United States v. Andrew Milton Williams ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-13079
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cr-00204-MEF-CSC-5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANDREW MILTON WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
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(May 19, 2015)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Andrew Williams appeals his 48-month total sentence, imposed after he
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1349, and bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. On appeal,
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Williams argues that: (1) his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the
district court based its denial of a downward departure for diminished capacity on
an incorrect legal standard and a clearly erroneous fact; and (2) his sentence was
substantively unreasonable because the district court relied on impermissible
factors and improperly weighed the evidence of diminished capacity. After
thorough review, we affirm.
We review de novo our subject matter jurisdiction. United States v.
Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2005). We review the sentence a
district court imposes for “reasonableness,” which “merely asks whether the trial
court abused its discretion.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir.
2008) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007)).
For starters, we lack jurisdiction to review Williams’s challenge to his
sentence for procedural unreasonableness. Under our clear law, we have no
jurisdiction to review a district court’s discretionary refusal to grant a downward
departure under the Sentencing Guidelines, unless the district court incorrectly
believed that it lacked the authority to depart from the guideline range. United
States v. Dudley, 463 F.3d 1221, 1228 (11th Cir. 2006). Further, we will assume
that the sentencing court properly understood its authority absent a record
indication to the contrary. Id.
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The record here shows that the district court understood that it had the
authority to grant the downward departure that Williams requested. The district
court listened to arguments for and against the departure, listened to and
questioned Williams’s witness, and thoroughly explained why it was not granting
the departure. Williams does not provide us with any relevant authority that
otherwise grants us jurisdiction in the context of the denial of a downward
departure. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of a downward
departure to Williams.
We also reject Williams’s claim that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. In reviewing the “‘substantive reasonableness of [a] sentence
imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard,’” we consider the “‘totality of the
circumstances.’” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Gall, 552 U .S. at 51). The
district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary to
comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).1 “[W]e will not second
guess the weight (or lack thereof) that the [court] accorded to a given [§ 3553(a)]
factor ... as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the
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The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to
protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training
or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the
pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted
sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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circumstances presented.” United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir.
2010) (quotation, alteration and emphasis omitted). Thus, while the district court
must evaluate all of the § 3553(a) factors, it may “attach great weight to one factor
over others.” United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quotation omitted). We will not reweigh the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and will
not remand for resentencing unless the district court committed a clear error of
judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by imposing a sentence outside the
range of reasonable sentences. United States v. Langston, 590 F.3d 1226, 1237
(11th Cir. 2009).
The party challenging the sentence bears the burden to show it is
unreasonable. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
While we do not automatically presume a sentence falling within the guideline
range to be reasonable, we ordinarily expect that sentence to be reasonable. United
States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). A sentence imposed well
below the statutory maximum penalty is another indicator of reasonableness.
United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
In this case, Williams’s total sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment was
within his applicable guideline range and well below the possible total sentence of
30 years. Moreover, Williams’s intelligence, college degree, and technical skills
were appropriate factors for the district court to consider under the § 3553(a) factor
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concerning the history and characteristics of the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(1). Williams’s claim that those factors should not have been used to
“negate” his post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) is an argument about the
denial of his motion for downward departure, and, as discussed above, we lack
jurisdiction to review the denial of a downward departure. Dudley, 463 F.3d at
1228. To the extent Williams argues that the district court unreasonably balanced
his intelligence, education, and skills against his PTSD, he has not shown why his
48-month total sentence is outside the range of reasonable sentences in light of all
the circumstances in his case. As for Williams’s argument that the district court
relied on an erroneous fact, the record as a whole reflects that the district court
understood the timeline of Williams running a radiology business, losing that
business, committing his crimes, obtaining treatment for his PTSD, and securing a
stable job. In sum, Williams has not met his burden to show that his sentence was
unreasonable in light of the record and § 3553(a).
AFFIRMED.
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