United States v. Jose Armando Casas , 632 F. App'x 1003 ( 2015 )


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  •               Case: 15-10557     Date Filed: 12/03/2015   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-10557
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 0:14-cr-60172-RLR-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JOSE ARMANDO CASAS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (December 3, 2015)
    Before WILSON, MARTIN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Jose Armando Casas appeals his 188-month sentence, which was imposed
    after he pleaded guilty to one count of possessing with intent to distribute 500
    Case: 15-10557     Date Filed: 12/03/2015   Page: 2 of 6
    grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine in violation
    of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). On appeal, Casas argues that the district
    court erred in denying him a minor-role reduction in light of recent amendments to
    the United States Sentencing Guidelines and because he was paid only a small sum
    to transport the drugs. He also argues that his sentence is substantively
    unreasonable. After careful review, we affirm.
    I.
    A district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in an offense is a
    finding of fact that this Court reviews for clear error. United States v. Rodriguez
    De Varon, 
    175 F.3d 930
    , 937 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The district court has
    “considerable discretion in making this fact-intensive determination.” United
    States v. Boyd, 
    291 F.3d 1274
    , 1277–78 (11th Cir. 2002). The defendant bears the
    burden of establishing his entitlement to a minor-role reduction by a preponderance
    of the evidence. United States v. Alvarez-Coria, 
    447 F.3d 1340
    , 1343 (11th Cir.
    2006) (per curiam).
    A defendant is entitled to a two-level reduction if he “was a minor
    participant in any criminal activity.” United States Sentencing Guidelines
    § 3B1.2(b). Minor participants are those who are “less culpable than most other
    participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal.” Id. § 3B1.2,
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    comment. (n.5). Whether to apply a minor-role adjustment “is heavily dependent
    upon the facts of the particular case.” Id. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.3(C)).
    In determining whether a minor-role adjustment applies, the district court
    should consider: (1) the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct; and (2) his role as
    compared to those of other participants. De Varon, 
    175 F.3d at 940
    . The fact that
    a defendant’s role is less than those of other participants may not be dispositive
    because it is possible that none of them are minor participants. 
    Id. at 944
    . When
    considering the role of a drug courier, “the amount of drugs imported is a material
    consideration in assessing a defendant’s role.” 
    Id. at 943
    . “[A] drug courier is not
    necessarily a minor or minimal participant.” United States v. Smith, 
    918 F.2d 1551
    , 1566 (11th Cir. 1990).
    In recent amendments to the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission
    clarified the factors to consider for a minor-role adjustment, particularly for low-
    level offenders. The Commission added the following language to the Application
    Notes for § 3B1.2:
    In determining whether to apply subsection (a) or (b), or an
    intermediate adjustment, the court should consider the following non-
    exhaustive list of factors:
    (i)     the degree to which the defendant understood the scope
    and structure of the criminal activity;
    (ii)    the degree to which the defendant participated in
    planning or organizing the criminal activity;
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    (iii)   the degree to which the defendant exercised decision-
    making authority or influenced the exercise of decision-
    making authority;
    (iv)    the nature and extent of the defendant’s participation in
    the commission of the criminal activity, including the
    acts the defendant performed and the responsibility and
    discretion the defendant had in performing those acts;
    (v)     the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit from
    the criminal activity.
    USSG App. C, Amend. 794. Although this Court applies the version of the
    Guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing when reviewing the district court’s
    application of the Guidelines, we consider clarifying amendments retroactively on
    appeal regardless of the date of sentencing. United States v. Jerchower, 
    631 F.3d 1181
    , 1184 (11th Cir. 2011).
    Here, the district court did not clearly err in denying Casas a minor-role
    adjustment. Casas was not a mere courier delivering drugs to someone else for
    distribution. He hid a large quantity of methamphetamine—three kilograms—in
    the engine compartment of a vehicle and drove it from Texas to Fort Lauderdale,
    Florida. He intended to exchange the methamphetamine for cocaine there, and
    then planned to deliver the cocaine to another location. Casas argues that he is
    eligible for a minor-role adjustment because he had little decision-making
    authority and did not stand to gain much from the transaction. Even though Casas
    did not set prices or the quantity of drugs to be delivered, he was entrusted, without
    supervision, with a large quantity of narcotics for an extended period. Given
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    Casas’s knowledge of the scope and structure of the scheme and his level of
    responsibility in carrying it out, the district court’s denial of a minor-role reduction
    was not clear error.
    II.
    We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of
    discretion. United States v. Asante, 
    782 F.3d 639
    , 648 (11th Cir. 2015). “The
    party challenging the sentence bears the burden to show it is unreasonable in light
    of the record and the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Tome, 
    611 F.3d 1371
    ,
    1378 (11th Cir. 2010). Although we do not automatically presume that a within-
    Guidelines sentence is reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a sentence to be
    reasonable. Asante, 782 at 648. “A sentence imposed well below the statutory
    maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable sentence.” United States v.
    Dougherty, 
    754 F.3d 1353
    , 1362 (11th Cir. 2014).
    Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a 188-month
    sentence and denying Casas’s request for a downward variance. First, his sentence
    falls at the very bottom of the applicable Guideline range. It thus carries an
    expectation of reasonableness. See Asante, 782 F.3d at 648. Second, it falls well
    below the maximum possible sentence of life. See Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1362.
    Casas notes that this is his first drug offense, he cooperated with police, he has
    maintained steady employment, and he has no history of drug or alcohol abuse.
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    However, Casas was previously convicted for smuggling illegal aliens into the
    United States and has been deported twice, only to return unlawfully. His crimes
    have since become more serious; here, Casas played a significant role in a criminal
    scheme involving a large quantity of drugs. Casas has not met his burden of
    showing that his within-Guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable. We
    affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
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