United States v. Oneil Anthony Harris ( 2018 )


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  •           Case: 17-14814   Date Filed: 04/20/2018   Page: 1 of 10
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-14814
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 4:17-cr-10009-JLK-4
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ONEIL ANTHONY HARRIS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (April 20, 2018)
    Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 17-14814     Date Filed: 04/20/2018      Page: 2 of 10
    Defendant Oneil Harris appeals his 24-month sentence, imposed after he
    pled guilty to illegal reentry after deportation. On appeal, he argues that the
    district court’s upward variance from the guideline range constituted an abuse of
    discretion. After careful review, we affirm.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    In March 2017, United States Customs and Border Protection officers
    located a disabled vessel approximately two nautical miles from Tavernier,
    Florida. The officers boarded the vessel and discovered 11 passengers below deck,
    none of whom had legal status in the United States or permission to enter the
    United States. Defendant, a citizen and national of Jamaica, was one of the
    passengers below deck. A subsequent investigation revealed that Defendant was
    ordered removed from the United States in December 2012. However, he was not
    physically removed from the United States until September 2016, following a
    conviction and imprisonment sentence in Illinois for possession with intent to
    deliver cannabis.
    Defendant was charged with illegal reentry after having been previously
    deported for an aggravated felony, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a), (b)(2). He
    later pled guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement.
    Applying the 2016 Guidelines, the Presentence Investigation Report
    assigned Defendant a base offense level of 8 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a).
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    Defendant received a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulting
    in a total offense level of 6. He received three criminal history points for a June
    2013 conviction in Illinois for possession with intent to deliver cannabis, for which
    he received an eight-year sentence. The PSR noted that Defendant was arrested in
    2002 but failed to appear and was not convicted until 2013. Defendant also
    received two additional criminal history points because the present offense was
    committed while he was on parole for the 2013 drug offense, resulting in a
    criminal history category of III. Based on a total offense level of 6 and a criminal
    history category of III, Defendant’s guideline range was 2 to 8 months’
    imprisonment.
    Prior to the sentencing hearing, the Government filed a motion for an
    upward variance. Specifically, the Government argued that the 2016 Guidelines
    provide for a 10-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(2)(A) if a defendant
    sustained a conviction for a felony offense and received a sentence of five years or
    more before the defendant was ordered removed from the United States for the first
    time. Because Defendant was not convicted of the felony drug offense until after
    he was ordered removed in 2012, the Government acknowledged that the
    enhancement did not apply. The Government nevertheless argued that the district
    court should vary upward as though the enhancement did apply because
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    Defendant’s conduct warranted an increased sentence pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b)(2) and the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors.
    At the sentencing hearing, the Government presented testimony from United
    States Customs and Border Protection Officer Narcisco Fernandez. Officer
    Fernandez testified about Defendant’s June 2013 drug conviction in Illinois and his
    immigration history. Specifically, Officer Fernandez explained that an expedited
    order of removal was entered against Defendant in December 2012 after he was
    apprehended while trying to enter the United States in Dania, Florida. Defendant
    was not immediately removed at that time because he was extradited to Illinois to
    face the drug charges stemming from his arrest in 2002. Following Officer
    Fernandez’s testimony, the district court calculated a guideline range of 2 to 8
    months’ imprisonment.
    The Government reiterated that § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A)—which provides for a 10-
    level enhancement if the defendant was convicted of a felony offense and received
    a sentence of five years or more before he was ordered removed from the United
    States—conflicts with § 1326(b)(2), which requires only that a defendant is
    physically removed from the United States subsequent to a conviction for an
    aggravated felony. The Government asserted that an upward variance was
    warranted to punish Defendant for his actions, which involved committing a
    serious crime, being deported, and then coming back to the United States.
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    Although the Government clarified that it was not asking for the court to apply the
    enhancement, it asserted that if the enhancement had applied, Defendant’s
    guideline range would have been 24 to 30 months’ imprisonment.
    Defendant asserted that the court should deny the Government’s motion for
    an upward variance because he did not qualify for the 10-level enhancement under
    the 2016 version of the Guidelines due to the fact that he was ordered removed
    before he was convicted of the felony drug offense.
    The court granted the Government’s motion for an upward variance,
    concluding that Congress clearly intended to deter aliens who have a prior felony
    conviction from reentering the United States. The court stated that it would
    exercise its discretion to vary upward and sentence Defendant within the range that
    would have been applicable if the 10-level enhancement under the 2016 Guidelines
    had applied: 24 to 30 months’ imprisonment. After considering the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors, the court sentenced Defendant to 24 months’ imprisonment.
    Defendant objected to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the upward
    variance and this appeal followed.
    II.   DISCUSSION
    Using a two-step process, we review the reasonableness of a sentence
    imposed by the district court for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Cubero,
    
    754 F.3d 888
    , 892 (11th Cir. 2014). We first look to whether the district court
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    committed any significant procedural error, such as miscalculating the advisory
    guideline range, treating the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, failing to
    consider the § 3553(a) factors, 1 selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous
    facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence. Id. Then we examine
    whether the sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the
    circumstances. Id. The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of
    showing that it is unreasonable. United States v. Pugh, 
    515 F.3d 1179
    , 1189 (11th
    Cir. 2008).
    “A district court making an upward variance must have a justification
    compelling enough to support the degree of the variance and complete enough to
    allow meaningful appellate review, and this Court will vacate such sentence only if
    left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
    error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence
    outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United
    States v. Dougherty, 
    754 F.3d 1353
    , 1362 (11th Cir. 2014) (brackets and quotations
    omitted). We “may not presume that a sentence outside the guidelines is
    1
    The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
    and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
    promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
    deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
    education or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
    Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission;
    (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution
    to victims. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).
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    unreasonable and must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the
    § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” United States v.
    Irey, 
    612 F.3d 1160
    , 1187 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted).
    Defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
    24-month sentence, which reflected a 16-month upward variance from the top of
    the guideline range of 2 to 8 months’ imprisonment. We disagree. Although the
    upward variance was significant, it is still well below the 20-year statutory
    maximum sentence. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b)(2); see also United States v. Gonzalez,
    
    550 F.3d 1319
    , 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a sentence well below the
    statutory maximum is an indicator of reasonableness).
    Moreover, when imposing the 24-month sentence, the district court
    emphasized Congress’s intent in deterring individuals like Defendant, who reenter
    the United States after being convicted of a serious crime. See United States v.
    Zelaya, 
    293 F.3d 1294
    , 1298 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Section 1326(b)(2) mandates a
    harsher punishment for an alien who, having been deported subsequent to
    committing an aggravated felony, illegally re-enters the United States.” (quotations
    omitted)). Indeed, Defendant was removed in September 2016 following the
    completion of his eight-year sentence in Illinois for possession with intent to
    deliver cannabis. Less than one year later, Defendant illegally reentered the United
    States in March 2017. The district court considered Defendant’s argument that his
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    motivation for returning to the United States was to see his wife and children but
    nevertheless concluded that an upward variance was justified by the § 3553(a)
    factors, including Defendant’s history and characteristics, the need for deterrence,
    and the need to promote respect for the law.
    Defendant asserts that the district court abused its discretion by deciding to
    vary upward based on an enhancement that does not apply to him. According to
    Defendant, § 2L1.2(b) was amended in 2016 to expressly prevent the sentencing
    enhancement from applying to defendants like him. The 2016 version of
    § 2L1.2(b) provides in relevant part for a 10-level enhancement if the defendant
    sustained a conviction for a felony offense for which the sentence imposed was
    more than five years “before the defendant was ordered deported or ordered
    removed from the United States for the first time.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) (2016)
    (emphasis added). It is undisputed that because Defendant’s June 2013 conviction
    for possession with intent to deliver cannabis did not occur until after he was
    issued an expedited order of removal in December 2012, he does not qualify for
    the 10-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A).
    And to be clear, the district court did not apply the 10-level enhancement
    pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A) in the present case. The court, however, did conclude
    that the advisory guideline range of 2 to 8 months’ imprisonment was insufficient
    to punish Defendant, an illegal alien who was deported and reentered the United
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    States after being convicted of a serious crime. We cannot say that the district
    court abused its discretion by concluding that Defendant’s conduct warranted a
    sentence above the guideline range. See United States v. Tome, 
    611 F.3d 1371
    ,
    1379 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a court is free to consider any information
    relevant to a defendant’s background, character, and conduct when imposing an
    upward variance).
    Notably, although Defendant was arrested on the Illinois drug offense in
    2002, he was not convicted until 2013. Indeed, he absconded for nearly a decade
    before he was apprehended by Customs and Border Protection officers while
    attempting to illegally enter the United States in 2012. Thus, it was through his
    own conduct that Defendant was able to delay the timing of his conviction. Had
    Defendant not fled, he presumably would have been convicted on the Illinois drug
    charge before the order of removal had issued. In other words, his criminal
    conduct clearly occurred before issuance of that order. Then, following both a
    drug conviction and his eventual removal in 2016, Defendant illegally reentered
    the United States in March 2017.
    On these facts, the district court’s decision to impose an upward variance
    comports with the purpose of the § 1326(b)(2), which is to provide more severe
    punishment for the “illegal entry by a deportee who has earlier committed a serious
    crime while in the United States.” Zelaya, 
    293 F.3d at 1298
    . Under these
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    circumstances, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that the district
    court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors in this case. See
    Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1362.
    To the extent Defendant argues that district court improperly justified the
    upward variance with factors that were already contemplated by the Guidelines, his
    argument is without merit. We have stated that “a district court can rely on factors
    in imposing a variance that it had already considered in imposing an
    enhancement.” United States v. Rodriguez, 
    628 F.3d 1258
    , 1264 (11th Cir. 2010).
    Accordingly, Defendant’s sentence is AFFIRMED.
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