Roel Vaughn, Jean Vaughn vs Nacco Materials Handling Group, Inc. ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-10094 SEPTEMBER 12, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 4:09–cv-00570-VEH
ROEL VAUGHN,
JEAN VAUGHN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
NACCO MATERIALS HANDLING GROUP, INC.,
successor by merger to HYSTER COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(September 12, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is a products liability case. Roel Vaughn was injured on the job while
operating a forklift manufactured by Hyster Company, Inc. Vaughn thereafter
brought this action against Hyster.1 He alleged that Hyster was liable for his
injuries under the Alabama Extended Manuracturers’ Liability Doctrine and for
breaching its purported implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose. The district court granted Hyster summary judgment after
excluding, on Hyster’s motion, the opinions of Vaughn’s two expert witnesses.
Memorandum Opinion dated December 3, 2010.
Vaughn appeals the summary judgment, arguing that the district court
abused its discretion in excluding the opinions of his experts and erred in granting
summary judgment because material issues of fact remained to be litigated with
respect to his breach of implied warranty claims. We affirm.
The district court, in its order granting Hyster summary judgment,
described how Vaughn’s injury occurred, according to Vaughn:
Mr. Vaughn was employed by Federal Mogul Corporation as a
materials handler and was performing his job duties at its
Jacksonville, Alabama plant when the subject accident occurred on
March 2, 2007. The accident occurred while [Mr.] Vaughn was
operating a Hyster “standup” fork lift truck, which he had regularly
operated since December of 2004. According to [Mr.] Vaughn, he
maneuvered the lift truck into an aisle, and stopped the vehicle to the
left of some shelves containing automotive parts. [Mr.] Vaughn then
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Vaughn’s wife joined him as a plaintiff, asserting a derivative claim for loss of
consortium.
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looked down and to his right toward two pallets on the floor, to locate
parts he needed to lift with the truck and move onto another pallet.
While holding in his right hand a label identifying the parts he needed
to move, [Mr.] Vaughn leaned to his right to get a closer look at the
pallets on the floor. [Mr.] Vaughn does not remember how far he
leaned, testifying that “I Just remember leaning over.” [Mr.] Vaughn
testified that “[o]ne second I was looking at this label, and the next
second I knew something bad had happened, and I was turned like
sideways, and my arm was dangling.” [Mr.] Vaughn’s right arm
apparently struck a portion of the shelving and was severely injured.
[Mr.] Vaughn does not know how the accident occurred. [Mr.]
Vaughn does not believe that the vehicle moved on its own.
Mr. Vaughn is “fairly sure” that an operating manual was located on the lift
truck, but he does not recall reading it. In a section warning operators
to “use common sense,” the operating manual warned that operators
should “[k]eep arms, legs, and head inside operator’s compartment.”
Mr. Vaughn also acknowledged that there were various warning
labels on the vehicle. [Mr.] Vaughn testified that “I saw them on
there, and I’m sure I read part of it, but I don’t know if I read letter for
letter.” Like the operating manual, the warning labels instructed
operators to “[k]eep arms, legs and head inside operator’s
compartment.” In February 2004, approximately three years prior to
the accident, Mr. Vaughn completed a Federal Mogul “Lift Truck
Operators Training Course Written Exam.” In the “true or false”
portion of the exam, [Mr.] Vaughn indicated that the following
statement was false: “[I]t is OK to have your feet or hands outside the
running lines of the equipment.” [Mr.] Vaughn testified that he knew
he could be injured if he did not keep his arms inside the operator’s
compartment.
The district court excluded the opinions of Vaughn’s expert witnesses,
Emmett Gamel and Thomas Talbot, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, after it
engaged in the gatekeeping function prescribed by Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed.2d 469 (1993),
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and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed.2d
238 (1999). The court found Gamel lacking in “sufficient knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education to render an opinion concerning the design or
safety feature design of forklift trucks,” Mem. Op. at 16, and that Vaughn failed to
show that the “methodology used by Gamel in formulating his opinions [was]
reliable.” Id. at 20. The court found Talbot’s opinions unreliable because, “like
Gamel’s, [they were] not based upon sufficient facts or data, and because Talbot
did not use any methodology in reaching his opinions.” Id. Moreover, as with
Gamel’s opinions, Vaughn “did not address the reliability of Talbot’s testimony in
[his] response” to Hyster’s motion to exclude the opinions. Id. at 22. “They
offered no explanation, no factual support, no case law, and no argument to
support a conclusion that the methodology used by Talbot in formulating his
opinions [was] reliable.” Id.
The record fully supports the district court’s Daubert findings and thus its
decision to exclude the experts’ opinions. Hence, the district court’s ruling did not
constitute an abuse of discretion.
The district court rejected Vaughn’s claim that Hyster breached an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose on the ground that Vaughn
“abandoned” the claim by not addressing the claim in his response to Hyster’s
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motion for summary judgment. Id. at 27. We find no error in the court’s action.
The district court rejected Vaughn’s claim that Hyster breached an implied
warranty of merchantability because, assuming that the experts’ opinions were not
needed to make out a claim, Vaughan failed to satisfy the court’s requirement that,
in opposing a motion for summary judgment, a party
must . . . produce significant, probative evidence demonstrating a
genuine issue [of material fact] for trial. In [his] response, [Vaughn]
merely noted that “Plaintiffs testimony regarding the unmerchantable
quality of the subject forklift is . . . sufficient to defeat Defendant’s
summary judgment motion.” Although Plaintiffs’ counsel filed Mr.
Vaughan’s deposition, Plaintiffs never cited to any portion of that
testimony as evidence which would support this claim. . . . . As
required by Appendix II of the Uniform Initial Order, the Plaintiffs
must support each statement of fact with specific reference to those
portions of the evidentiary record that support it. . . . And, as the
Plaintiffs admitted . . . Vaughn does not know how the accident
occurred.
Id. at 28 n.8. We discern no error in the district court’s rejection of the implied-
warranty-of-merchantability claim. The court’s judgment is accordingly
AFFIRMED.
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