United States v. Antoine Fernand Saint-Surin ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-11714
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:05-cr-60078-KAM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANTOINE FERNAND SAINT-SURIN,
a.k.a. Antoine St. Surin,
a.k.a. Commandante,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(December 3, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Antoine Fernand Saint-Surin and twelve others were charged in a multi-
count indictment returned by a Southern District of Florida grand jury on April 12,
2005. Saint-Surin, who was in fugitive status, was arrested in Ecuador by local
authorities on November 12, 2009, and transferred to United States custody on
November 13, 2009. On April 9, 2010, represented by retained counsel, he pled
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to import five kilograms or more
of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). Prior to sentencing, he moved the
District Court withdraw his guilty plea, claiming among other things that his
retained counsel was laboring under a conflict of interest. The court denied his
motion, but appointed the Federal Public Defender to represent him. The court
subsequently sentenced him to prison for a term of 180 months. Saint-Surin
appealed , challenging the District Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw and
claiming that his signature on a legal services agreement (dealing with his
representation by the Public Defender) was forged. We affirmed. United States v.
Saint-Surin, 477 Fed.Appx. 683 (11th Cir. 2012.
On January 12, 2015, Saint-Surin, appearing pro se, moved the District
Court to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on
Amendment 782 to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. The amendment lowered the base offense
level for most drug offenses. The court denied his motion, and he appeals the
decision, arguing that the court improperly denied his motion based on claims he
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made in his earlier motion to vacate filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He also
contends that the purposes of a criminal sentence set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
support a reduction in his sentence.
We review the District Court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Jones, 548 F.3d 1366, 1368 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008). A district court may
modify a term of imprisonment based on a Guidelines sentence range that has
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2). Amendment 782 provides a two-level reduction in the base offense
level for most drug offenses. U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 782. In considering a §
3582(c)(2) motion, the court must engage in a two-part analysis. United States v.
Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780 (11th Cir. 2000). First, the court recalculates the
sentence under the amended guidelines, determining a new base level by
substituting the amended guideline range for the originally applied guideline range,
and then using that new base level to determine the sentence it would have
imposed. Id. Second, the court decides whether, in its discretion, it will elect to
impose the newly calculated sentence under the amended sentence range or retain
the original sentence. Id. at 781. In exercising this discretion, the court should
consider the § 3553(a) purposes.1 Id.; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, comment. (n.1(B)(i)).
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The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
seriousness of the offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence;
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The court must also consider the nature and seriousness of the danger to any
person or community that may be posed by a reduction, and it may consider the
defendant’s post-sentencing conduct. United States v. Smith, 568 F.3d 923, 927
(11th Cir. 2009); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, comment. (n.1(B)(ii),(iii)).
We find no abuse of discretion here. The record discloses that the District
Court considered the § 3553(a) purposes. While the court did not specify which of
the purposes guided its decision, the court did consider its previous finding that
Saint-Surin’s testimony during his motion to withdraw his guilty plea was
“knowingly false.” The court acted within its discretion in doing that. Moreover,
it was within the court’s discretion to consider Saint-Surin’s post-sentencing filings
where he continued to challenge the authenticity of the legal services agreement
and his Miranda 2 waiver. See Smith, 568 F.3d at 927 (the court “may consider the
post-sentencing conduct of the defendant”); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, comment.
(n.1(B)(iii)). While Saint-Surin had s a right to challenge the proceedings, he did
not have the right to testify falsely or submit false pleadings. See Nix, 475 U.S. at
173, 106 S. Ct. at 997.
AFFIRMED.
(4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or
vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing
Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need
to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
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