United States v. Jeffrey Stringer , 636 F. App'x 770 ( 2016 )


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  •               Case: 15-12102     Date Filed: 01/26/2016   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-12102
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 9:98-cr-08005-DTKH-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JEFFREY STRINGER,
    a.k.a. Jeffery Stringer,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (January 26, 2016)
    Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 15-12102     Date Filed: 01/26/2016   Page: 2 of 7
    Defendant Jeffrey Stringer, proceeding with counsel, appeals the district
    court’s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) and Amendment 782 of the Sentencing Guidelines. After careful
    review, we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    In 1998, a federal grand jury charged Defendant with: (1) manufacturing
    cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) (“Count 1”); (2) possession
    with intent to distribute cocaine base (“Count 2”), in violation of § 841(a)(1); and
    (3) possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of § 841(a)(1) (“Count
    3”). Prior to trial, the Government filed a notice of enhancement based on
    Defendant’s prior convictions pursuant to 
    21 U.S.C. § 851
    (a)(1). Defendant
    proceeded to trial and a jury convicted him on all three counts in the indictment.
    In anticipation of sentencing, the probation officer prepared Defendant’s
    Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). The PSR indicated that Defendant was
    a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 because he had two prior convictions for
    either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. Because the statutory
    maximum for at least one of the Defendant’s present offenses was life
    imprisonment, Defendant’s career offender status resulted in a base offense level
    of 37. Receiving no reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Defendant’s total
    offense level was 37. Due to his numerous prior convictions and his career
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    offender designation, the PSR assigned Defendant a criminal history category of
    VI. Based on a total offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of VI, the
    PSR calculated Defendant’s initial guideline range as 360 months to life.
    However, because the statutory mandatory minimum for Counts 1 and 2 was life,
    Defendant’s guideline range for those counts was life imprisonment. As to Count
    3, which carried a statutory maximum of 360 months, Defendant’s guideline range
    was 360 months’ imprisonment.
    The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment as to Counts 1
    and 2, and 360 months’ imprisonment as to Count 3, to run concurrently with each
    other. On appeal, we affirmed.
    In January 2015, Defendant filed a letter with the district court regarding his
    eligibility for a sentence reduction. The district court construed his letter as a
    motion for sentence reduction pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) and Amendment
    782 to the Sentencing Guidelines, and appointed the Office of the Federal Public
    Defender to represent Defendant.
    The district court ultimately denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that, as
    a career offender, Defendant was not eligible for a sentence reduction. Defendant
    moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the district court. Defendant now
    appeals from that decision, arguing that he is eligible for a sentence reduction
    based on Amendment 782. He contends that the district court improperly relied on
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    his status as a career offender in finding that he was ineligible for relief because
    one of his predicate offenses was not a crime of violence in light of the Supreme
    Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. at __, 
    135 S. Ct. 2551
    (2015).
    II. DISCUSSION
    We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions on the scope of its
    authority under § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Jones, 
    548 F.3d 1366
    , 1368 (11th
    Cir. 2008). Under § 3582(c)(2), a district court may modify a term of
    imprisonment when the original sentencing range has subsequently been lowered
    as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines by the Sentencing Commission. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2).
    When determining whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction, a
    district court is to consider only the effect of the applicable guideline amendment,
    and all other original sentencing determinations are to remain the same. United
    States v. Bravo, 
    203 F.3d 778
    , 780–81 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Dillon v. United
    States, 
    560 U.S. 817
    , 831 (2010) (holding that the alleged sentencing errors that the
    Defendant sought to correct were not affected by the applicable guideline
    amendment and were therefore outside the scope of the § 3582(c)(2) proceedings).
    In order to be eligible for a sentence reduction, a defendant must identify an
    amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines that is listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d).
    4
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    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1). However, a district court may not use a guideline
    amendment to reduce a defendant’s sentence unless the amendment actually lowers
    the defendant’s applicable guideline range. Id. 1B1.10(a)(2)(B); id. § 1B1.10,
    comment. (n.1(A)). Moreover, in cases where a guideline amendment would lower
    a defendant’s otherwise-applicable guideline range, the district court lacks
    jurisdiction to consider a § 3582(c)(2) motion if the defendant’s guideline range
    was based on a statutory mandatory minimum sentence. United States v. Liberse,
    
    688 F.3d 1198
    , 1201 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mills, 
    613 F.3d 1070
    ,
    1076–78 (11th Cir. 2010).
    Amendment 782 reduced the base offense level for most drug offenses by
    two levels. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d); U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 782 (2014).
    Amendment 782 did not make any changes to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, the career
    offender guideline. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 782 (2014).
    When a defendant is sentenced as a career offender, his base offense level is
    determined by § 4B1.1, not under the Drug Quantity Table set forth in U.S.S.G.
    § 2D1.1(c). U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1; United States v. Moore, 
    541 F.3d 1323
    , 1327 (11th
    Cir. 2008). In Moore, we considered whether defendants who were sentenced as
    career offenders under § 4B1.1 were eligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief in light of
    Amendment 706, which like Amendment 782, lowered the § 2D1.1(c) base offense
    levels for certain quantities of crack cocaine. 
    541 F.3d at 1325
    . We held that the
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    defendants did not qualify for § 3582(c)(2) relief because Amendment 706 had no
    effect on their applicable guideline ranges, which had been calculated under
    § 4B1.1. Id. at 1327–28, 1330; see also United States v. Lawson, 
    686 F.3d 1317
    ,
    1321 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that Moore remained binding precedent and that
    Amendment 750 did not lower the guideline range for career offenders).
    Here, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s § 3582(c)(2)
    motion. Defendant’s total offense level and applicable guideline range were not
    based on the drug quantity offense levels in § 2D1.1, but instead were based on the
    career offender level in § 4B1.1. Because Defendant’s guideline range was not
    based on the drug quantity guidelines, Amendment 782 did not lower the
    sentencing range upon which Defendant’s sentence was based. 1 See Lawson, 686
    F.3d at 1321; Moore, 
    541 F.3d at
    1327–28, 1330.
    Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that his amended guideline
    range should be calculated without respect to his career offender designation given
    the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson. We review sentencing challenges raised
    for the first time on appeal for plain error. 2 United States v. Moreno, 
    421 F.3d 1
    Notwithstanding Defendant’s career offender designation, Defendant would also be ineligible
    for a sentence reduction with respect to Counts 1 and 2 because his applicable guideline range
    was based on the statutory mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment. Liberse, 688 F.3d at
    1201. He would, however, be eligible for a sentence reduction as to Count 3 because his
    guideline range was not based on any statutory mandatory minimum sentence.
    2
    Under plain error review, we will reverse where there is “(1) an error (2) that is plain and
    (3) that has affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and . . . (4) the error seriously affects the
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    1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 2005). But Defendant cannot show that the district court
    erred plainly, or otherwise, because the district court was only permitted to
    consider the effect of the guideline amendment and was required to leave all
    original sentencing determinations intact. Bravo, 
    203 F.3d at
    780–81; see also
    Dillon, 
    560 U.S. at 831
    . In short, Defendant cannot challenge his career offender
    designation in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. Accordingly, the district court
    committed no error in concluding that Defendant was ineligible for a sentence
    reduction under § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782.
    AFFIRMED.
    fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Madden, 
    733 F.3d 1314
    , 1322 (11th Cir. 2013).
    7