United States v. Charles Dean Partin ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-11008
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cr-00188-MHT-SRW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHARLES DEAN PARTIN,
Defendant – Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(December 16, 2015)
Before HULL, WILLIAM PRYOR, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Charles Partin appeals his convictions and 292-month sentence for one count
of transportation of a stolen vehicle, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312, and two
counts of transportation of a minor with the intent to engage in criminal sexual
activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). Mr. Partin raises four issues on
appeal. First, he argues that the district court erred by admitting his pre-Miranda
statements made to park rangers. Second, he asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by admitting DNA evidence that showed he was the father of the
child of the victim A.L. Third, he contends that the district court incorrectly
denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. And finally, he claims that the district
court erred by applying a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. After
a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
I
A
On September 3, 2012, at around 5:00 p.m., Officer Jeremy Morrison, a park
ranger in Hamilton County, Tennessee, received a report from a park employee of
what he believed to be a minor female performing oral sex on an adult male in a
vehicle at a remote campsite area. Officer Morrison, along with Officer
Christopher Baxter and Shannon McDonald, went out to locate the vehicle and
campsite identified by the employee.
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Upon arriving at the campsite, Officer Morrison found Mr. Partin and A.L.,
the victim, sitting in the vehicle described by the employee, watching a movie.
Officer Morrison approached the vehicle, identified himself, explained why he had
come to their campsite, and asked for their identification and A.L.’s age. Both Mr.
Partin and A.L. responded that they had not been engaging in oral sex, and Mr.
Partin stated, “[S]he doesn’t do that. I can’t get her to do that.” D.E. 106 at 6. Mr.
Partin gave Officer Morrison his identification. Both Mr. Partin and A.L. said that
she was 18, but A.L. did not have any identification.
Officer Morrison asked A.L. to step out of the vehicle and walk up the hill
with him so that he could get her information to verify her identity. While Officer
Morrison took A.L. up to the patrol car where Officer McDonald was waiting,
Officer Baxter stayed with Mr. Partin. At first, A.L. gave Officer Morrison a false
date of birth, and he was unable to verify her identity. Eventually, however, she
admitted that she was only 15 years old and that Mr. Partin was her step-father.
When Officer Morrison returned to the vehicle, Mr. Partin maintained that A.L.
was 18, that she was a friend of the family and his babysitter, and that they were at
the park on vacation.
Officer Morrison went back to A.L. and asked her for her legal guardian.
A.L. provided her mother’s name but said that she did not have her phone number.
She told Officer Morrison that he would have to contact another person, whose
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number was in Mr. Partin’s phone, to get in touch with her mother. While
speaking with A.L., Officer Morrison learned that she was pregnant and that she
and Mr. Partin had come to the park because they were running from the Alabama
Department of Human Resources.
Once Officer Morrison learned how to reach A.L.’s mother, he returned to
the vehicle and told Mr. Partin that A.L.’s legal guardian would need to be
contacted. Mr. Partin asked why A.L.’s legal guardian would need to be contacted
if A.L. was 18, but ultimately agreed to give Officer Morrison his phone. After
Officer Morrison retrieved the contact information, he placed the phone on the
hood of Mr. Partin’s car, where Mr. Partin was sitting. Mr. Partin, up to this point,
was not restrained.
Officer Morrison asked Mr. Partin for consent to search the vehicle and the
two tents next to the vehicle at the campsite. Mr. Partin signed a consent to search
form. In one tent, Officer Morrison found a laundry hamper, and in the second tent
he found male and female clothing, a bed made out of blankets, and wet towels.
Officer Morrison did not remove any of the items from the tent. In Mr. Partin’s
vehicle, Officer Morrison found a sex toy in a flute case. Mr. Partin claimed that it
belonged to A.L. and was not his.
Shortly after Officer Morrison began the search, Mr. Partin became upset,
and began to collect the items from his campsite as if he was getting ready to leave.
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At that point, Officer Morrison was worried that Mr. Partin was moving and
potentially destroying evidence, and explained to Mr. Partin that he was going to
be detained. At 7:04 p.m., almost two hours after Officer Morrison arrived at the
campsite, Mr. Partin was patted down and handcuffed. While Mr. Partin was
detained, no investigatory actions were taken. Officer Morrison contacted the
Sherriff’s Office, and Detective Greg Carson, a child abuse detective, responded to
the scene. At this time Detective Carson read Mr. Partin his Miranda rights and
took off Mr. Partin’s handcuffs.
Officer Morrison heard Detective Carson go over the Miranda rights with
Mr. Partin, saw Mr. Partin sign a waiver of rights form, and heard Mr. Partin
indicate that he understood his rights. At no point did Officer Morrison hear Mr.
Partin request an attorney or state that he did not want to answer any questions.
Mr. Partin was handcuffed again and transported to the police station.
After her return to Alabama, A.L. was taken to a medical center by an
Alabama Department of Human Resources official for an ultrasound. While she
was filling out paperwork, Mr. Partin approached A.L., ordered her to leave with
him, grabbed her by the wrist, and pulled her down the stairs. A.L. left with Mr.
Partin, got in a van that her mother was driving, and subsequently switched into a
second van. Mr. Partin told A.L. that he and A.L.’s mother had stolen the second
van from an auto dealership. They retrieved A.L.’s siblings and began driving
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towards Mexico to avoid the Amber Alert that they believed would go out when it
was discovered A.L. was gone. On the drive to Mexico, Mr. Partin and A.L. had
sexual intercourse several times, and she performed oral sex on Mr. Partin.
Eventually, Mr. Partin and A.L.’s mother decided not to continue on to
Mexico, and instead drove to Ohio. While in Ohio, Mr. Partin had sexual
intercourse and oral sex with A.L. before the FBI eventually found them and
arrested Mr. Partin.
B
Prior to trial, Mr. Partin filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to
the park rangers before he was read his Miranda rights. The magistrate judge
recommended denying the motion to suppress and concluded that Mr. Partin was
not the subject of a Terry stop, but rather a consensual police-citizen encounter.
The magistrate judge alternatively found that even if Mr. Partin were deemed to be
the subject of a Terry stop, the officers had “a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting criminal activity, both at the time the rangers initially approached the
vehicle and afterward.” D.E. 146 at 10.
The magistrate judge also concluded that Mr. Partin was not effectively in
custody during the encounter with the officers. As a result, the officers were not
required to give him Miranda warnings.
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First, the magistrate judge found that there was no restraint to the degree
associated with formal arrest because there was no evidence that the officers
blocked the campsite to prevent Mr. Partin from leaving, that they threatened or
touched him, or indicated that he was forced to comply. The magistrate judge
found that the tone of the encounter was generally calm and cooperative and that
Mr. Partin freely consented to searches and willingly answered questions. In the
magistrate judge’s view, this was not the highly intrusive coercive atmosphere that
would require Miranda warnings.
Second, the scope of the investigatory stop was not exceeded, and thus, did
not mature into an arrest requiring probable cause as well as Miranda warnings
prior to questioning. In applying a four-factor test, the magistrate judge concluded
that (1) that the officers’ investigative techniques were quick, with minimum
interference; (2) nothing in the record indicated that the officers were less than
prompt in carrying out their investigation; (3) an officer’s instruction to Mr. Partin
that he remain by his car was not overly intrusive, but rather was reasonable in
light of the circumstances; and (4) although two hours is longer than the average
Terry stop, in this scenerio the officers were diligent and the total amount was
reasonable in relation to the purpose of the stop and the necessary scope of the
investigation.
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The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and denied Mr.
Partin’s motion to suppress.
C
Before trial, the government filed a motion in limine stating that it would
seek to introduce evidence of Mr. Partin’s motive and intent, including testimony
of analysts who would testify as to two matters: the results of the DNA analysis
performed on A.L.’s underwear found at the campsite (which contained Mr.
Partin’s semen); and the analysis performed regarding the paternity of A.L.’s baby
(which showed that Mr. Partin was the father). Mr. Partin argued that the
government should be prohibited from introducing any evidence concerning his
sexual relationship with A.L. before the events alleged in the indictment, as well as
any evidence concerning the paternity of A.L.’s baby. Mr. Partin argued that the
evidence was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and 404. Mr.
Partin further argued that it was not until the paternity test results were revealed,
which was after the indictment was issued, that he learned he was likely the father
of the child. He alleged that he believed a person named “Eric” was the father of
the child. Therefore, he continued, at the time of the trip to Tennessee and the
subsequent trip to Ohio, the paternity test results were irrelevant because the
elements of the charge were his intent and motive at the time of the trip.
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The district court ruled that evidence as to prior sexual encounters between
A.L. and Mr. Partin was admissible, but reserved ruling on the admissibility of the
paternity test results until after A.L. testified. The district court instructed the
government to not go into the DNA evidence during opening statements or during
direct examination.
At trial, after the government had presented A.L.’s testimony on direct
examination—during which A.L. testified that she and Mr. Partin had sex in
Tennessee and Ohio—Mr. Partin claimed that the government “ha[d] opened the
door” on the matter of A.L’s past sexual partners and the possible paternity of her
child. Accordingly, Mr. Partin argued that cross-examination in this area was
appropriate. The district court warned Mr. Partin that if his intention was to show
that there existed a person named “Eric” that could have been the father of the
child, then “the DNA probably definitely comes in to show that Eric is not the
father of this child.” D.E. 297 at 54. During cross-examination, Mr. Partin
questioned A.L. about Eric. Subsequently, the district court ruled that the DNA
paternity evidence was admissible: “[T]he probative value is pretty overwhelming
for two reasons. Number one is it refutes your implied contention that she’s lying.
Secondly, the DNA test shows that in fact he was the father, so there’s no prejudice
at all.” Id. at 69.
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At the close of the government’s case and at the conclusion of trial, Mr.
Partin moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the government failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of counts two and three. Mr.
Partin conceded that A.L. was transported in interstate commerce and that she was
a minor, but he denied that he transported her across state lines with the intent to
engage in unlawful sexual activity. The district court denied each of the motions.
The jury found Mr. Partin guilty of all three charges in the indictment.
At sentencing, Mr. Partin objected to the PSI, which recommended a two-
level enhancement for obstruction of justice. The district court overruled the
objection, finding that Mr. Partin obstructed justice by lying on two occasions
during his testimony at trial. The district court stated:
First of all, when he denied taking A.L. out of Alabama to have sex.
It’s clear that his intent was to have sex with A.L. in Tennessee as
well as in Ohio, and, in fact, he did [and] . . . independently and
separately . . . [Mr. Partin] clearly perjured himself and obstructed
justice when he claimed that he had sex with A.L., his step-daughter,
because she sneaked into his bed and he mistook her for an older
woman.
D.E. 329 at 10 (alterations added).
Mr. Partin raises four issues on appeal. First, he argues that the district court
erred by denying his motion to suppress his pre-Miranda statements to officers
because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him, and even if they had
reasonable suspicion, the stop matured into a custodial detention before he was
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given his Miranda warnings. Second, Mr. Partin contends that the district court
abused its discretion by admitting DNA evidence demonstrating that he was the
father of A.L.’s child because the evidence was not relevant and because its
prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. Third, Mr. Partin asserts that the
district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the
government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he transported A.L. out
of state with the intent to engage in unlawful activity with her. Finally, Mr. Partin
claims that the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for
obstruction of justice.
II
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, legal rulings are subject to
de novo review and factual findings are reviewable for clear error. See United
States v. Watkins, 760 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2014). We consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government, which prevailed below. See id. We
are not restricted to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, and may
consider the record as a whole. See United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1185
(11th Cir. 2011). Additionally, we afford substantial deference to the district
court’s credibility determinations, both explicit and implicit. See United States v.
Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012).
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The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. Not all interactions
between law enforcement and citizens, however, implicate the Fourth Amendment.
See Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1185. Only when an officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen, may a court
conclude that a seizure has occurred. See id.There are three broad categories of police-citizen encounters for purposes of
our Fourth Amendment analysis: (1) police-citizen exchanges involving no
coercion or detention; (2) brief seizures or investigatory detentions; and (3) full-
scale arrests. See United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 777 (11th Cir. 2006). With
regard to the second category of police-citizen encounters, the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit a police officer in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner from approaching a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior, even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest. See Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186.
Pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), law enforcement officers may
seize a suspect for a brief, investigatory stop. Such a stop, known generally as a
Terry stop, and can be conducted where the officer has reasonable suspicion that
the subject was involved in, or is about to be involved in, criminal activity, and the
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stop “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.” Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186.
Reasonable suspicion requires more than just a hunch; it demands that the
totality of the circumstances create, at least, some minimal level of objective
justification for the belief that the person was or is engaged in unlawful activity.
See United States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 1572, 1576 (11th Cir. 1995). The Supreme
Court has firmly rejected the argument that a reasonable cause for an investigative
stop can only be based on the officer’s personal observation, rather than on
information supplied by another person. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct.
1683, 1688 (2014). In fact, where the information received can be corroborated by
officers, it is sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. See id. Additionally, police may also draw on their own experience and
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative
information available to them. See United States v. Lindsay, 482 F.3d 1285, 1290–
91 (11th Cir. 2007). Whether reasonable suspicion exists is determined by
considering the totality of the circumstances. See Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186.
We agree with the district court’s alternative finding that Mr. Partin was the
subject of a Terry stop and there was reasonable suspicion for the officers to stop
him. The officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop based on the report
they had received from a park employee regarding possible criminal activity and
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their own initial observations at the scene. We disagree with Mr. Partin’s
argument that the stop matured into a custodial detention for which Miranda
warnings were required. The stop did not exceed its scope, and Mr. Partin was not
subjected to the same type of inherently coercive environment as a stationhouse
interrogation.
Miranda warnings are required only when a defendant is “in custody,”
meaning that there has been either a formal arrest or a restraint on the defendant’s
freedom of movement that is of the degree associated with a formal arrest. See
United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2006). Whether a person is
in custody “depends on whether under the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonable man in his position would feel a restraint on his freedom of movement
to such extent that he would not feel free to leave.” United States v. Brown, 441
F.3d 1330, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Relevant factors include the
location and duration of the questioning, the statements made during the interview,
whether the defendant was physically restrained, and whether the defendant was
released after questioning. See Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012).
Not all restraints on a person’s freedom of movement constitute custody for
purposes of Miranda. Courts must determine “whether the relevant environment
present[ed] the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house
questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. at 1190. In making that determination, we
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have considered whether the circumstances were such that a reasonable person
would have “believe[d] that he was utterly at the mercy of the police, away from
the protection of any public scrutiny, and had better confess or else.” United States
v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1150 (11th Cir. 2004). . Because the custody standard is
objective, the subjective beliefs of the defendant and the officer as to whether the
defendant was free to leave are irrelevant. See Brown, 441 F.3d at 1347.
In distinguishing between a Terry stop and an arrest, we consider four
nonexclusive factors: “(1) the law enforcement purpose served by the detention;
(2) the diligence with which the officers pursued the investigation; (3) the scope
and intrusiveness of the investigation; and (4) the duration of the detention.”
Street, 472 F.3d at 1306. In balancing these factors, we focus on “whether the
police diligently pursued a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.”
Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
First, in analyzing the law enforcement purposes served by the detention, the
most important consideration is whether the police quickly and with minimum
interference pursued a method of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel
their suspicions. See Acosta, 363 F.3d at 1146. Here, Officer Morrison
approached the vehicle and asked for identification to confirm the ages of the
passengers. Given that the park employee’s report was that the female passenger
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was young and possibly a minor, asking for identification to determine age was the
quickest method to confirm or dispel the suspicion that A.L. might be a minor.
Second, “we ask whether the police were diligent in pursuing their
investigation, that is, whether the methods the police used were carried out without
unnecessary delay.” Id. The record indicates that the officers were diligent and
that the methods they used did not create unnecessary delay. Although separating
A.L. and Mr. Partin created some delay because Officer Morrison had to walk up
and down the hill to communicate with each of them, this was necessary under the
circumstances. Separation, and any extra time spent corroborating their stories,
was reasonable to get the truth from A.L. about her identity and age without any
pressure from Mr. Partin for her to lie.
Third, “we ask whether the scope and intrusiveness of the detention
exceeded the amount reasonably needed by police to ensure their personal safety.”
Id. “While restriction on freedom of movement is a factor to be taken into account
in determining whether a person is under arrest, it alone is not sufficient to
transform a Terry stop into a de facto arrest.” Id. at 1147 (citation omitted). Until
Mr. Partin was handcuffed, his freedom of movement was only restricted with
regards to going up the hill to speak with A.L. Other than that, he was free to walk
around within the vicinity of his vehicle and smoke. Restricting Mr. Partin from
A.L. was necessary to ensure that officers could determine her age without Mr.
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Partin’s insistence that she was 18. Additionally, Mr. Partin was in possession of
his car keys and his cellphone the entire time. The only brief exception was when
Officer Morrison used the phone to write down the contact information of the
person who could be reached to find A.L.’s legal guardian.
The “final factor is whether the duration of the detention was reasonable.”
Id. From our discussion of the third factor, it is clear that the amount of time was
reasonable under the circumstances of this case. Although two hours may be
longer than a typical Terry stop, it was reasonably necessary in this case.
In summary, the stop did not evolve into a custodial detention for which
Miranda warnings were required because it did not exceed its scope. The district
court did not err in denying Mr. Partin’s motion to suppress his pre-Miranda
statements.
III
Next we turn to Mr. Partin’s challenge to the admission of the DNA
paternity evidence. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1123 (11th Cir. 2011).
Even if the district court’s ruling constitutes abuse of discretion, however, we will
reverse only if the error was not harmless. See id. An evidentiary error is harmless
unless, in light of the record as a whole, there is a reasonable likelihood that the
error had a substantial influence on the outcome of the proceeding. See id.17
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Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that although “[e]vidence of a
crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order
to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character,” such “evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.” Evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) if (1) the
evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character; (2) there is
sufficient proof to enable a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant committed the act(s) in question; and (3) the probative value of the
evidence cannot be substantially outweighed by undue prejudice, and the evidence
must satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See United States v. Ford, 784 F.3d
1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 2015).
Such evidence may be independently admissible if it arose out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, is necessary to
complete the story of the crime, or is inextricably intertwined with the evidence
regarding the charged offense. See id. Whether offered under Rule 404(b) or as
intrinsic evidence, the district court must find that the probative value of the
proffered evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice and that it
meets the other requirements of Rule 403. See id. In reviewing a district court’s
decision not to exclude evidence under Rule 403, we “view the evidence in the
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light most favorable to admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing
its undue prejudicial impact.” United States v. Bradberry, 466 F.3d 1249, 1253
(11th Cir. 2006).
The district court did not err in admitting the DNA evidence establishing Mr.
Partin as the father of A.L.’s child because it was relevant for a number of reasons.
First, it was relevant to Mr. Partin’s motive and intent for taking A.L. to
Tennessee. It also provided context as to why Mr. Partin took A.L. from her
medical appointment while she was in the custody of the DHR, and why he
attempted to flee to Mexico. Further, as the district court noted, the evidence was
relevant to refute Mr. Partin’s implied contention that A.L. was lying about her
relationship with him and the implication that Eric was the father of her child.
Finally, the probative value of the paternity test was not substantially
outweighed by any risk of unfair prejudice because there was other evidence in the
record, to which Mr. Partin did not object, from which the jury could have found
that Mr. Partin had a sexual relationship with his stepdaughter and inferred that he
was the father of her child. Even assuming the district court had erred in admitting
the paternity evidence, Mr. Partin has not demonstrated that the evidence had a
substantial prejudicial impact on the outcome of the trial.
IV
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We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal on
sufficiency of the evidence grounds. See United States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288,
1290 (11th Cir. 2011). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable
inferences and credibility choices in the government’s favor. See id. at 1290–91.
The evidence is sufficient if a reasonable trier of fact could find that it established
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Beckles, 565
F.3d 832, 840 (11th Cir. 2009).
Federal law prohibits the knowing transportation, in interstate commerce, of
an individual under the age of 18 with the intent to engage in criminal sexual
activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). To prove that Mr. Partin violated § 2423(a), the
government had to prove that he (1) knowingly transported A.L. in interstate
commerce; (2) A.L. was under the age of 18; and (3) Mr. Partin intended to engage
in criminal sexual activity with A.L. See id.
As to the element of intent, we have often noted the difficulty in establishing
a defendant’s state of mind. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1279
(11th Cir. 2003). Given this difficulty, intent most often is inferred from
circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Manoocher Nosrati-Shamloo, 255
F.3d 1290, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001). Thus, where there is some corroborative
evidence of the defendant’s guilt and the defendant testifies in his own defense, his
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testimony may by itself establish elements of the charged offense. See United
States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008). This is especially true of
subjective elements such as the defendant’s intent. See id. We have also noted
that the jury is allowed to disbelieve the defendant and to infer that the opposite of
his testimony is true. See United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1211 (11th
Cir. 2002).
Here, the government presented evidence that Mr. Partin took A.L. across
state lines, had intercourse with her, and had her perform oral sex on him. Mr.
Partin claimed in his trial testimony that the intention of his traveling from
Alabama to Tennessee was for the purpose of starting a new life with his family
and that the trip to Ohio was to allow A.L. to live with the family again and not
with child services. But the jury was free to reject his testimony and conclude that
it was not true. Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Mr. Partin
acted with the requisite intent for violating § 2423(a), and the district court did not
err in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.
V
Mr. Partin’s last argument concerns the district court’s sentencing
enhancement for obstruction. The government bears the burden of establishing the
facts necessary to support a sentencing enhancement by a preponderance of the
evidence. See United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779, 783 (11th Cir. 2007).
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We review a district court’s interpretation and application of the advisory
sentencing guidelines to the facts de novo, and review its findings of fact for clear
error. See United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2011).
A factual finding is clearly erroneous when, upon review of the evidence, we are
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See id. at
1195. Additionally, we give substantial deference to the district court’s implicit
and explicit credibility determinations concerning witness testimony. See Lewis,
674 F.3d at 1303.
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement if the
defendant willfully obstructs or attempts to obstruct the administration of justice
with regard to the prosecution of his offense of conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
Obstruction of justice includes perjury. See id., comment. (n.4(B)). In the context
of § 3C1.1, we have defined perjury as “false testimony concerning a material
matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of
confusion, mistake or faulty memory.” United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 981
(11th Cir. 2015). See also U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n.2).
Mr. Partin argues that the application of § 3C1.1 constituted error. We
disagree.
In finding that the obstruction of justice enhancement applies, a district court
should clearly and separately address each element of its perjury finding. See
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Case: 15-11008 Date Filed: 12/16/2015 Page: 23 of 23
United States v. Equanazi, 752 F.3d 912, 938 (11th Cir. 2014). We may, however,
“affirm a district court’s enhancement even absent particularized findings
regarding the defendant’s perjury so long as the district court found in general that
the defendant’s testimony was perjurious as to material matters and the record
supports that finding.” United States v. Hatney, 80 F.3d 458, 463 (11th Cir. 1996)
(citing United States v. Dobbs, 11 F.3d 152, 155 (11th Cir. 1994)).
The district court did not err in finding that Mr. Partin perjured himself on
material matters when he denied taking A.L. out of Alabama with the intent to
engage in criminal sexual activity. We give substantial deference to the district
court’s decision to credit A.L.’s testimony over Mr. Partin’s regarding the sexual
activity that occurred on the two trips, and other evidence presented at trial
supports the district court’s finding. As such, the district court did not err in
applying the obstruction of justice enhancement.
VI
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Mr. Partin’s convictions and
sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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