Edwin Oscar Martinez v. United States ( 2019 )


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  •              Case: 18-12284    Date Filed: 01/28/2019   Page: 1 of 8
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-12284
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:00-cr-00001-JAL-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    EWIN OSCAR MARTINEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (January 28, 2019)
    Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Ewin Oscar Martinez alleged a jurisdictional defect in his criminal
    convictions through a motion filed under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure. The district court construed his motion as a second or successive one
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    under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction because Martinez
    did not receive authorization to file it from us. We affirm.
    I.
    In 2000, a federal jury convicted Martinez of conspiracy to commit hostage
    taking, hostage taking, conspiracy to commit carjacking, carjacking, and using and
    carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. The United States District Court for
    the Southern District of Florida sentenced him to life imprisonment. This Court
    affirmed the convictions and sentence. See United States v. Ferreira, 
    275 F.3d 1020
    (11th Cir. 2001).
    In 2002, Martinez filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside,
    or correct his sentence. The district court denied that motion. Since then, Martinez
    has repeatedly filed motions attacking his convictions, and the district court has
    repeatedly dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction because Martinez has (repeatedly)
    failed to obtain our authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. See
    Farris v. United States, 
    333 F.3d 1211
    , 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Without
    authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive
    petition.”).
    In Martinez’s latest filing, he submitted a “Motion to Reverse Jurisdictional
    Errors and Flagrant Violations of the Defendant’s Constitutional Right of Due
    Process of Law,” which he supplemented six times. As supplemented, Martinez’s
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    argument was that the district court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because the
    government had not proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and that his judgment
    of conviction was therefore void under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure. About midway through his supplements, Martinez also filed a motion to
    disqualify the district judge for bias and prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455.
    In a single omnibus order dealing with these motions and others, the district court
    construed Martinez’s Rule 60(b) motion as a successive § 2255 motion and
    dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction, and denied Martinez’s disqualification motion
    because there was “no evidence of bias or prejudice” against Martinez or in favor of
    the government.
    II.
    Although we typically review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of
    discretion, we review a district court’s decision to construe such a filing as a second
    or successive § 2255 motion de novo. See 
    Farris, 333 F.3d at 1216
    . We review a
    district judge’s refusal to recuse herself for abuse of discretion. Murray v. Scott, 
    253 F.3d 1308
    , 1310 (11th Cir. 2001).
    III.
    Martinez raises two arguments. First, he contends that because a “void
    judgment cannot be procedurally defaulted, forfeited or waived,” the district court
    should have considered his jurisdictional arguments. Second, he argues that due
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    process required the district court to rule on the disqualification motion before
    considering the Rule 60(b) motion. We find neither argument persuasive.
    A. Rule 60(b) Motion
    A federal prisoner must obtain our authorization before filing a second or
    successive § 2255 motion, and the failure to do so deprives the district court of
    jurisdiction to consider the motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); 
    Farris, 333 F.3d at 1216
    . Here, the district court correctly construed and dismissed Martinez’s Rule
    60(b) motion as an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion.
    It does not matter that Martinez purported to file his motion under Rule 60(b).
    The Supreme Court has held that using Rule 60(b) “to present new claims for relief
    from a state court’s judgment of conviction—even claims couched in the language
    of a true Rule 60(b) motion—circumvents AEDPA’s requirement that a new claim
    be dismissed unless it relies on either a new rule of constitutional law or newly
    discovered facts.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 
    545 U.S. 524
    , 531 (2005). 1 Martinez’s filing
    is an attack on the validity of his criminal conviction, so it is properly analyzed as a
    successive § 2255 motion. Gonzalez held that “a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in a § 2254
    case is not to be treated as a successive habeas petition if it does not assert, or
    1
    The Gonzalez Court addressed this issue in the § 2254 context, but we have stated that “the
    principles developed in habeas cases also apply to § 2255 motions.” Gay v. United States, 
    816 F.2d 614
    , 616 n.1 (11th Cir. 1987).
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    reassert, claims of error in the movant’s state 
    conviction.” 545 U.S. at 538
    . Here,
    though, Martinez does assert claims of error in his conviction. We have held, after
    Gonzalez, that a Rule 60(b) motion qualifies as a second or successive habeas
    petition in these circumstances. See Williams v. Chatman, 
    510 F.3d 1290
    , 1293–95
    (11th Cir. 2007).
    Nor does it matter that Martinez alleges a jurisdictional defect in his criminal
    convictions. First, we doubt that the jurisdictional nature of a claim seeking relief
    from a criminal judgment excuses § 2255 movants from the usual authorization
    requirement for second or successive motions. The statutory text makes clear that a
    motion under § 2255 is itself the proper way to assert that “the court was without
    jurisdiction” to impose a sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); see also 
    Williams, 510 F.3d at 1294
    (stating, without qualification, that when “a Rule 60(b) motion qualifies as
    a second or successive habeas petition as defined in Gonzalez,” it “must comply with
    the requirements for such petitions under the AEDPA”). Second, although Martinez
    styles his claim as jurisdictional, he actually argues that “the government large [sic]
    failed to prove the elements of the charges of ‘carjacking’ and ‘use of firearms’ in
    this case.” His claim is thus functionally a challenge to the sufficiency of the
    evidence, not a true claim of jurisdictional defect.
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    In sum, because Martinez did not receive our authorization to file his
    successive § 2255 motion, the district court correctly dismissed it for lack of
    jurisdiction.
    B. Disqualification Motion
    The district court denied Martinez’s disqualification motion in the same
    omnibus order in which it dismissed his Rule 60(b) motion. Martinez did not include
    the district court’s ruling on his disqualification motion in his notice of appeal, so
    we lack jurisdiction to consider it on the merits. See Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick
    Indus., Inc., 
    825 F.2d 1521
    , 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). But Martinez did appeal the
    district court’s dismissal of his Rule 60(b) motion, and he argues that the district
    court should not have considered that until it had ruled on his disqualification
    motion.
    In general, a court should rule on a disqualification motion before it takes
    other non-ministerial actions in a case. See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 
    977 F.2d 764
    , 784 n.26 (3d Cir. 1992). But we have not treated this preferred order of
    operations as an inflexible rule. Here, the district court addressed recusal and the
    Rule 60(b) motion in the same order, tending to recusal first. Martinez cites no
    authority to suggest this was error, and—particularly in light of the district court’s
    denial of the disqualification motion, Martinez’s failure to appeal that denial, and
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    the fact that the district court correctly dismissed the Rule 60(b) motion—we discern
    no grounds for reversal.
    *       *    *
    The district court’s dismissal of Martinez’s Rule 60(b) motion is
    AFFIRMED.
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    JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring.
    I join the courts opinion, but add that Mr. Martinez’s recusal/disqualification
    claim also fails on the merits.
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