United States v. Nova A. Montgomery , 631 F. App'x 666 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-10370
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cr-00178-JDW-AEP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NOVA A. MONTGOMERY,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(November 5, 2015)
Before MARCUS, JULIE CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Nova Montgomery appeals her convictions for five counts of tax evasion, in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, and five counts of failing to file a tax return, in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203. On appeal, Montgomery argues that: (1) the district
court abused its discretion in excluding her testimony about certain proposed
defense exhibits and in excluding the admission of several of those exhibits; and
(2) the district court erred in its instruction to the jury on reasonable doubt. After
careful review, we affirm.
We review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487, 501 (11th Cir. 2014). We
apply the harmless error standard to erroneous evidentiary rulings. United States
v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005). An error is harmless unless it
had a substantial influence on the case’s outcome or leaves a grave doubt as to
whether the error affected the outcome. Id. We review jury instructions properly
challenged below de novo to determine whether the given instructions misstated
the law or misled the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party. United States v.
Felts, 579 F.3d 1341, 1342 (11th Cir. 2009). We will reverse because of an
erroneous instruction only if we are “left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt
as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations.” Id. at 1342-43(quotation omitted).
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First, we are unpersuaded by Montgomery’s claim that the district court
abused its discretion in excluding certain testimony and exhibits. In Cheek v.
United States, the defendant was charged with tax evasion and failing to file a tax
return. 498 U.S. 192, 194 (1991). The Supreme Court held that “a defendant’s
views about the validity of the tax statutes are irrelevant to the issue of willfulness
and need not be heard by the jury.” Id. at 206. However, if someone simply fails
to understand that he has a duty to pay income taxes under the Internal Revenue
Code, he cannot be guilty of “willfully” evading those taxes. Id. at 201-02. Thus,
the Supreme Court held that Cheek was entitled to have the jury instructed about
his asserted beliefs that wages were not income and that he was not a taxpayer
within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 206-07.
When a defendant testifies at trial, any of the defendant’s statements that are
disbelieved by the jury may be considered as substantive evidence of the
defendant’s guilt, and the jury may therefore conclude that the opposite of the
defendant’s testimony is true. United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir.
1995). “This rule applies with special force” where the elements to be proven are
highly subjective, such as intent or knowledge. Id. at 315.
Here, Montgomery claims that the district court abused its discretion by
excluding from evidence the substance of cases, government publications, and
other materials that allegedly supported Montgomery’s good-faith belief that she
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had no duty to pay income taxes or file returns. Yet, even if the district court erred
by excluding this evidence, that error would have been harmless. As the record
reveals, the district court permitted Montgomery to testify, in great detail, about
her beliefs on income taxes, based on specific cases that she had read. This
testimony spanned over 100 pages, and she was often allowed to go through the
cases by name, one-by-one. The court also admitted a seven-page statement of her
beliefs into evidence. Moreover, Montgomery chose to testify at trial, so any
statements that the jury disbelieved could be considered as substantive evidence of
her guilt, especially when the element to be proven was willfulness. See Brown,
53 F.3d at 314-15. In short, because the jury did not believe Montgomery’s
testimony, the admission of the exhibits at issue and of her testimony about the
substance of several of those exhibits would not have had a substantial influence
on the case’s outcome. Accordingly, the error, if any, was harmless.
We also find no merit to Montgomery’s claim that the district court erred
when it instructed the jury on reasonable doubt by equating reasonable doubt to
proof that jurors would rely on in the most important of their own affairs. We’ve
upheld jury instructions defining reasonable doubt, in which the instruction
equated the proof to that which a juror would be willing to rely or act upon without
hesitation in the most important of their affairs. See United States v. Hansen, 262
F.3d 1217, 1249 (11th Cir. 2001). Further, we have “repeatedly approved of the
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definition of reasonable doubt provided in the Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury
Instructions.” United States v. James, 642 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2011).
In this case, the district court did not misstate the law or mislead the jury to
the prejudice of Montgomery by giving the Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury
Instruction, in which proof beyond a reasonable doubt was equated to that which a
juror would be willing to rely and act upon without hesitation in their important
affairs. That definition of reasonable doubt is supported by our precedent. See
Hansen, 262 F.3d at 1249. We are bound by our prior precedent until it is
overruled by the Supreme Court or our Court sitting en banc. United States v.
Lawson, 686 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the district court did
not err by instructing the jury in this way.
AFFIRMED.
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