United States v. Daryon Sharp , 307 F. App'x 385 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                            [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    JAN 15, 2009
    No. 08-11909                THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar               CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 88-00188-CR-CB
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DARYON SHARP,
    a.k.a. Dewayne Smith,
    a.k.a. Buck,
    a.k.a. Buckwheat,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Alabama
    _________________________
    (January 15, 2009)
    Before CARNES, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Daryon Sharp, a federal prisoner convicted of crack cocaine offenses,
    appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
     motion to reduce
    his sentence. After review, we affirm.
    Under § 3582(c)(2), a district court has discretion to reduce the term of
    imprisonment of an already incarcerated defendant if that defendant “has been
    sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has
    subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 994
    (o).” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1) (Supp. May
    1, 2008). However, “[w]here a retroactively applicable guideline amendment
    reduces a defendant’s base offense level, but does not alter the sentencing range
    upon which his or her sentence was based, § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a
    reduction in sentence.” United States v. Moore, 
    541 F.3d 1323
    , 1330 (11th Cir.
    2008); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (Supp. May 1, 2008). Sharp based his
    § 3582(c)(2) motion on Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which
    lowered most, but not all, of the base offense levels under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 for
    crack cocaine offenses.
    The district court did not err in concluding that Sharp was ineligible for a
    § 3582(c)(2) reduction.1 At Sharp’s original sentencing, the district court found
    1
    We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions regarding the scope of its
    authority to modify a sentence under § 3582(c)(2). United States v. White, 
    305 F.3d 1264
    , 1267
    2
    that Sharp was responsible for at least 15 kilograms of crack cocaine.2 Although
    Amendment 706 reduced by two levels the offense levels for crack cocaine
    offenses involving less than 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine, Amendment 706 left
    unchanged the base offense level (level 38) for offenses involving 4.5 kilograms or
    more of crack cocaine. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2006) with U.S.S.G.
    § 2D1.1(c)(1), (2) (2008). Because Sharp is responsible for more than 4.5
    kilograms of crack cocaine, Amendment 706 had no effect on his base offense
    level or applicable advisory sentencing range.
    To the extent Sharp argues that United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 738
     (2005) entitles him to a sentence reduction, Booker does not provide an
    independent basis for § 3582(c)(2) relief. United States v. Jones, 
    548 F.3d 1366
    ,
    ___, 
    2008 WL 4934033
    , at *2 (11th Cir. 2008). Further, because Sharp did not
    (11th Cir. 2002).
    2
    Sharp’s argument that the district court incorrectly calculated the amount of drugs at his
    original sentencing is outside the scope of a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. See United States v.
    Bravo, 
    203 F.3d 778
    , 781-82 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining that § 3582(c)(2) “does not grant the
    court jurisdiction to consider extraneous resentencing issues”); United States v. Cothran, 
    106 F.3d 1560
    , 1563 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding district court’s refusal in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding
    to re-examine drug quantity because factual decisions from the original sentencing are to be left
    intact). In any event, Sharp challenged the drug quantity finding on direct appeal, and this Court
    affirmed. See United States v. Andrews, 
    953 F.2d 1312
    , 1326-27 (11th Cir. 1992). Moreover,
    Sharp filed an earlier § 3582(c)(2) motion for reduction based on a prior guidelines amendment –
    Amendment 505 – and in the appeal of the denial of that motion, this Court pointed out: “The
    district court was not authorized to review its findings about the quantity of cocaine attributed to
    Sharp . . . .” United States v. Sharp, No. 96-6538, slip. op. at 3 (11th Cir. June 19, 1997) (per
    curiam).
    3
    qualify for resentencing under § 3582(c)(2), the district court had no occasion to
    consider the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors and the advisory guidelines or to exercise
    its discretion to impose a new sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
    4