United States v. Tauvaris Hall ( 2013 )


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  •             Case: 12-14787     Date Filed: 10/30/2013   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-14787
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cr-21104-DMM-10
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    TAUVARIS HALL,
    a.k.a. T,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (October 30, 2013)
    Before DUBINA, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Tauvaris Hall, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
    Case: 12-14787       Date Filed: 10/30/2013        Page: 2 of 6
    denial of his 2012 motion to reduce his sentence, pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) and Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines.
    In 2006, Hall pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
    distribute cocaine and cocaine base (“crack cocaine”), in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 846. The presentence investigation report (PSI) applied the 2008
    Sentencing Guidelines Manual to assign Hall a base offense level of 32, pursuant
    to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, because Hall was responsible for 1,613 grams of cocaine, 391
    grams of crack cocaine, and 4,501 grams of marijuana, an equivalent total of 8,147
    kilograms of marijuana. 1 After a two-level increase for possessing a dangerous
    weapon in the offense and a total three-level reduction for acceptance of
    responsibility, Hall’s total offense level was 31. Based on an offense level of 31
    and a criminal history category of III, Hall’s guideline range was 135 to 168
    months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Hall to 72 months’
    imprisonment. 2
    In 2012, Hall filed a pro se 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) motion based on
    Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines, in which he asked the district court
    1
    Pursuant to § 2D1.1(c)(3), an offense involving at least 3,000 kilograms but less than
    10,000 kilograms of marijuana would receive a base offense level of 34, but a two-level
    reduction to the base offense level applied, pursuant to § 2D1.1 n.10(D)(i), for a base offense
    level of 32.
    2
    The government had previously moved for a sentence reduction, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
    § 5K1.1 and 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (e), because after his arrest Hall provided substantial assistance.
    2
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    that “all new law be applied” that would help reduce his sentence. The district
    court denied Hall’s § 3582(c)(2) motion because, even after application of
    Amendment 750, his base offense level remained unchanged.
    We review de novo a district court’s decision about the scope of its legal
    authority under § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Moore, 
    541 F.3d 1323
    , 1326 (11th
    Cir. 2008). Pursuant to § 3582, a district court may modify a defendant’s term of
    imprisonment where the defendant was sentenced “based on a sentencing range
    that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). However, a sentence reduction is not authorized under § 3582(c)(2)
    if the relevant amendment does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s
    applicable guideline range. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B); United States v.
    Hippolyte, 
    712 F.3d 535
    , 542 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (U. S. Oct. 7,
    2013)(No. 12-10828).
    A district court must follow a two-step process in ruling on a § 3582(c)(2)
    motion. United States v. Bravo, 
    203 F.3d 778
    , 780–81 (11th Cir. 2000). First, the
    court must recalculate the defendant’s sentence by “substituting the amended
    guideline range for the originally applied guideline range, and then using that new
    base level to determine what ultimate sentence it would have imposed.” 
    Id. at 780
    .
    In other words, the court “shall determine the amended guideline range that would
    have been applicable to the defendant if the amendment(s) . . . had been in effect at
    3
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    the time the defendant was sentenced.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1). Under the
    second step, the court must decide whether, in its discretion and in light of the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) sentencing factors, to retain the original sentence or to resentence
    the defendant under the amended guideline range. Bravo, 
    203 F.3d at 781
    .
    District courts may not reexamine the other sentencing determinations made at the
    original sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1) (stating that courts should
    substitute only the amendment and “leave all other guideline application decisions
    unaffected”); Bravo, 
    203 F.3d at 780
    .
    To determine a base offense level for an offense that involves different
    controlled substances, the Guidelines provide that each substance is to be
    converted to its marijuana equivalent, the quantities are to be added together, and
    then the offense level is to be determined based on reference to the Drug Quantity
    Table. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (n.8(B)) (2012). Amendment 750,
    effective November 1, 2011, and retroactive, eliminated the two-level reduction to
    the combined base offense level where the offense involved both crack cocaine and
    other controlled substances. See U.S.S.G. App. C., amend. 750 (2011).
    Amendment 750 also lowered the base offense levels for particular crack cocaine
    quantities in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). See id. Under Amendment 750, 1 gram of
    crack cocaine equates to 3,571 grams of marijuana. Id.; U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1,
    4
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    comment. (n.8(D)) (2012). Amendment 750 did not amend the marijuana
    equivalency for powder cocaine, which equates 1 gram of powder cocaine to 200
    grams of marijuana. U.S.S.G. App. C., amend. 750 (2011); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1,
    comment. (n.8(D)) (2012). A defendant’s base offense level is 32 after
    Amendment 750 if he was held accountable for at least 1,000 kilograms, but less
    than 3,000 kilograms, of marijuana. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4) (2012).
    Here, we conclude from the record that the district court properly denied
    Hall’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. Under the Drug Equivalency Table in effect after
    Amendment 750, Hall was responsible for a total of 1,723 kilograms of marijuana:
    each of 1,613 grams of cocaine equates to 200 grams of marijuana, for a total of
    322.6 kilograms of marijuana; each of 391 grams of crack cocaine equates to 3,571
    grams of marijuana, for a total of 1,396.2 kilograms of marijuana; and Hall was
    also responsible for a total of 4.5 kilograms of marijuana. A defendant responsible
    for 1,723 kilograms of marijuana is assigned a base offense level of 32. See
    U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4) (2012). Applying the same sentencing determinations
    made by the sentencing court, Hall’s adjusted offense level would still be 31, and
    his guideline range would remain 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment. See U.S.S.G.
    § 1B1.10(b)(1). Accordingly, the district court did not err when it determined that
    5
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    it did not have the discretion to reduce Hall’s sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2).3
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    Hall also urges this Court to remand his case for sentencing in light of Dorsey v. United
    States, 567 U.S. ___, 
    132 S.Ct. 2321
     (2012), and United States v. Hinds, 
    713 F.3d 1303
     (11th
    Cir. 2013). Neither case applies here. Dorsey held that Congress intended the Fair Sentencing
    Act (FSA) to apply to defendants who committed their offenses before the FSA but were
    sentenced after it went into effect. See Dorsey, 567 U.S. ___, 
    132 S.Ct. at 2326, 2335
    . Hall both
    committed his offense and was sentenced prior to the FSA, and thus Dorsey does not apply. As
    for Hinds, it also does not apply in Hall’s case because it applies the Dorsey rule to a de novo
    resentencing following the effective date of the Fair Sentencing Act, circumstances which are not
    present here. See Hinds, 713 F.3d at 1305.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-14787

Judges: Dubina, Martin, Per Curiam, Pryor

Filed Date: 10/30/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024