Melanie Williams v. Matthew Sirmons ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JAN 13, 2009
No. 08-13218 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00686-CV-J-33-MCR
MELANIE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellee.
versus
MATTHEW SIRMONS,
JAMES MILLS,
Defendants-Appellants,
SHERIFF JOHN RUTHERFORD
of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office,
Defendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(January 13, 2009)
Before BIRCH, HULL and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Melanie Williams brought suit against Deputy Matthew Sirmons, Deputy
James Mills, and Sheriff John Rutherford of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office,
alleging, inter alia, that Mills and Sirmons used excessive force against her in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Deputies Mills and Sirmons moved for summary
judgment, arguing that they were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.
The district court denied the deputies’ motion. Sirmons and Mills appeal.
As an initial matter, we note that a district court’s order denying a
defendant’s motion for summary judgment grounded on a claim of qualified
immunity is immediately appealable despite there being disputed issues of fact,
unless the only disputed issue is whether the evidence could support a finding that
particular conduct occurred. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312 (1996).
Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s legal analysis in
denying qualified immunity, even though the district court noted that material
issues of fact remain. Cottrell v. Coldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1996).
BACKGROUND
The parties dispute several key facts in this case; however, in determining
the facts for summary judgment purposes, we, like the district court, are required to
2
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Under this standard, the evidence
supports the following facts:
In the early hours of May 8, 2005, Melanie Williams, then seven and a half
months pregnant with her first child, noticed that she had begun to bleed vaginally.
Concerned, she began to drive herself to St. Vincent’s Medical Center. En route,
Williams ran a red light. Less than one mile from the hospital, Williams pulled
over when signaled to stop by Deputies Sirmons and Mills. After Sirmons
approached her car, Williams explained to him that she was pregnant, bleeding,
and on her way to the hospital. Sirmons appeared unconcerned and requested
Williams’ drivers’ license and proof of insurance and inquired whether she owned
the car she was driving. After receiving the requested documents, Sirmons
returned to his patrol car to verify her identity and issue a traffic citation. Williams
then fled from the stop in her vehicle. Mills and Sirmons pursued Williams with
their lights and sirens on.
Williams drove directly to the hospital’s emergency vehicle bay with
Sirmons and Mills close behind. As Williams exited her car, Sirmons grabbed her
arm and told her that she was going to jail. Williams pulled free and ran towards
the emergency room yelling, “Help! I’m pregnant and bleeding.” Williams
3
stopped at two locked doors in the emergency room, still calling out for help.
Sirmons caught up to Williams and wrapped his arms around her, causing them
both to fall to the floor. Sirmons dislocated his shoulder in the fall. Sirmons got
up, and Mills took Sirmons’ place, kneeling atop the prone Williams while he
unhurriedly handcuffed her. All the while, Williams was struggling to stand up
and pleading with the deputy to get off her stomach because she was pregnant.
The deputies then arrested Williams.
Mills took Williams to the patrol car where he allowed her to be examined
by a nurse from the hospital. Thereafter, Williams was admitted to the hospital and
found to be bleeding vaginally and in premature labor. Her physicians successfully
staved off the premature labor and Williams was released from the hospital ten
days later.
Williams sued Sirmons and Mills under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
violations of her Fourth Amendment rights during her arrest.1 At the conclusion of
discovery, Sirmons and Mills moved for summary judgment, arguing that they
were entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer could have
believed that there was probable cause for the arrest and that their use of de
1
Williams also sued the deputies for malicious prosecution under state law and Sheriff
Rutherford in his official capacity under § 1983 and for false arrest and battery under state law.
These claims are not at issue in this appeal.
4
minimis force in arresting Williams was lawful and necessary under the
circumstances. The district court denied the deputies’ motion, finding that there
was sufficient record evidence to justify the conclusion (1) that Williams’ arrest
was not founded upon probable cause and therefore any use of force was
unauthorized and (2) that the force used was excessive under these circumstances.
Accordingly, the district court found that the deputies were not entitled to the
defense of qualified immunity as a matter of law.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a denial of a motion for summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds de novo, applying the same standard as required in the district
court.2 Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1485. Summary judgment may be granted only where
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
DISCUSSION
In a civil rights action under § 1983, the doctrine of qualified immunity
might shield law enforcement officers from liability. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
2
We note that “a defendant who does not win summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds may yet prevail on those grounds at or after trial on a motion for a judgment as a matter
of law.” Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1487 (citing Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1546 (11th Cir. 1994)).
In this interlocutory appeal, we decide only whether the evidence, construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, required the district court to grant summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds.
5
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Pursuant to this doctrine, law enforcement officers are
entitled to qualified immunity so long as the alleged civil damages arose from the
officers’ discharge of their discretionary functions and their conduct “could
reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have
violated.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). Qualified immunity
does not provide a mere defense to liability, but rather a complete immunity from
suit. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001). Saucier instructs that
summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate at the earliest
stages of litigation “[i]f the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct
would be clearly unlawful.” 533 U.S. at 202.
To claim qualified immunity, the officer first must show that he was acting
within his discretionary authority when the alleged violation occurred. Kesinger v.
Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2004); Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d
1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). Once this is shown, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to show that the official is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Skop v. City of
Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007). To avoid summary judgment on
the basis of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendant
violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time
of the alleged violation.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252,
6
1264 (11th Cir. 2004). These two inquiries must be followed in this order “to set
forth principles which will become the basis for a [future] holding that a right is
clearly established.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 372 (2007) (alteration in
original) (quotation marks omitted).
In this case, it is uncontested that Deputies Sirmons and Mills were acting
pursuant to their discretionary authority in pursuing and arresting Williams.
Accordingly, the burden is upon Williams to show that the deputies violated her
clearly established constitutional rights. Williams calls her § 1983 claim one for
“excessive force;” however, she actually alleges and presents evidence of two
separate constitutional violations, which the district court fully addressed: (1) that
the deputies did not have probable cause to arrest Williams and (2) that the
deputies used excessive force in effecting her arrest. Although both issues are
framed under the rubric of excessive force, the probable-cause question is distinct
from the excessive-force claim. Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th
Cir. 2008) (holding that “a genuine ‘excessive force’ claim relates to the manner in
which an arrest was carried out, independent of whether law enforcement had the
power to arrest”). Accordingly, we address these two alleged violations separately.
A. Probable Cause
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a police officer must have probable
7
cause to make a warrantless arrest. Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1345
(11th Cir. 2002). Probable cause to arrest exists when law enforcement officials
have facts and circumstances within their knowledge sufficient to warrant a
reasonable belief that the suspect had committed or was committing a crime.
United States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002); Rankin v. Evans,
133 F.3d 1425, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that “the standard for
determining the existence of probable cause is the same under both Florida and
federal law”). “In the context of a claim for false arrest, an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity where that officer had ‘arguable probable cause’” to effectuate
the arrest. Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 762-63 (11th Cir. 2006). Arguable
probable cause exists where an objectively reasonable officer in the same
circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the officers effectuating the
arrest could have believed that probable cause existed. See Thornton v. City of
Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1399 (11th Cir. 1998).
In this case, it is undisputed that Sirmons and Mills lawfully stopped
Williams for running a red light and that Williams drove away from the traffic stop
before she was given permission to do so in violation of Florida Statute
§ 316.1935, which makes the willful attempt to flee or elude an officer a felony.
Accordingly, based on their own observations, the deputies had probable cause to
8
believe Williams had committed a crime. Williams argues, however, that the
deputies knew or should have known that she was justified in leaving the traffic
stop due to her medical emergency, which provided an affirmative defense to her
criminal conduct and removed the probable cause for her arrest.
Generally, in determining probable cause an arresting officer does not have
to consider the validity of any possible defense. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
145-46 (1979). An exception to the general rule exists, however, when the
arresting officer actually has knowledge of facts and circumstances conclusively
establishing an affirmative defense. In Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d
1007 (6th Cir. 1999), the Sixth Circuit considered whether the defendant police
officers were entitled to a qualified immunity defense against a Fourth Amendment
claim arising out of their arrest of the plaintiffs who claimed they had been arrested
without probable cause. The court said: “The law has been clearly established
since at least the Supreme Court’s decision in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 162 (1925), that probable cause determinations involve an examination of all
facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge at the time of an arrest.” Id.(emphasis in original). Because the officers “had full knowledge of facts and
circumstances that conclusively established, at the time of the . . . arrests, that the
plaintiffs were justified – by statute – in carrying concealed weapons during their
9
work,” the court concluded defendant police officers lacked probable cause to
believe the plaintiffs violated the law. Dietrich, 167 F.3d at 1012. The court held
therefore that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Id.We are persuaded by Dietrich and agree that in determining whether
probable cause to arrest exists, an officer must consider all facts and circumstances
within that officer’s knowledge, including facts and circumstances conclusively
establishing an affirmative defense. See also Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503,
1506 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining that probable cause is “judged not with clinical
detachment but with a common sense view to the realities of normal life”); Painter
v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 571 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that an officer “in
assessing probable cause to effect an arrest, may not ignore information known to
him which proves that the suspect is protected by an affirmative legal justification
for his suspected criminal actions” ); Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 1396-97 (3d
Cir. 1989) (assuming without deciding that in determining probable cause the
arresting officers should consider facts establishing affirmative defenses). That is,
if an officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances which establish an
affirmative defense, he or she lacks probable cause to arrest, even when the facts
and circumstances establish that the person meets all elements of the offense.
Under Florida law, necessity or duress is an affirmative defense to the crime
10
of fleeing or eluding a police officer, as codified under Fla. Stat. § 316.1935. See
Rowley v. State, 939 So. 2d 298, 300 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006). The elements of the
defense are (1) the defendant reasonably believed that a danger or emergency
existed that she did not intentionally cause; (2) the danger or emergency threatened
significant harm to her or a third person; (3) the threatened harm was real,
imminent, and impending; (4) the defendant had no reasonable means to avoid the
danger or emergency except by committing the crime; (5) the crime was committed
out of duress to avoid the danger or emergency; and (6) the harm the defendant
avoided outweighs the harm caused by committing the crime. Driggers v. State,
917 So.2d 329, 331 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005).
In this case, the evidence taken in the light most favorable to Williams
establishes that the deputies knew from their interview with her during the traffic
stop that Williams was pregnant, bleeding, in distress, and on her way to the
hospital for emergency treatment. The deputies, however, detained Williams in
order to write a traffic citation. Immediately thereafter, the deputies observed
Williams drive away from the traffic stop without permission and proceed directly
to a hospital less than one mile away, where she exited her car, ran towards the
emergency room, and called out, “Help! I’m pregnant and bleeding.” Because
they followed her directly from the traffic stop where she claimed to need medical
11
attention to the hospital where she immediately asked for help, the deputies should
have known that Williams was not acting willfully to flee officers; rather, she was
acting under necessity. A reasonable officer would have known, given this
particular set of circumstances, that Williams’ flight from the traffic stop was
justified by the affirmative defense of necessity or duress. For this reason, the
deputies lacked arguable – much less actual – probable cause to arrest, even though
the circumstances established that Williams met all elements of the offense of
fleeing or eluding a police officer. The deputies, therefore, are not entitled to the
defense of qualified immunity as a matter of law for Williams’ claim that the arrest
was unsupported by probable cause and the district court properly denied summary
judgment on this ground.
If no probable cause authorizes an arrest, any use of force to effectuate the
unlawful arrest is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Bashir v. Rockdale
County, Ga., 445 F.3d 1323, 1331-33 (11th Cir. 2006); Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d
1253, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that although the use of force below a de
minimis threshold ordinarily will not be actionable, even de minimis force will
violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer is not entitled to arrest or detain the
suspect). This rule makes sense because if a stop or arrest is illegal, “then there is
no basis for any threat or any use of force, and an excessive force claim would
12
always arise but only collaterally from the illegal stop or arrest claim.” Jackson v.
Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1170-71 (11th Cir. 2000). A plaintiff’s damages for
unlawful arrest, therefore, include damages for any injury, pain and suffering, and
mental anguish caused by the force used to effect that false arrest, regardless of
whether the force would have been reasonable or excessive had there been
probable cause. Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 158-59 (11th Cir. 1995).
Accordingly, to the extent Williams asserts that the force was excessive as
unjustified by probable cause, this claim is subsumed into and included within her
unlawful arrest claim. Id.C. Excessive Force3
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not use excessive force
in the course of a lawful arrest. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 394-95
(1989). Likewise, a police officer with the ability to do so must intervene to stop
another police officer’s use of excessive force. Priester v. City of Riviera Beach,
Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 924-25 (11th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court instructs that
“[d]etermining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’
3
In addition to claiming that the use of force in her arrest was illegal as unsupported by
probable cause, Williams also asserts as a discrete claim that the deputies’ force was excessive,
assuming her arrest was legal. Accordingly, although there are genuine issues of material fact as
to whether probable cause existed for her arrest, we also address whether, assuming probable
cause did exist, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is merited on Williams’
excessive force claim.
13
under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against
the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. As
in other Fourth Amendment contexts, the “reasonableness” inquiry in an excessive
force case is an objective one: “the question is whether the officers’ actions are
‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,
without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397. In making this
determination, we examine such factors as “the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether [s]he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest
by flight.” Id. at 396.
It is well established in this circuit that where an arrest is supported by
probable cause, the application of de minimis force as needed to effect the arrest,
without more, will not support a claim for excessive force in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. See Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2000). This is
the case because “the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily
carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to
effect it,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, and we “recognize that the typical arrest
involves some force and injury.” Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th
14
Cir. 2002). “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the
peace of a judge’s chambers” violates the Fourth Amendment. Graham, 490 U.S.
at 396 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
In this case, the evidence presented by Williams establishes that after
Williams ran away from the deputies, Deputy Sirmons grabbed Williams from
behind and pulled her to the ground and that Deputy Mills placed his knee on her
back and put his weight upon her in order to handcuff her. Once Williams was
restrained, no further force was used against her. Williams presents no evidence
that she was injured as a result of the force; accordingly, we must characterize the
use of force is as de minimis. See Rodriguez, 280 F.3d at 1351; Nolin, 207 F.3d at
1258 n.4.
The district court, applying the Graham factors, found that the need for force
was slight because (1) the crime at issue was neither severe nor minor, (2)
Williams objectively posed no threat to others, and (3) she was no longer fleeing
because she was stopped by two locked doors. The district court further found that
although a minimal amount of force and injury usually is objectively reasonable in
the course of a lawful arrest, the force used in this case was nonetheless
unreasonable. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied upon Rodriguez
v. Farrell, in which this court held that de minimis force was objectively reasonable
15
even when it resulted in serious injury, if the officer performing the arrest was
unaware that the force would aggravate a preexisting medical condition. 280 F.3d
at 1351. Extrapolating from this holding, the district court reasoned that de
minimis force could be unreasonable if the officer was aware that an arrestee had a
preexisting condition making her particularly susceptible to injury. Applying this
logic to the facts of this case, the court found that because the need for force was
slight and because the deputies knew from Williams’ visibly pregnant body that
she was “particularly vulnerable to what would otherwise be de minimis force,”
their use of even minimal force was unreasonable.
Reluctantly, we must disagree with the district court. First, we disagree with
its analysis of the Graham factors. Although we agree with the district court that
Williams did not objectively pose a threat to the officers or others, we conclude
that eluding an officer – a felony under Florida law – is a very serious crime and
that the deputies reasonably believed that Williams was resisting arrest and
attempting to flee.4 Under these circumstances and assuming that probable cause
existed, the deputies were objectively reasonable in believing that the application
of some degree of force was necessary to effect an arrest.
4
We disagree with the district court’s finding that because Williams had reached a set of
locked doors, she was no longer fleeing. The evidence shows that Williams reached the doors
only one or two seconds before Deputy Sirmons. Considered objectively, there was not enough
time for Deputy Sirmons to know whether or not Williams was still attempting to flee.
16
Furthermore, we disagree with the district court’s interpretation of our dicta
in Rodriguez. In that case, we suggest that where an officer knows of an arrestee’s
particular vulnerability and nonetheless applies a degree of force which causes
serious injury, that force, under some circumstances, may be considered excessive,
even if the force used would not have harmed a less vulnerable person.5 In other
words, where an otherwise minimal amount of force causes serious injury and the
officer knew it would cause serious injury, the application of such minimal force
may not be objectively reasonable. Nothing in Rodriguez suggests, however, that a
minimal amount of force against a fragile arrestee which results in a minimal injury
– of the sort that would be expected from a typical arrest of a resisting arrestee – is
sufficient to support an excessive force claim. Accordingly, our dicta in Rodriguez
is not inconsistent with our conclusion in Nolin that evidence establishing only
“the minimal amount of force and injury involved in a typical arrest” will not
support a claim for excessive force. 207 F.3d at 1258 (emphasis added).
Unlike the arrestee in Rodriguez, who was seriously injured by an otherwise
de minimis use of force, Williams was – miraculously – not harmed by the
deputies’ use of force in restraining her. Accordingly, the exception suggested by
5
This is not to suggest that an officer is never justified in using more than de minimis
force against an arrestee with a known pre-existing condition. Many factors may justify such a
use of force so long as the potential for serious injury is balanced against the “countervailing
governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
17
our dicta in Rodriguez is not applicable in this case. We need not decide what
amount of force is reasonable when an officer is aware that an arrestee is
particularly susceptible to injury; however, we have no choice but to conclude that
the force was reasonable where an officer causes no injuries in the course of
effecting a lawful arrest, despite the fact that the arrestee is particularly susceptible
to injury.6
For these reasons, although we agree with the district court that the deputies’
behavior was reprehensible, we disagree that the evidence supports a finding that
the force was excessive if there was probable cause for an arrest. Accordingly, we
conclude that summary judgment is appropriate on Williams’ excessive force
claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying
summary judgment on Williams’ claim that her arrest violated the Fourth
6
We note, however, that even a use of force that results in de minimis injuries may be
excessive if the force is unreasonably applied to an unresisting arrestee after she has been
restrained. See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1192 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that, although the
only injuries were de minimis bruises, officer’s slamming arrestee’s head onto the trunk of her
car was objectively unreasonable where arrestee was unresisting and handcuffed). In this case,
there is no evidence that any force was used against Williams once she was successfully
restrained.
18
Amendment as unsupported by probable cause, VACATE the district court’s order
denying summary judgment on Williams’ claim that the deputies used excessive
force in a lawful arrest, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
19