3553(a) provides that district courts must consider, inter alia, (1) the
    applicable Guideline range; (2) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (3) the
    history and characteristics of the defendant; (4) the need for the sentence imposed
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    to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
    provide just punishment for the offense; (5) the need for adequate deterrence to
    criminal conduct; (6) protection of the public from further crimes of the defendant;
    and (7) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(1)-(6). "The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a
    matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court, and we will not
    substitute our judgment in weighing the relevant factors." United States v.
    Amedeo, 
    487 F.3d 823
    , 832 (11th Cir.) (quotations and alterations omitted), cert.
    denied, 
    128 S.Ct. 671
     (2007).
    "[A]n acknowledgment by the district court that it has considered the
    defendant's arguments and the factors in section 3553(a) is sufficient under
    Booker."    United States v. Talley, 
    431 F.3d 784
    , 786 (11th Cir. 2005). Although
    we do not apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence that falls within the
    guidelines range, we ordinarily expect such sentences to be reasonable. See 
    id. at 787-88
    .
    In imposing Williams’s sentence, the district court stated that it had
    considered the advisory guidelines, the statutory mandatory minimum, and the
    § 3553(a) factors. Given Williams’s extensive criminal history, and the violent
    details of his plan to conduct an armed home invasion robbery, we cannot say that
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    this sentence was unreasonable.
    AFFIRMED.
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